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Bill Charles* The Story of Law Reform in Nova Scotia:
A Perilous Enterprise
The basic or overarching question addressed by the author is why institutional
law reform in Nova Scotia has experienced such operational difficulties and
challenges, particularly in relation to funding, to the point where it can be
described as a perilous enterprise. In the process of searching for an answer
to this question, the author examines the origins and development of organized
law reform in Nova Scotia over the last 65 years, with special attention paid to
the experience of Nova Scotia's two statutory commissions. As a backdrop to
the discussion, the author examines the complicated process of law reform itself
and suggests reasons why governments are not the most suitable agencies to
carry out this type of work. Finally, the author provides suggestions as to why
governments appear to have such difficulty providing consistent and adequate
funding for independent law reform commissions.
La question fondamentale ou primordiale abordde par /'auteur est de savoir
pourquoi la rdforme du droit institutionnel en Nouvelle-Ecosse a connu de
telles difficultbs et ddfis opdrationnels, particulibrement en ce qui concerne le
financement, au point qu'elle peut 6tre d~crite comme une entreprise pdrilleuse.
Dans le processus de recherche d'une rdponse 6 cette question, /'auteur examine
les origines et /'6volution de la rdforme du droit organis6 en Nouvelle-Ecosse
au cours des 65 dernibres anndes, en accordant une attention particulibre 6
/'expdrience des deux commissions dorigine lgislative de la Nouvelle-Ecosse.
Comme toile de fond de la discussion, /'auteur examine le processus complexe
de la rdforme du droit en tant que telle et propose des raisons pour lesquelles les
gouvernements ne sont pas les mieux places pour mener 6 bien ce type de travail.
Enfin, /'auteur propose des hypotheses expliquant pourquoi les gouvernements
semblent avoir autant de difficultd 6 fournir un financement coherent et addquat
pour les commissions de rdforme ind~pendantes.
* William H Charles, QC, Professor Emeritus of the Schulich School of Law was Dean of the Law
School from 1979 to 1985. Through most of his career, Professor Charles supported and was involved
with law reform in Nova Scotia.
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Introduction
The legal system and its constituent parts, like an old automobile, require
constant attention, maintenance and repair. Principles and rules that make
up the substance of the law, together with the supporting institutions,
practices and procedures that provide our society with law and order and
the way to settle our disputes, need to be constantly monitored and updated.
The process of doing this we call law reform. It is a process that is crucial
to the support and maintenance of the rule of law. Law reform can be
carried out by different agencies or organizations and can be sporadic or
continuous. In this paper we will focus our attention upon two Nova Scotia
agencies created by statute to carry out continuous law reform. Called Law
Reform Commissions, the first was created in 1969 and given the title
of an "Advisory Commission."' The second was brought to life in 1990
and described as "An Independent Commission." 2 Although our main
emphasis will be upon the operations of these two statutory bodies, we
will also explore some general themes or issues inherent in the law reform
process as a whole in order to provide a general backdrop against which to
examine the roles, achievements and experiences of our two commissions.
The whole process of carrying on or doing law reform work is far
from simple and usually involves issues or problems that are common to
all law reform agencies. The car analogy mentioned above tends to give
the impression that law reform is a simple process, but it is not. We begin
our more general discussion of the law reform process with a closer look at
such issues as how law reform commissions approach their work, the work
method they employ and the limits of law reform. Also discussed will be
the machinery of government and its role in law reform, why governments
cannot do a proper job of law reform, and the general characteristics of
law reform commissions. In the context of law reform in Nova Scotia
specifically, we will examine early attempts at law reform in the province
prior to the creation of the first law reform commission in 1969. We will
then proceed to a fairly detailed review and analysis of the two law reform
commissions. An overarching question, based upon the experience in
Nova Scotia and elsewhere, is whether continuous law reform, as carried
out by a law reform commission, is a sustainable activity in Nova Scotia
particularly and if not, why not?
1. An Act to Provide for a Law Reform Advisory Commission, SNS, 1969, C 14, as amended by
SNS, 1976, C 37.
2. An Act to Establish an Independent Law Reform Commission, SNS, 1990, C 17. Given Royal
Assent 19 June 1990.
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In the late 1960's and early 70's in Canada each of the common law
provinces and the federal government had statutorily created law reform
commissions or other institutions established to carry out continuous law
reform.3 By 2015, (and some 45 years later) only six of the original ten
organizations remain in operation. Of the six, only three remained as
government-created and government-funded institutions. Nova Scotia was
one of these, the other two being Manitoba and Saskatchewan. British
Columbia's commission had been terminated and reinstated as a non-
statutory non-governmental body, as was the case in Ontario. Only two of
the original ten commissions could boast of continuous, non-interrupted
operation (Manitoba and Saskatchewan) both of which were small in size
and budget.4
In Nova Scotia, the first Advisory Commission lasted ten years before it
succumbed in 1981 because appointments of commissioners were allowed
to lapse and new ones were not appointed. The Second Commission
was created in 1990 and continued in full operation until 2016 when
the government withdrew its funding.' Under the original non-statutory
arrangement established in 1990, the Nova Scotia government committed
itself to providing $150,000.00 or 50 percent of the Commission's total
budget of $300,000.00 with the Law Foundation of Nova Scotia6 agreeing
to pay a matching amount of $150,000.00, if revenues permitted. However,
an unexpected substantial drop in interest rates shortly after the Second
Commission began operations in 1991, forced the Law Foundation to
decrease its funding to the extent that it could only provide 33 percent
of the Commission's budget for the first ten years of operation. As a
result, the government's contribution increased from 50 percent to 66.6
percent, but the average budget of the Commission for the first ten years
was $248,672.00, rather than the $300,000.00 originally planned. Over
3. See Peter Hanford, "The Changing Face of Law Reform" (1999) 73 Austl LJ 503 at 513-516 for
one account of the rise and fall of law reform commissions. For another account, see WH Hurlburt,
"The Origins and Nature of Law Reform Commissions in the Canadian Provinces: A Reply to
'Recommissioning Law Reform' by Professor RA Macdonald" (1997) 35:4 Alta L Rev 880.
4. The Manitoba Commission, created in 1970, suffered an hiatus in operations from 1987-1990.
(See WH Hurlburt, "A Case for the Reinstatement of the Manitoba Law Reform Commission" (1998)
25:2 Man LJ 215. In 1997 the Manitoba Government cut its funding dramatically from $400,000 to
$50,000 at p 238.)
5. On 8 June 2015, the Liberal government of Nova Scotia notified the Commissionthat government
funding of the Commission would cease as of 31 March 2016. This decision is not mentioned in the
Commission's Annual Report, covering the period 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2016 (but it is referred to
in a letter from the Commission's President to the Premier dated 24 September 2015 [unpublished]).
6. The Law Foundation of Nova Scotia is a public fund created by an amendment to the Barristers
and Solicitors Act in 1976, SNS 1976, c 22. The foundation is largely funded by the interest which
lawyers receive on money held in trust for clients.
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the entire span of twenty-six years (1990-2016) government funding has
averaged 53.4 percent of the Commission's budget. The decision in 2016
by the government to terminate funding appeared to deliver a fatal blow
to the Commission. Although not legally dead, since 1 March 2016, the
Commission has been on life support and, if resuscitated, is not expected
to resume operations in the same form as the statutory body. The Nova
Scotia government had previously withdrawn funding in 2001, but the
commission was able to maintain its operations with the critical financial
support of the Law Foundation.'
The above short, historical account cannot help but raise the question
why is institutional law reform so precarious an enterprise in Nova Scotia?
Why is government funding, in particular, so questionable or uncertain?
After reviewing in more detail the operations and activities of both Nova
Scotia commissions, an attempt will be made to answer these questions.
I. Some preliminary considerations
1. Law reform- What is it? What does it mean?
The question invariably evokes a variety of different answers by writers
and speakers on the subject.' One legal commentator has suggested that
the term "has no exact, objective meaning,"9 but usually refers to some
program for changing the law with the implication that the change is for
the better.o Hurlburt, in his excellent book, Law Reform Commissions in
the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada adopts a definition found in
the Oxford Companion to Law which places the same emphasis upon "the
alteration of the law in some respect with the view to its improvement."11
This definition will be used as a working definition throughout this paper.
Law reformers propose changes to the law with the intention and hope
that the changes will improve the law. But what constitutes improvement
in their minds? Do they have a concept of some ideal law that embodies the
qualities of fairness, justness, efficiency, and clarity; and is enforceable;
that maximizes freedom and accords with prevailing social values and
needs of society; against which to measure their proposed improvements?
It would be comforting to think so, but is that actually the case? We also
7. Eleventh Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 2001-2002 (Halifax)
at 4 [Eleventh Annual Report].
8. The problem is discussed at some length by Hurlburt, Law Reform Commissions in the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada (Edmonton: Juriliber, 1986) at 3-9.
9. Lawrence M Fridman, "Law Reform in Historical Perspective" (1969) 13 Saint Louis ULJ 351,
quoted in Hurlburt, ibid at 4.
10. Ibid.
11. Supra note 8 at 6, citing David M Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1980) at 729.
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need to realize that there are important differences between the process
involved in proposing changes to the law, the actual changes that result
therefrom, and the consequences of the proposed changes, if and when the
proposals become legislated into law. Intention to make changes can be
known, as well as the proposed changes themselves, but the consequences
of the proposed changes cannot always be known in advance with any
degree of certainty. Improvements in the law that are intended and hoped
for do not always happen as planned.
The concept of law reform, therefore, is not quite as simple as one
might think, and, to compound the difficulty, the concept or meaning of
law itself in the abstract is just as difficult to pin down. Furthermore, the
word "law" can also mean different things to different people in different
contexts.12 Anglo-Canadian usage of the term law usually refers to it as a
collection of rules or principles of conduct established either by legislative
authority, court decisions or established custom.13 Another definition, in
the same Anglo-Canadian tradition, emphasizes the fact that these rules
and principles are imposed upon individuals and enforced with sanctions
if not followed, as is illustrated by the following definition of law as: "A
body of rules for the guidance of human conduct which are imposed upon,
and enforced among, the members of a given state.""
A less positivistic or philosophic view of the law is that expressed by
a Canadian legal academic who stressed that:
Law is not brute fact, but is a fragile human accomplishment, which is at
once a powerful and dynamic human institution. It reflects, at the same
time as it helps to shape, the character of a society. Law is a powerful
lense through which citizens are able to view and judge their society.
Over time, it comes to express citizens' beliefs and convictions as well
as their prejudices and pathologies."
However, we have to remember that law is merely one part, although a
very important part, of an overall functioning legal system.
When the discussion about law turns to the nature and purposes of
law the meaning of law tends to change. As a former federal minister of
justice has explained "...law is not just a 'technical body of rules'; it is
12. Gerald L Gall, The Canadian Legal System (Toronto: Carswell Company, 1977) at 13, citing
Derham, Maher & Waller, An Introduction to Law (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1966) at 182
suggests several different definitions of law that have been used historically.
13. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 9.
14. Gall, supra note 12 at 3, citing Philip S James, Introduction to English Law (London:
Butterworths, 1972) at 5.
15. Professor RA Macdonald, "Law Reform For Dummies" (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall U 859 at
871.
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the organizing principle for the re-configuration of society. Law is not
just an agency of social control; it articulates the values by which men
seek to live."1 6 Another description of the function of law emphasizes two
purposes. First, the law serves to regulate the affairs or interrelationships of
all persons in society, whether individuals, corporations or governments.
Second, law sets a standard of conduct and morality for the guidance
of citizens in a society." As one renowned American legal scholar has
explained, law is the "quest for good and workable arrangements for
facilitating human interaction.""
Because our society is based upon the principle of the rule of law,
the health or condition of that law is and should be of vital importance to
us. Virtually all aspects of a person's life are affected by the over-arching
pressure of the law. That law and the legal system for its administration
must command the respect of its citizens if it is to be effective. A legal
system that corrodes or deteriorates and ceases to provide justice will
inevitably engender disrespect in the population. The concept of the rule
of law involves the principle that all persons in society, whether private
individuals or government officials, are equally subject to the law. No one
is above the law. "History shows that a nation which neglects the ordinary
care of its laws is neglecting something which is very important to its
national well being."19
2. How law reform commissions approach law reform
Ideally, a law reform commission embarking on the task of reforming the
law should start with a well-thought-out plan of action. The plan will usually
be based to a large extent on the kind of statutory mandate the commission
has been given. That mandate might be very broad, as illustrated by that
of the United Kingdom Law Reform Commission, which was charged
with "keep[ing] under review all the law with which they are... concerned
with a view to its systematic development and reform." 20 A similar broad
mandate was given to the Law Commission of Canada which required the
Commission to "study and keep under review... the laws of Canada with a
view to making recommendations for their improvements, modernization
16. Hon John Turner, "Law for the Seventies: A Manifesto for Law Reform" (1971) 17:1 McGill LJ
1 at 2.
17. Gall, supra note 12 at 1.
18. Lon L Fuller, "American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin Patterson's
Jurisprudence Men and Ideas of the Law" (1954) 6:4 J Leg Educ 457, cited in RA Macdonald, supra
note 15 at 872 n 33.
19. UK, Law Commission, Twenty-Eighth AnnualReport: 1993 (No 223) (BAILII) at 1. Quoted by
Hanford, supra note 3 at 518 n 97.
20. Law Commissions Act 1965 (UK), C 22, s 3(1).
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and reform, ... responsive to the changing needs of modem Canadian
society and of individual members in that society."2 1
By way of contrast, a statutory mandate may be much more limited,
as is the case in Nova Scotia, where the first Advisory Commission was
limited to reviewing very specific parts of the law as requested by the
Department of the Attorney General and to recommending proposals for
change.22 If a commission's mandate is a broad one, such as "to review all
the law of the province,"23 the commission, as part of its action plan, would
have to consider a series of important questions such as the following:
What is to be included in the term "law"? What meaning should the
commission attribute to it? Where does a systematic review of "the law"
begin? What is to be considered a defect or deficiency in the law? How are
defects or deficiencies to be identified? What changes in the law will need
to be made in order to cure or correct the flaws and make "the law" better
(or to improve it?)
Each of the above questions requires elaboration.
The law
Somehow commissioners will have to reach a consensus about their
understanding of what "the law" entails. As already noted, the concept
of "law" is understood differently, depending upon the philosophical
outlook of the person considering the question. As a practical matter this
question may not be expressly addressed by some commissions at all with
commissioners just assuming that there is a common understanding of the
term.
The starting point Identifying defects
How does a commission with a broad mandate select the starting point for
its reform work? It may decide to establish an order of priority by selecting
an area of law that is thought to be most in need of reform, but what
criteria will it use to determine this and other areas? How will deficiencies
be identified? The answer, of course, is that the commission will have to
do extensive background research and collect data, both legal and nonlegal
to outline the nature and scope of the defects. Some defects may involve
language that is ambiguous or out of date. In other situations the legal
rules may be in conflict with each other and in need of reconciliation. In
still other circumstances the rule or rules may have been drafted in a way
21. Law Reform Commission Act, SC 1969-70, c64, s 11.
22. Supra note 1, s 4.
23. As was the directive given by the Nova Scotia Legislature to the 2nd Independent Law
Commission in section four of the Law Reform Commission Act, supra note 2.
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that makes them unduly complicated or complex making them difficult
for the reader to understand. In some cases the problem may be not in
the language or its construction, but in the fact that there is a gap in the
law, revealing an area of human activity that requires legal regulation but
which has somehow escaped legal coverage. The oversight may be the
fault of the drafters or it may be that social conditions have changed.
Finding solutions
Once the legal defect or defects have been identified the commission
must then decide how to remedy the defect by creating and providing an
effective legal solution that will improve the law. In cases where the issue
or problem is a matter of form, involving ambiguous, unduly complex or
out-of-date language, or even a gap in the law, the solution may be easily
found. But in other situations the difficulty may be in the fact that existing
laws are unsuitable because they produce unjust results, in some cases
because serious ethical or moral considerations are involved, reflecting
basic social values. In these cases, in our pluralistic society it might be
difficult to find a social consensus to support a proposed solution. In cases
where the commission has been able to identify more than one potential
solution, it may have to choose between them and try to assess, as best it
can, which one will improve the law the most.
As one experienced law reformer has explained: "Law reform is the
process of identifying and clarifying standards of performance for the legal
order and of finding and implementing ways of maximizing achievements
of those standards." 2 4
Because many persons who serve as commissioners are legally
trained, as either practitioners, judges, retired judges, or academics, it is
likely they will be guided in making these difficult decisions by values
they are familiar with, such as fairness, efficiency, justness, clarity and
enforceability. In addition, the ideal law should try to maximize individual
freedom and conform to social values. But social values in general are
"as unruly a herd of horses as are those values which are embodied in
what is technically called 'public policy."' 25 Values that law reformers
claim or appear to be pursuing are sometimes inconclusive or vague.
Law reformers will also be influenced in their decision making by their
unspoken personal values.
24. JN Lyon, "Law Reform Needs Reform" (1974) 12:2 Osgoode Hall U at 429. Hurlburt, supra
note 8 describes the process somewhat differently as "...including the selection and application of
values and the development and implementation of proposals for specific law reforms." at 9.
25. Hurlburt, supra note 8at 295 who also outlines some of the general values which often serve as
a guide for law commissioners as they make their difficult decision at 267-269.
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The foregoing discussion should make it clear that the law reform
process requires law reform commissions to address and to try to answer
a series of very difficult questions. Law reform is not for the faint of
heart. The extent to which individual commissioners consciously develop
an action plan and address these questions in an organized way will no
doubt vary, and in some cases a plan may not be developed at all. Some
commissions may be totally reactive, that is, they respond primarily
to suggested reforms as passed on to them by other people rather than
attempting at the outset to develop a philosophy of reform or criteria for
selecting areas to be reformed.
3. Limitations on law reform commissions: Lawyers'law or social
policy law or both?
Law reform commissions do have their limits in that they are primarily
oriented towards reform of the law, as well as legal and government
institutions and how they operate, with their most common output being
proposed legislation.2 6 They are not expected to solve all the social problems
of society by pursuing a program of social reform.2 7 Because commissions
are usually composed of a majority of legally-trained persons, with just
a sprinkling of nonlawyers, they tend to be more comfortable dealing
with what is known as lawyers' law, technical law or private law. They
are more at home dealing with rules that they encounter professionally
and the practices and institutions associated with the administration and
application of those rules. Lawyers are less inclined to delve into reform
measures that involve significant social policy issues.2 8 These are reform
issues that are designed to accomplish changes in the social order, such as
a transfer of economic, political or social power from one group to another
to correct a perceived imbalance in society. This kind of law change in
a democratic system of government is generally reserved to an elected
legislature and often involves issues of political partisanship. Changing the
eligibility of citizens to vote, changing the tax laws or social entitlements
26. This point is forcibly made by Hurlburt in response to criticism levelled at law commissions for
not addressing fundamental social problems by critics such as Professor R.A. Macdonald in his article
"Recommissioning Law Reform," supra note 3. Hurlburt also discusses the limits of law reform
commissions in his article, "A Case for the Re-instatement of the Manitoba Law Commission," supra
note 4. See also RA Samek, "A Case for Social Reform" (1977) 55:3 Can Bar Rev 409.
27. In his excellent book, Hurlburt discusses what the creators of law reform commission expect
from their creations, as well as the values applied by the Commissions. Supra note 8 Ch 5 at 250 ff.
28. Professor Geoffrey Sawer has suggested that "...in lawyers' law, policy or social purpose is
encapsulated in propositions-principles, rules, concepts and maxims-and an attempt is made
to proceed by propositional logic within that system whereas, in what I call the law of social
administration, social policy and purpose are directly apprehended and an attempt is made to proceed
by reference to them." See Sawer, "The Legal Theory of Law Reform" (1970) 20:2 UTLJ 183 at 192-
193.
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are some examples of social policy changes that commissions try to avoid.
There are other examples, such as the right-to-die legislation or same-
sex marriage provisions that not only invoke social policy but have the
added complication of raising serious ethical and moral principles as well.
Lawyers are thought to be no more better equipped to make decisions with
regard to these issues than are ordinary citizens and yet they may well be
called upon to do so as members of a law reform commission.
The predominance of lawyers on reform commissions has made the
appointment of nonlawyers an important issue for commissions and those
creating them. It is no wonder that critics of law reform commissions are of
the view that they have too narrow a focus when it comes to selecting law
reform projects and that they shy away from examining reform projects
that involve significant social policy decisions.2 9 It goes without saying
that most changes in the law, including even technical law, will have
some social consequences and in this sense involve some degree of social
policy. In the final analysis, what differentiates so called social policy law
from lawyers' law is the importance and significance of the social policy
changes that might result from the proposed reform. As Hurlburt points
out in his very valuable book, we must recognize that "... in relation to the
nature and function of law these categories are artificial because all law
embodies social policy; that for the same reason the term 'technical law'
can even be misleading; that the drawing of boundary between technical
law and social policy-law at any time involves much subjective judgment;
and that the boundary is constantly shifting."3 0 As the author goes on to say,
in order to have a useful discussion of the process of law reform in general
and the work and function of law reform commissions in particular, such
a distinction is necessary.31
4. How law reform commissions do their work
Law reform commissions usually work on a project-by-project basis since
it is impossible to reform all of the law at once. 32 But, if they are large
29. See, for example, Lyon, supra note 24, Macdonald, supra note 23, Samek, supra note 26, and
RA Macdonald, "Jamais deux sans trois.. Once Reform, Twice Commission, Thrice Law" (2007) 22:2
CJLS 117.
30. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 13-14, suggests that "technical law" be defined as "... law which
society at any given moment leaves to lawyers and which is comparatively 'rule bound' or which
is encapsulated in propositions in a system within which the law proceeds by propositional logic
in its attempted achievement of social purpose." Hurlburt goes on to define "social-policy law" as
"...law which society at any given moment reserves for development by Parliament and by the
ordinary machinery of government and which is comparatively free in its attempted achievement of
social purposes."
31. Ibid at 14.
32. Hurlburt, supra note 4 at 232.
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enough and have sufficient resources, they may be able to work on several
projects at the same time. Whether a commission is requested by the
Attorney General to review a particular part ofthe law of a particular statute
or they have by some process decided which part of the law to review on
their own, the commission goes through a series of well-recognized steps
or stages before issuing a final reform proposal.
The first stage and perhaps the most important, is that involving the
collection of research data, both legal and nonlegal, that is relevant to
the particular reform project underway. Accurate and complete research
data is, therefore, the starting point and foundation for a law reform
commission's reform process. It is clearly necessary first to determine
the state of the existing law in the area being reviewed, then to carefully
delineate the deficiencies, and finally, to explore potential solutions.
Research data usually includes legal information in the form of cases,
statutes, and regulations applicable to the legal area under review. It often
includes empirical data in the form of statistical information, social facts,
and social values. Legal data is normally easy to obtain, unlike empirical
information which often takes much time and effort to collect. Research
data can also include facts that describe potentially applicable solutions
that will eliminate deficiencies in the law. These potential cures are often
found in the reports of other law reform commissions which are frequently
consulted as part of the research process. It is also important to note that the
collection or compilation of research data is often the result of extensive
consultation with other law reform agencies and individuals who have
relevant knowledge in the area.
After the research stage is completed and research reports, often called
working papers, initial reports or sometimes study papers, are prepared
either by commission staff or external researchers, the commission goes
through a process of intensive discussion with research staff which
usually results in the production of a commission document often labelled
a discussion paper. This paper outlines the existing legal situation, the
deficiencies found, and offers tentative suggestions for change. The
discussion paper is circulated to interested and affected parties and their
comments are invited. After receiving feedback from the public and other
persons, the commission reviews it in detail and, if changes are required
to the discussion paper, they are made and a final report is then produced.
This report containing the proposals for reform is usually forwarded to
the Attorney General and circulated to the public as well. The Attorney
General and his or her staff review the commission proposals and either
act upon them, in whole or in part by drafting legislation to implement
them, or they are set aside without reason given to the commission for
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rejection. On occasion, commission reports are returned to the commission
for further review and further recommendations. Regretably, the primary
measure used to judge whether a commission is successful and worthy of
continued financial support is the number of commission proposals that
result in legislative change.
5. The machinery of government and law reform33
If law reform is so important, how does it get done in a modem state
without a law reform commission? Does the machinery of government
become engaged in law reform at all? One important aspect of good
government involves maintaining the provincial law in good condition
and responsive to the needs of society. The one institution of government
primarily responsible for the good governance of the province is the
provincial legislature operating within its constitutional jurisdiction.
Responsible government, as a theory, means that the responsibility for
legislative action rests primarily in the executive branch of government
spearheaded by the cabinet. Part of this responsibility involves initiating
new laws when deemed necessary, as well as making changes to existing
laws that are considered to be unsuitable. Unsuitable in this context may
mean laws that produce unjust or undesirable results, those that are out of
date in terms of language, or those that no longer produce satisfying social
results in tune with contemporary social interests or needs.
In theory, legislatures could organize themselves to design and carry
out a continuous program of law reform, but they have never done so.3 4
Legislative law making and law reform by contemporary legislatures
consist of examination and review of legislative proposals submitted to
the representative institutions by the cabinet which are either accepted or
rejected by the legislative body. Legislative bodies do enact reforms of the
law, but they usually do not have the capacity to do so in any substantial
or continuous way.3 5 The legislatures usually rely upon the executive to
originate legislation that changes the law, but the dominant purpose of the
executive is to devise and implement policies that will carry out a political
agenda, not to review the body of general law so that it will be more perfect
and function better for the benefit of those affected by it. The cabinet as
a whole pays little attention to systematic and continuous law reform.3 6
If a government does involve itself in law reform at all, the reforms it
33. For an excellent discussion of the machinery of government and its potential for law reform see
Hurlburt, supra note 4 at 218-220.
34. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 447.
35. Hurlburt, supra note 4 at 219.
36. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 447.
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usually initiates are most likely to be ad hoc reforms which are considered
to be important and necessary by those who control the political process.3 7
Sometimes a government department will carry out a review of an area
of law for which the department is administratively responsible when it
thinks that reform is needed.3 8
Legislatures and the executive may wish to delegate some of
their powers to subordinate bodies such as administrative tribunals
or administrators. But they cannot pass off the ultimate responsibility
for good government and effective laws to such bodies. It is true that
the subordinate creatures of the legislature can create law by passing
regulations as part of their task of implementing and applying legislative
provisions. Subject to judicial review, these regulations can change the law
they create insofar as it involves administrative practices, procedures and
policies. However, their primary role is not to change the law but rather to
carry out the administrative task assigned to them in the legislation by the
legislature, to flesh out and add detail to the general legislative provisions
in their parent statute. 3 9
Judges do make law, and, occasionally they make changes in the law.
In this sense they reform the law. Donoghue v. Stevenson" is a prime
example of how the courts bought about a major reform of the law of torts
by lowering the standard of fault required to support a claim in negligence.
But the court did not create the new standard for the sole purpose of
reforming the law per se. They changed the law to bring about what they
considered to be a more just result in the case before them. Courts are
established to adjudicate and any changes they make in the law are usually
incidental to adjudication. The judicial method is not a reforming method.
As one experienced law reform commissioner has expressed it:
The Judge should reason from legal principle and should not apply his
own view about social goals. While the judge's role in law making and
law reform is important, it is circumscribed by legal principle and by
statute, and it rarely extends to the systematic development of the law."
In addition to the normal or usual agencies of government such as the
legislature, the executive, and the administration, there are other external
bodies that engage in some aspect of what might be considered to be
37. Hurlburt, supra note 4 at 220.
38. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 447-448.
39. Hurlburt, supra note 4 at 220.
40. Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] UKHL 100 (BAILII), [1932] AC 562, cited by Hurlburt, supra
note 4 at 219.
41. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 447.
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law reform.4 2 For example, royal commissions, commissions of inquiry,
select committees of the House or the Legislature and task forces can be
used as fact finders and charged to investigate difficult problems, making
recommendations and findings. Royal commissions, for example, are
very suitable for dealing with complex, difficult problems that require
the collection of large amounts of information that must be reviewed and
assessed to produce an independent and well considered report. Similarly,
commissions of inquiry can be given "wide ranging investigative authority
to uncover facts concerning matters of public importance." They are often
able to "investigate, reform and educate in ways superiorto the mechanisms
available to the judicial and legislative branches of government."4 3
In situations where a government requires continuing advice upon a
subject, whether for use in the legislative process or otherwise, a standing
committee is often created. It can provide the government with scientific
or non-scientific advice based upon information or opinions provided by
experts. Atask force may also be assembled to investigate and provide either
factual data or opinion, or both, regarding a specific subject matter-such
as court restructuring." What distinguishes law reform carried out by law
reform agencies from reform efforts carried out by these various advisory
bodies is the commission's systematic, continuous review and analysis of
the entire body of laws, as well as legal institutions and practices, with the
purpose of revealing defects or shortcomings and proposing solutions."
It has been argued that the ordinary machinery of government, even
as supplemented by the useful work of external bodies, is still not able
to provide the kind of law reform needed to improve areas of the law
that are unsuited to the conditions to which they apply. What is lacking
is a systematic, continuous review of the law and the legal system as
a whole, one that is "not wholly dependent upon the exigencies of the
political process,"4 6 the kind of approach to reform that only a body like
a law reform commission dedicated to the task can provide. Canada's
former minister of justice went so far as to declare that the process of law
reform goes to the core of defining the kind of society we will have as a
Canadian people and the kinds of rights we will enjoy as individuals.4
42. As Hurlburt points out ibid at 449-450, where the author discusses the law reform roles and
capabilities of these external agencies.
43. Robert Centa & Patrick Macklem, "Securing Accountability Through Commissions of Inquiry:
ARole For the Law Commission of Canada" (2001) 39:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 117 at 119-120.
44. For example, the Report of the Nova Scotia Court Structure Task Force (Halifax: 1991) (Charles
Report 1991).
45. See the assessment by Hurlburt, supra note 8at 450-453.
46. Hurlburt, supra note 4 at 220.
47. See Turner, supra note 16 at 2, quoted by Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 181.
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These words were uttered with reference to the work of the Federal Law
Reform Commission, but they apply with equal validity to provincial law
commissions and to provincial laws.
Special features of law reform commissions
What is it about law reform commissions that sets them apart from other
organizations that engage in law reform and makes them particularly
suitable for systematic law reform work? The following special features
or characteristics have been identified and suggested as particularly
important for indepth research and extensive pubic consultation that is
such an important part of the modem law reform process.
* Commissions are, to a great extent, separate from the ordinary
machinery of government and independent of government bureaucracy
or any other group or sector of the community."
* They are intended to operate continuously over extended periods of
time with either full-time or part-time staff members.49
* They are usually small in size compared with other government or
non-governmental institutions.o
* The commissions are primarily composed of lawyers or judges with
only a minority of nonlawyers."1
* The decisions made by commissions are collective decisions
arrived at after intense discussion of issues by a team of carefully
selected individuals working together for extensive periods of time.
Commissioners are not necessarily experts in law reform but gain law
reform experience as they serve their terms as commissioners. 52
* Commissions do not legislate or make law except to the extent that
they put forth proposals for changes in the law that might become law
eventually, if accepted by the government and passed as legislative
enactments by the legislatures. However, their reports, whether
adopted or not by the government, become authoritative, accurate
statements of the existing law.53
* Commissions operate in the public arena in that their reports become
public documents and subject to public scrutiny and discussion. These
features or characteristics not only allow a law reform commission to
do the kind of fundamental research work and consultation that is so
48. Hurlburt, ibid at 454.
49. Hanford, supra note 3 at 507.
50. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 454.
51. Hurlburt, ibid, and Hanford, supra note 3 at 507.
52. Hanford, supra note 3 at 508-509.
53. Ibid.
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essential if effective reform of the law is to be achieved, but it also
provides for public input to the process and, hopefully, reduces public
suspicion of the process itself. It may engender public approval as
well. 4
II. The pre-commission era and law reform
1. Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity ofLegislation in
Canada
The Conference, a national agency, was organized by governments of the
provinces in 1918 underthe sponsorship ofthe Canadian Bar Association.
It has met annually since 1918 with the exception of one year, 1940.
It is composed of representatives from each of the ten provinces, the
territories, and the Government of Canada who each appoint three or more
representatives. In the past, they have included judges, members of the
offices of attorneys general, most often legislative counsel, practising
lawyers and law faculty members.
The purpose of the Conference was declared to be that of the
"simplification, systematization, and in a very considerable degree,
unification of the positive law of the provinces on a large variety of topics
affecting the transactions of every day business."5 6 The Conference was
intended to produce "uniform legislation on subjects common to all,
model acts of the best type, well drafted and carefully considered." 7 The
Conference was particularly concerned to eliminate conflicting decisions
of courts from different provinces dealing with the same legal issue and
arising out of identical or similar facts or different judicial interpretations
of the same or similar statutory provisions.
Although the expressed primary purpose of the Conference was to
achieve uniformity of legislation in Canada, the very process of preparing
54. Ibid.
55. Horace E Read, "Public Responsibilities of the Academic Law Teacher in Canada" (1961) 39:2
Can Bar Rev 232 at 235.
56. Ibid at 235, quoting Hon Lyman P Duff (Address delivered at the First Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Bar Association, 20 March 1915), Report of the Canadian Bar Association: 1915 at 58. See
also, LR MacTavish, "Uniformity of Legislation in Canada: An Outline" (1947) 25:1 Can Bar Rev 36.
57. Read, supra note 55 at 235-36: quoting President Teed (President's Address delivered at the
Sixth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada,
30 August 1923), Proceedings of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in
Canada at 20.
58. Read, ibid. The more specific purposes were declared to be "(a) to secure uniformity in the
lex scripta of provincial enactments governing the same activity or thing in commercial or kindred
subjects"; and "(b) to obviate conflicting decisions of courts from different provinces upon the same
question arising out of identical or similar facts and under statutes substantially alike in principle or
varying slightly only in phrases expressing those principles."
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"model acts" involving the rephrasing and rearranging of existing statutory
provisions inevitably resulted in some degree of reform, even if not
intended.5 9 In some cases, revisions of older uniform acts was deliberately
reformative,6 0 while in other situations the Conference developed model
legislation on subjects not covered by statute in the common law provinces,
and, in this sense, reformed the law.6 1 In 1965, the then President of the
Conference openly declared that the task of the Conference was "to reform
the law and not merely to codify it." 6 2 The view was not, however, shared
by all.63
By 1961, Nova Scotia had adopted nineteen "Model Acts." 64 As one
well known Canadian legal scholar, John Willis, observed, the Conference
had its greatest success getting uniform proposals adopted by the provinces
when "ironing out minor vaniations in statutes that are substantially
common to all provinces" and that it had the least amount of success when
it wandered into what he called "a mild form of law reform," citing the
Contributory Negligence Act as an example.6 5 Professor Willis also noted
that the Conference deliberately avoided dealing with areas of law like
taxation or regulatory legislation because these areas involved so much
policy which provinces wanted to control.6 6
Practices or procedures of the Conference67
Proposals or suggestions for subjects for model acts could be brought to
the Conference by the Canadian Bar Association, provincial attorneys
general or by conference members. In order to be acted upon proposals
had to have the support of at least four governments for a uniform act to be
drafted and an expressed willingness to enact it.
The actual preparation of model acts went through many stages,
starting with the research stage undertaken by designated commissioners.
Their research report contained information that outlined the desirable
features as well as the deficiencies of existing law in Canada and elsewhere
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., such as the Contributory Negligence Act and the Human Tissue Act.
62. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 174: quoting WF Bowker (President's Address delivered at the 47th
Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, 23
August 1965).
63. Ibid, in a brief to the Attorney General of BC regarding the establishment of a law reform
commission, members of the faculty of UBC expressed this view.
64. Read, supra note 55 at 236.
65. John Willis, "Securing Uniformity of law in a Federal System-Canada" (1944) 5:2 UTLJ 352
at 365.
66. Ibid at 364-365
67. Described by Read, supra note 55 at 237-238 nn 26, 28.
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in particular areas. The report also recommended in a general way the type
of legislation it was believed to be desirable, making special mention of
the features to be included (as well as those to be excluded). Following the
initial research report the process continued with discussion in principle;
preparation of a draft act if the research report was accepted; followed by
a second draft; discussion of a second draft; more discussion of the main
principles; final approval by the Conference of the draft act; publication
of the tentatively approved draft by the Conference; submission to the
attorneys general, the Canadian Bar Association and other interested
parties for feedback; consideration of comments received; final approval
of the draft act; and ultimately publication of the draft act as a model
act in the proceedings of the Conference and the recommendation of the
model act to the provincial attorneys general. It was a long but thorough
process. It will become obvious that many, but not all, of the stages of
the creation of a model act were also adopted and followed by later Nova
Scotia commissions.
Assessment of the Conference
In spite of the fact that the Conference did, in fact, bring about changes in
provincial laws, some of which were quite significant, it was not created
to deliberately achieve systematic law reform. Rather, its main goal was
to achieve some degree of legal consistency and uniformity in Canada
by convincing provinces to adopt uniform model acts. In addition, its
very structure and practices could not enable it to carry out systematic
law reform even if it wanted to do so. The Conference had no permanent
staff and met only once a year, although particular subcommittees working
on specific model acts did meet thoughout the year. Research funds were
small and research was carried out by its members as best they could.
Still, the Conference was able to produce a considerable number of model
acts, a good many of which served as important background sources for
research carried on by our two Nova Scotia Law commissions.6 8
2. Nova Scotia Legislative Research Centre: Dalhousie Law School
In 1950, Dr. Horace Read, Dean of the Dalhousie Law School established
the Nova Scotia Legislative Research Centre at the Dalhousie Law School.
The Centre was intended to allow students to engage in the preparation of
actual government bills under the supervision of the teacher of the course
in legislation and the Legislative Counsel of the province. This "laboratory
work," to use Dean Read's words, was intended to help students appreciate
68. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 174 makes a similar assessment. Between 1921 & 1961, the Conference
prepared and recommended for enactment fifty model acts. Read, supra note 55 at 236.
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and understand the process of legislation itself and to comprehend the many
steps that have to be taken in order for a bill to be ready for presentation
to the legislature. By obtaining a better understanding of how statutes are
created, the hope was that the students would also better understand the
later process by which courts had to interpret legislative provisions using
the so-called rules of statutory interpretation.69
Dean Read had a second purpose in mind for the Centre. He wanted
to make the results of student research and drafting available to the
government and relieve those public servants charged with the preparation
of government bills of some of the research they would have to do
themselves in the preparation of these bills. It was Dean Read's hope
that the Centre's activities would someday "grow into an embryonic law
reform commission, keeping the laws of Nova Scotia under continuous,
objective, and politically disinterested study with the aim of discovering
how to develop them to best fit the needs of the province.""
The Nova Scotia Legislative Research Centre at Dalhousie had been
modelled upon a similar experiment developed by Dean Read at the
University of Minnesota law school in which students researched and
drafted private members' bills. According to John Willis, the service
provided to the various groups and organizations who wanted to present
these private bills to the legislature was so popular that "the laboratory
was just about to become an institute" with Dean Read as director when
Dr. Read was appointed Dean of Law at Dalhousie. The plan for the
Minnesota Institute was replicated as a centre for legislative research in
Halifax with the support and encouragement of the then Premier Angus L.
MacDonald."
A large portion of the student work at the Dalhousie Centre involved
comparative research which required students to investigate and make
comparative analyses of the methods by which other countries and
jurisdictions tackled the same or similar legislative problems. Students
also consulted with welfare agencies, provincial civic organizations,
the social sciences and government departments. Students' duties also
included preliminary drafting of legislation.72
During the first ten years of operation Dal students made substantial
contributions to the research on which approximately half a dozen statutes
69. In the author's personal experience.
70. Willis, A History of The Dalhousie Law School (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979) at
177-178.
71. Ibid.
72. Based upon the author's personal experience as both a student and instructor in the course of
Legislation
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were based.7 3 Students also worked on several projects of the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada. John Willis
saw the accomplishments of the Centre a little differently as he explained
"the students had done much ofthe purely scissors and paste work involved
in producing Revised Statutes, 1954 and some of the groundwork for a few
reform measures but that was all.""4
Whatever the correct perspective might have been, the number of
suitable projects from the government for the Centre to work on gradually
diminished to the point where Dean Read in his 1955-59 Report to the
president of the University was forced to concede that "the work [being]
done by the students in the... Centre [was] no more than a valuable
supplement to the classroom work of his course in legislation."
What went wrong?
A major reason for the Centre's lack of success was the fact that students
were being asked to work on proposed government legislation rather
than private members' bills. The difference being that government bills
normally are more complex and tied to a legislative time schedule that is
much more time sensitive than private bills. The amount of careful research
and drafting that can be done by forty or fifty students in an academic year
is limited. As John Willis explained "...the needs of the civil servants did
not usually mesh with the students' available time and capability."7 6
A second contributing factor was insufficient supervision. No matter
how bright and intelligent students might be, their lack of experience
researching and drafting legislation necessitated close supervision.
Acting both as Dean of the Law School and as an instructor / director of
the Centre, Dean Read was unable to provide the necessary supervision
which is particularly important for those students who were not prepared
to do the required "bull work" or leg work involved in finding out how the
present law was actually working and exposing any obvious defects. Dean
Read's hope for a small beginning, an embryonic law reform commission,
failed to materialize, but the seeds of law reform had been planted in Nova
Scotia: The need was there but a successful mechanism to carry out reform
had yet to be developed.
73. These included Proceedings Against the Crown Act of 1951, The Hon Profit Societies Act of
1953, The Survival ofActions Act of 1954, The Interpretation Act of 1954, The Testators Family
MaintenanceAct of 1956 and The Act to Simplify Convegances of 1956.
74. Willis, supra note 70 at 178.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
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3. The Nova Scotia Barristers'Society
There was a growing awareness within the legal community in Nova
Scotia that every lawyer had some responsibility for the improvement of
the law and its administration in the province. This concern manifested
itself in 1953 when the Council of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society
created a Board of Legal Research. The Board, sometimes referred to as
the Legal Research Law Reform Committee, had been established as a
result of a Council resolution "to establish a body which would promote
improvement in private law and procedure and which would inquire and
report on suggestions for law revision, amendment or enactment that were
referred to it by Council or by the Council's legislation committee."" The
Board brought together practicing lawyers, legal academics from the law
school as well as law students from the Legislative Research Centre at
Dalhousie. It operated for almost 20 years with the last reference to it
appearing in Council minutes in 1973.
During this 20 year period the Bar Council also had a Legislative
Committee which studied potential statues and drafted statutory
amendments or new laws, copies of which were forwarded to the Attorney
General. If particular topics required lengthy or indepth analysis beyond
the capabilities of the Committee, they would be referred to the Board.
Overtime, attempts were made to integrate the activities of the Committee
and the Board by sharing the same personnel. After 1973, lack of any
reference to a separate Research Board in Council Minutes suggests that
the Board's activities had been assumed by the Legislative Committee.78
The Committee/Board did make a significant contribution to the
improvement of Nova Scotia law by its work on the Bill entitled "An Act
to Simplify Conveyances in the Creation of Pre-trial Procedures for the
Supreme Court ofNova Scotia," its work on the Statute ofFrauds,79 the rule
against perpetuities,"o modernization of the administration of estates, land
title registration, landlord and tenant law, the Companies Act," creation
of a family court, vendor and purchaser legislation, personal properties
securities legislation, family maintenance law and dower. Many of these
77. Memo prepared by William Lawrence Legal Research Officer for the 2nd Law Reform
Commission as background for the Commission Report Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia,
The Case for the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (Halifax: December 2001). Mr. Lawrence's
unpublished memo cites Bar Council Minutes of September 53 at 2.
78. Ibid.
79. Statute ofFrauds, RSNS 1989, c 442.
80. See, The Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission, Perpetuities, Halifax, Nova Scotia
Archives (1996-055/011-04).
81. CompaniesAct, RSNS 1989, c 81.
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topics would continue to be the subject of further study by succeeding law
reform commissions in Nova Scotia.8 2
Law reform was also being carried out on particular topics by special
committees or subgroups of the Barristers' Society, such as regional or
country bar associations, but the Society also saw the need for a more
broadly-based law reform body. At the Society's annual meeting in 1965,
suggestions were made for the formation of a law reform committee,
"composed of lawyers, sociologists and others who are interested in
the public weal to form such a committee, and to make suggestions to
the Attorney General's department."8 3 Later that year Council passed
a resolution calling for permanent machinery which would ensure:
"continuous review of existing legislation; the promotion of revisions to
existing legislation; and the promotion of new laws as required.""4 The
resolution just happened to coincide with the enactment or creation of the
UK Law Reform Commission in 1965, which was followed one year later
with the creation of the Ontario Law Reform Commission.
III. The first Law Reform Advisory Commission 1969-1981
1. Bill-43 and the reasons for it
On 25 February 1969 the Honourable R.A. Donahoe introduced for first
reading Bill-43 titled "An Act to provide for a Law Reform Advisory
Commission."" Three days later on second reading Mr. Donohoe told the
House of Assembly:
I do not propose to make any long address, relative to the principle of
it. I'm sure that Honourable members who have had an opportunity
to peruse it will know exactly what it is intended to do. And on the
introduction of it, I did advise the house that this Bill is put forward
in order to provide material and matter for consideration in this most
important region of law reforn. 8 6
But beyond telling the House that Bill-43 had something to do with the
important subject of law reform, Mr. Donohoe had nothing to say about
the reasons for the Bill, what it was supposed to accomplish or how this
would be done. Admittedly the Bill was relatively short, comprised of only
ten sections, but the topic certainly was important enough to warrant more
82. The case for the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, supra note 77; and Perpetuities,
supra note 80.
83. Ibid at 3, citing Council Minutes of 2 July 1965.
84. Ibid at 4, citing Council Minutes of 4 December 1965.
85. Introduction of Bills, Debates of the Nova Scotia House ofAssembly, 49th Parl, 3rd Sess, (25
February 1969) at 664.
86. "Bill 43, Law Reform Commission," 2nd Reading, ibid at 1098-1099 (Hon RA Donohoe).
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of an explanation than was given by the Honourable Minister. On the other
hand, the fact that there is no record of any kind of debate by the House
members on second reading or in committee might suggest that there was
no need for further elaboration by the minister. Perhaps the perceived
need for a law reform commission was so obvious to the House that no
explanation of its raison d'etre was required, a less charitable explanation
might be that no one really cared. Whatever the correct interpretation of
the event might be, there appears to have been no debate in the House
on second reading and the Bill was referred to the Law Amendments
Committee and returned to the House apparently without comment.
However, there were external forces at work in Canada and in
the United Kingdom in the years leading up to 1969 that might have
influenced the government to introduce legislation to create a law reform
commission. In 1964-1965 the United Kingdom government had created
the United Kingdom Law Reform Commission"7 and, at roughly the same
time, Ontario created its own Law Reform Commission." Closer to home,
as we have seen, the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society expressed its concern
for the need for some kind of law reform machinery with the passage of a
Bar Council resolution in 1965 calling for a law reform commission that
would help keep the laws of the province under continuous review.8 9 In
addition, there was a more general world view in the 1960s reflecting a
growing recognition in many countries that the whole body of the law was
potentially in need of reform and that this could best be accomplished by
a standing body of appropriate professional experts to consider reform of
the law on a continuing basis. 90 According to this view, society appeared
to be losing faith in the other traditional methods for bringing about legal
change. The legislatures were busy, the executive dominated by the need
to satisfy the political agenda of the party in power, and judges who were
bound by precedent and the literal rule of interpretation as well as the
belief that it was not up to them to carry out the investigative research
involved in the gathering of social data of the kind required for law reform.
The law was seen as not keeping up with rapid changes in technology
and in social values. There was an optimistic belief that state-sponsored
87. Supra note 19.
88. The Ontario Law Reform Commission Act, SO 1964, c 78 as amended by RSO 1970, c 321.
89. See above, the text accompanying note 77.
90. Sawer, supra note 28.
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activities could cure social problems9 1 and that the human intellect could
devise means to bring the external world fully under control.9 2
Of all the factors that might have influenced the Nova Scotia
government to introduce Bill-43, the passage of a Nova Scotia Bar
Council resolution was probably the most important. It was the only factor
mentioned by the Minister on second reading of the Bill when he explained
that Bill-43 was being put forward by the government at the request of
the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society.9 3 As law reform measures go, Bill-43
presented to the Nova Scotia legislators a cautious approach. It did not
seem to create a loose cannon that might invade and usurp the traditional
legislative prerogatives of the House of Assembly. The Commission in
its title was clearly described as advisory and the mandate given to the
proposed commission was clearly limited and controlled by the office of
the Attorney General.
Bill-43 became law on 3 April 1969 when the statute entitled "An
Act to Provide for a Law Reform Advisory Commission" received
Royal Assent. 9 4 The Commission, composed of ten commissioners, did
not, however, become operational until 1972.95 A member of the public
reading this statute for the first time could easily be forgiven for getting
the impression that the new Commission was very much under the
control of the Attorney General. Certainly there were parts of the statute
that conveyed this impression. For example, the Commission's mandate,
found in section 4 of the statute, required the Commission to undertake a
review of any statutory enactment the Attorney General might request and
"to recommend the repeal, revision or amendment of an enactment or any
part thereof so reviewed." The statute further provided that if the Attorney
General requested, the Commission was obliged to consider any matter
that was not already covered by statutory law and if the Commission
determined that legislation was required, to recommend legal reform or
change in the form of legislation. 9 6 The result of this provision was that if
a particular situation or set of circumstances, not then regulated by statute
or regulation, appeared to be causing problems in society, the Commission
was authorized, if the Attorney General requested, to investigate and
91. Hanford, supra note 3 at 506-507 quoting Judge Hal Jackson, "Law Reform from the Outside
looking Back" (Paper delivered to the 1987 Annual Conference of Society of London Lawyers)
[unpublished].
92. RA Macdonald, supra note 3.
93. Supra note 86.
94. Supra note 1.
95. Commissioners were appointed for two years, ibid, s 2(4). For a list of the first Commissioners
and the first Secretary and Executive Officer, see Appendix 16.
96. Supra note 1, ss 4(b), 5.
364 The Dalhousie Law Journal
propose a solution in the form of a draft statute. The Commission was also
given authority to initiate research into any area of the law the Commission
considered to be in need of reform, but only with the approval of the
Attorney General. The statute made it clear that the term "law" includes
the statute law, common law, judicial decisions, or any procedure under
the statute or other law.97
In addition to the ten commissioners, the Commission's administrative
staff was to be composed of a person serving as secretary and executive
officer of the Commission whose duties involved dealing with
administrative matters, and supervising any research as well as any other
services that might be required. The statute stipulated that this position
was to be filled by Legislative Counsel or a person in the public service
appointed by Cabinet.9 8 There was also the possibility that the Attorney
General could or would appoint an assistant secretary of the Commission
from the public service.9 9 The Commission was authorized to appoint
other staff members as research personnel with the approval of the
Attorney General. The fact that the chief administrative officer of the
Commission and the person in charge of supervising commission research
was also Legislative Counsel, had the benefit of ensuring a close working
connection between the Commission and the Department of the Attorney
General, but it also meant loss of central control over its activities.
The Attorney General's department also controlled the Commission
budget which meant that the Commission did not have to solicit for
funds from other external donors, but it also meant that the government
controlled the purse strings. There was a provision in the statute for the
creation of a separate "law reform fund" into which could be deposited
any sum of money contributed as a grant or a gift."'o As far as it is known,
no funds were ever accumulated in this account.
There were other non-statutory factors that tied the Commission closely
to the Department of Justice. For example, the Commission's offices were
located on the same floor and in the same building as the Department of
Justice. The Commission used the Department's library and secretarial staff
while members of the Legislative Counsel's office carried out invaluable
research on commission projects for the Commission.10 1 All very efficient
and beneficial to the Commission, but also lending support to the public
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid, s 3.
99. Ibid, s 3(2).
100. Ibid, s 9(2).
101. As observed by L Skene, "The Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission: An Early
Appraisal" (1974) 2:1 Dal U 201 at 206.
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perception that the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission was
not far from being a mere unit of the Department of Justice.
The issue of publication of Commission reports recommending
changes in Nova Scotia law was a point of contention throughout the life
of the Commission and provided additional evidence of the lack of control
the Commission had with regard to its own activities and operations.
The Commission was required to submit annual reports to the Attorney
General outlining the activities of the Commission during a given year.10 2
The Commission was also required to submit, in the form of final reports,
their research, conclusions and recommendations for individual reform
projects.1 0 3 The Attorney General was not obligated by the statute to
publish these reports, nor was the Commission specifically authorized to
publish them. As one commentator observed:
It is vital to good law reforn that proposed changes should be given the
fullest possible consideration before they are implemented and this will
be achieved most effectively by the Commission publicizing its findings
and inviting comments from interested persons before it reports to the
Attomey General with its recommendations.o4
These observations appear to be directed primarily at non-final or
discussion papers, but they are equally applicable to final reports of the
Commission.
The Law Reform Advisory Commission began operations on
25 January 1972 with the appointment of the first ten commissioners, all of
whom were part-time appointments. The secretary and executive officer's
functions were carried out by Legislative Counsel who, by necessity,
also had to be part time. In its 1973 Annual Report, the then executive
director and secretary, is described by the Commission's chairman as
being "Secretary and de facto research director, administrative manager
and liaison officer.""o The Chair of the Commission, the Hon. Mr.
Justice A. Gordon Cooper, was also only able to devote part of his time to
Commission operations. The Commission had no full-time professional
employees.1 0 6 In the first year of operations, the Commission received a
number of suggestions for projects that originated with the Legislative
Committee of the Barristers' Society or came from Legislative Counsel
102. Supra note 1, s 8(1).
103. Ibid, s 8(2).
104. L Skene, supra note 101 at 213.
105. Annual Report of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission 1973 (Halifax: Queen's
Printer) at 10; supra note 1, s 3. Mr. Walker acted in this capacity, except for short periods of time,
until 1981.
106. Ibid.
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himself All suggested topics were vetted first by the executive director and,
if deemed suitable, would be recommended to the Commission for their
approval and sent to the Attorney General with a positive recommendation
for Commission action. If he approved of the suggestions they would be
sent back to the Commission as a request from his office for action. One
legal commentator has suggested that, on its face, the Act does not permit
the Commission to initiate projects, even with the Attorney General's
approval.10 ' Whether legally authorized or not, the Law Reform Advisory
Commission began work on at least eight projects in its first year, three of
which were implemented by legislation. All of the research required for
these three studies or reports was provided by members of the Commission
without external research assistance.
At the same time that it was actively working on eight projects,
the Commission was also trying to determine its approach to the whole
question of law reform.10 s Recognizing that its statutory mandate required
a planned approach to law reform, the Commission decided to adopt an
approach that would involve studying fields or areas of law rather than
merely dealing with specific amendments to statutes to correct anomalies
in them.109 The Commission acknowledged that "the law should more
accurately reflect current social ideas and ideals to meet the needs of
the people of the Province in a world of changing social and economic
conditions."110 Whether their decisions to undertake the eight projects they
worked on in 1972 were influenced or affected by the above mentioned
"area approach" is not clear, but in September of 1972 the Commission
decided to commission Professor Charles of the Faculty of Law at
Dalhousie to prepare a study paper that would contain suggestions, based
on his experience, that would be proper areas of study and investigation
for the Commission.
In his paper, Professor Charles not only listed areas of law that other
provincial law reform agencies had studied and subsequently published
reports with recommendations for reform, but he also referred to thirty
model acts prepared by the Uniform Law Conference over the years that
had not yet been adopted by Nova Scotia. His paper also provided what
was described as "a philosophy of law reform" which emphasized that
the purpose of law reform was to improve the law and then described
the different ways this could be done. Relevant considerations, such as
107. L Skene, supra note 101 at 208.
108. Annual Report of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission 1972 (Halifax: Queen's
Printer) at 6.
109. Ibid at 5.
110. Ibid.
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a broad or narrow approach, or concentrating on lawyers, law or social
policy legislation, are also discussed in the paper.' The Charles Report
(1972) was delivered to the Commission in November 1972 and discussed
by the Commission in December of that year without any consensus being
reached as to the approach the Commission favoured. Whether the paper
had any effect upon the choice of projects subsequently undertaken by the
Commission is not clear, but the Commission did decide that it would not
undertake a review of a particular section of the Fatal Injuries Act, 11 2 a
project that had been suggested by the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society to
the Attorney General and passed on to the Commission for investigation.
In keeping with their stated "area approach" the Commission did not think
it appropriate to merely correct anomalies.
In 1972 the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society proposed to establish a
Law Foundation to provide funding for the new Law Reform Advisory
Commission. The proposal involved taking money from interest earned
on lawyers'/clients' trust accounts. In 1972 the Society approached the
Commission with the suggestion that the Commission take their proposal
and treat it as a law reform project. Quite properly, the Commission thought
it was not appropriate for the Commission to promote such an initiative
as a law reform project and suggested that the Barristers' Society should
take the lead in getting legislation passed.1 13 In 1973 the Society made
an attempt to have its law foundation proposal enacted into legislation
but was not successful. The reasons for rejection by the legislature are
interesting: the scheme amounted to an unwarranted appropriation of
clients' funds; the Law Reform Advisory Commission had not proven
itself and could not justify the appropriation of these funds for its purposes;
and if the work of the Commission was regarded by the government as
being so important then the government should directly bear the cost of
the Advisory Commission's work." (Although this was a Nova Scotia
Barristers' Society bill, one County Bar actually voted against it.) The
Advisory Commission had only been in existence for two years, but it
appears, it had not yet gained the confidence of the members of the House
of Assembly.
111. Unpublished study paper, 1972 (Charles Report 1972).
112. Fatal InjuriesAct, RSNS 1967, c 100.
113. Minutes of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (16 November 1972) at 1,
Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-001).
114. Minutes ofthe Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (21 January 1974) at 2, Halifax,
Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-002).
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2. The workplan Doing law reform
Besides having to agree on a general approach to law reform, the Advisory
Commission had to develop a more specific method of actually doing
law reform. The Commission addressed this issue in the second year
of operation and came up with a process that involved three different
stages."' The first stage would consist of a research report called a study
paper. This paper would be prepared by either commissioners or external
researchers hired for the task. The study paper was expected to include an
outline of the legal problems to be addressed, or in other words the defects
in the existing legal provisions, as evidenced by economic and social data
in statistical form, if available. The paper would also include reference to
data from the reports of other law reform commissions or agencies. Study
papers were usually intended for internal consumption only, but might also
be circulated to interested parties for comment, in some circumstances.1 1 6
The Commissioners having digested the study paper were expected to
then reach preliminary or tentative views or conclusions as to its contents
and agree on what changes might be recommended. Their views were
expressed in a working paper which was intended for circulation to other
interested parties for comment. This was the second stage. After receiving
and considering any comments about the contents of the working paper, the
Commission would then prepare, as the third stage of its workplan, a final
report. This final report, expressing the conclusions and recommendations
of the Commission would be then sent to the Attorney General's office for
consideration and possible action.
3. Some ongoing problems
During its ten year period of operation the Law Reform Advisory
Commission was continually plagued by a lack of full-time personnel
to carry out its reform mandate. By mid-1973, with a backlog of eight
projects to be completed, the Commission was convinced that a full-time
research officer was required, if the backlog was to be reduced. They
pressed their case with the Attorney General and went the further step of
stopping work on three projects and not beginning work on two others. In
his Annual Report December 1973, Chair Justice Cooper also noted that
law reform is a full-time job requiring a full-time chair and a full-time
director of research. To emphasize his point, Chair Cooper asked not to be
115. Supra note 105 at 6.
116. As the Commission explains in its 1973 Annual Report, ibid at 7, "Study Papers may or may not
be circulated for comment prior to the Commission arriving at tentative conclusions."
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reappointed, citing pressure of judicial duties and his belief that the time
had come to appoint a full-time chair.'
The Nova Scotia government addressed Chair Cooper's concerns and
suggestions by appointing a full-time chair and full-time executive director/
secretary effective 1 January 1974." Unfortunately, neither appointee
could take up their duties on that date. As a result, the Commission had to
operate without their services for six months, until June 1974. The effect
upon Commission operations was significant.1 1 9 The Commission was
only able to complete one project in 1974 and had eight others under study.
Lack of critical personnel also forced the Commission to refuse a request
from the Attorney General to conduct an assessment of legal aid services
in the province.120
During 1975-1976 the Advisory Commission was able to complete
five projects, but the Attorney General's office continued to request the
Commission to undertake other new projects, with the result that at the
end of 1976 the Commission still had eight projects under study.1 2 1 One
of the projects completed during this period was an act to amend the
Commission's founding statute.12 2 The amendment proposed changes to
the number of commissioners, an increase in the number of nonlawyers
on the Commission, and three-year terms for seven of the commissioners
in order to avoid any gaps in Commission operations. The Commission's
proposals, as put forward to the Attorney General, were accepted by the
government and the necessary statutory amendments were made in 1976.123
Lilias Toward was appointed Chair of the Commission in 1977 and
by the end of that year reported that the Commission now had ten projects
in progress.124 The backlog was obviously increasing. This was due in
large measure to the fact that during 1977 members of the Commission
had concentrated their efforts almost exclusively upon the subject matter
of matrimonial support and the ownership of matrimonial property in a
marriage, a project that was of particular interest to Chair Toward. To help
counteract the increasing backlog and to speed up the research process, the
117. Ibid at 11.
118. Annual Report of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission 1974 (Halifax: Queen's
Printer) at 5.
119. Supra note 101 at 201.
120. Supra note 118 at 7-8.
121. Ibid at 3. The eight projects included: Matrimonial Support, Limitations of Actions, Small Claims
Court, Companies Act, Probate Act, Occupiers Liability, Personal Property Security Legislation and
Illegitimate Children.
122. Supra note 1.
123. Ibid.
124. Minutes of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (14 November 1977) at 3,
Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-04).
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Commission decided to create small committees to deal with individual
projects. As the Chair explained, the committee members (commissioners)
would not be expected to do basic research themselves. This work was
to be done by the Commission's full-time research officer assisted by a
member of the Legislative Counsel's office.125
In 1978 the Commission was able to report that it had completed four
projects and that five were still under study.126 However, the Commission
also mentioned that by agreement with the Attorney General, they had
decided in October 1978 to hold in abeyance research work on three
projects so that the Commission could concentrate on other projects
considered to have greater urgency. 12 7 At its June meeting in 1978 the
Commission decided to ask the Attorney General to refer all topics dealing
with family law to it. In addition to its normal workload, the Commission
was also asked by the Nova Scotia representatives to the Uniform Law
Conference to review and comment on several uniform acts before they
were presented to the Nova Scotia government. Legislative Counsel
assured the Commission that it was proper for the Commission to express
its views, but the Commission wanted to make it clear that any views it
expressed were entirely unofficial and did not represent the formal view
of the Commission. 128
Lilias Toward's term as Chair ofthe Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory
Commission ended on 31 October 1979. One month before this date, Chair
Toward prepared a sixteen page report for the Attorney General to augment
the usual annual report of the Commission. 129 In her September Report,
Toward stressed the necessity of having a full-time chair and suggested
that "more research could be undertaken if the duties laid down in the
Act for the Executive Director were made the responsibility of a full-time
Chair."130 As she pointed out "it is very difficult for [Legislative Counsel]
to combine his duties [as such] with those of the Executive Director of
the Commission. Just when the Commission should be most active, the
House is in session with the result that the Legislative Counsel [/Executive
125. Ibid. The member was Bill Macdonald who had been rendering valuable assistance to the
Commission since 1974.
126. Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission Sixth Annual Report 1977-1979 (Halifax:
Queen's Printer, 1979) Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-06).
127. Ibid.
128. Minutes ofthe Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (8 September 1978) Halifax, Nova
Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-04); Minutes of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (3
November 1978) Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-04).
129. Report to the Attorney General, Hon Harry W How, QC from Lilias Toward QC (17 September
1979) [unpublished] Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/008-11).
130. Ibid at 16.
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Director] is hardly available even for consultation and cannot be expected
to carry out administrative duties and supervision of research at such
times."1 3 1 Chair Toward therefore recommended that the Act be amended
accordingly. She concluded her report by suggesting that "[ifl a team of
well qualified research personnel were to be built up, Nova Scotia could
have as effective a Law Reform Commission as any in Canada."1 3 2 The
implication of this comment is obviously that more full-time research staff
were needed and that the Commission was not as effective as it might be.
Only one project was completed in 1978-79, four were in progress and
three still in abeyance. No new projects were undertaken.1 3 3 The Annual
Report for 1979 is completely factual and lacking any observations or
recommendations. It would appear that Chair Toward elected to include
any such remarks in her separate report, one that the Attorney General
would not feel obliged to publish, or perhaps to ensure that the Annual
Report for 1979 would be published in some form. During the two years
when Toward was chair of the Commission, the Commission completed
four projects-two in 1978 and one in 1979.
On 21 December 1979 Linden Smith was appointed chair of the
Advisory Commission.13 4 Besides being the law partner of Harry How,
the Attorney General, Smith held other official offices. At the first meeting
of the Commission on March 1, 1980, Chair Smith proposed the adoption
of a new procedure to be followed which he explained would help to
expand the research part of the reform process.1 3 5 The new procedure
would involve the Office of Legislative Counsel doing the research on
projects and preparing draft acts for the Commission to review. Since
some members of the Legislative Counsel's office had been assisting the
Commission for a number of years, the proposal must have envisaged even
more members of the Legislative Counsel's office being involved. The
commissioners accepted the new proposal subject to several conditions.
The first condition was that any draft proposals for change had to include
alternatives and, secondly, that the draft clearly outline the principles upon
which the recommended change or changes were based. Chair Smith
131. Ibid at 9.
132. Ibid at 16.
133. Supra note 126. There was no mention of any new projects being undertaken in this report or that
for 1978.
134. By Order in Council dated 10 December 1979. Appointment effective 21 December 1979, at
a salary of $30,000 per year. See Order in Council 1017, regarding the appointment and Order in
Council 1102 regarding the salary, Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (Nova Scotia Executive Council
Order in Council Registers Book 121 pg 333 OIC 79-1662 and Book 122 pg 26 OIC 80-52).
135. Minutes ofthe Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (14 March 1980) at 1-2, Halifax,
Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-05).
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agreed to the conditions and pointed out that external research assistants
would be sought if that was necessary.136
There was no annual report published for 1980, although a draft report
had been prepared and circulated to commissioners. 13 7 Information gathered
from the Minutes indicates that the Commission had three new projects
referred to it during 1980 for atotal of nine projects under study.138 Several
of the new projects had their source in the Council of Maritime Premiers.
The result of this new development was that the catchment area for law
reform work expanded, thus adding to the workload of the Commission.
The Commission was still receiving references from the Attorney General
as late as January 1981, and was actively engaged in the discussion of
a uniform evidence act when it ceased to function.13 9 As of 23 January
1981 the Commission had twelve unfinished projects on its worklist.140
The newly instituted reform process had only been in operation for ten
months, too short a period for it to have any recognized effect, as far as
speeding up the reform process was concerned. A heavy workload and
apparently insufficient research resources was one of the ongoing major
problems that the Commission never quite overcame.
Independence
The Advisory Commission's founding statute clearly conveyed the
impression that the Commission was to operate under the close control of
the Attorney General and appeared to allow the Commission to exercise
little independent judgment in relation to its operation. The most direct and
forceful discussion of Commission independence is contained in a personal
report that Chair Toward sent to the Attorney General on the occasion
of the completion of her term as Chair of the Commission in September
1979.141 Toward was emphatic that the proper role of the Commission
was to take a longer range, continuous review of the law and that this
could not be achieved by the government or government departments.
She emphasized that the Commission's approach had to be unbiased and
nonpolitical, with the ability to go beyond the field of practical politics at
136. Ibid. "It was further pointed out that there may be outside contracting of research work if the
need arises."
137. Minutes ofthe Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (23 January 1981) at 4, Halifax,
Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-05).
138. New projects included: Securities Legislation, Uniform Rules of Evidence & Uniform Limitation
of Actions.
139. The last meeting of the Advisory Commission was held on 23 January 1981. Supra note 137 at
4. It was resolved that the Commission should meet again at the call of Chair. The call never came.
140. See Appendix 8.
141. Supra note 129.
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least on some occasions.1 4 2 To fulfill this role, the Commission not only
had to be independent in fact but, more importantly, it had to appear to
be independent to the public. To be credible in the eyes of the public, she
contended, the Commission must not appear to be simply producing what
the government instructs it to produce. It must not appear to be merely
an adjunct of the Attorney General's office for which the government
would be responsible. If the Commission had to await references to it by
its political masters, she argued, it would become, in fact, no more than
a standing Royal Commission with the added danger that the Attorney
General might be tempted to refer topics to the Commission to defuse
controversy and actually delay reform.14 3 Strong words indeed! Chair
Toward did acknowledge that for the most part, the Attorney General had
been very receptive to any suggestions made to him by the Commission...
(not surprising in light of the fact that the Legislative Counsel was the
source of more than one reform project suggestion to the Commission
and to the Attorney General). Toward did not, however, specifically call
for section 4(2) to be amended and her annual report does not suggest this
either.
It is a matter of record that during its ten years of operation the
Commission refused to undertake eight reform projects requested by
the Attorney General.14' Refusals were based on different grounds.
One request was refused because it required specific amendments to a
particular statute, 1 46 while another was rejected because it was too large
and potentially too time consuming.1 4 7 Several requests were refused
because the Commission thought they involved important social policy
issues rather than legal issues. 148 The distinction was important because
the Commission appears to have believed that the Legislature expected the
142. Ibid at 3.
143. Ibid at 4.
144. Ibid.
145. The rejected projects included: Amendments to the Fatal Injuries Act (1972), Assessment of
Legal Aid in NS (1974), Minors Consent to Medical Treatment (1975), Interest on Clients Trust
Accounts (1972), The Torrens Land Registry System (1973), The Trustee Act & Real Property (1973),
Status of Overholding Tenants (1978) and Practical Procedures re Magisterial Inquiries, Medical
Examiners & Coroner (1978). See also Appendix 1.
146. The Fatal Injuries Act.
147. Assessment of Legal Aid in N.S.
148. Interest on Client's Trust Accounts & Minors Consent to Medical Treatment.
374 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Commission to confine itself to reform projects that involved primarily
legal issues.1 4 9 Other projects were rejected for unknown reasons."o
In 1974, the Advisory Commission tried to formally establish its
freedom to select its own topics by requesting in its annual report to
the Attorney General that section 4 of its founding statute be amended
to allow the Commission to select its own topics."' The suggestion was
not acted upon by the Attorney General and section 4 was not amended.
Four years later, in 1978, at an internal meeting of the Commission, the
issue of independence was raised once more.152 Interestingly enough, the
commissioners expressed two different views regarding independence.
One group of commissioners thought that the Commission was more
intimately tied to the Attorney General than was necessary and that
the Commission should be able to initiate its own projects, subject to
approval by the Attorney General and to publish its own reports. Other
commissioners, however, pointed out that most of the projects currently
under study by the Commission had been initiated by the commissioners
themselves and suggested that it might be best to test the existing system
before recommending any changes, noting that the Attorney General had
not yet disallowed any Commission initiated project.
However, the commissioners were in agreement that the Commission
should be free to decide whether its reports should be published and
made available to the public. They further decided that once a matter
had been referred to the Commission they should be free to deal with the
matter as the Commission saw fit. Sometime before the end of 1978, the
Attorney General apparently met with the Commission. At this meeting
the commissioners outlined their concerns and made suggestions as to
how they would like to see the Commission operate. These concerns and
suggestions were incorporated into a written memorandum and sent to the
Attorney General.153
In the single year of Commission operation following the end of
Toward's term as Chair and the publication of her 1979 Report, there is
no evidence in the minutes or elsewhere of any action by the Attorney
General to increase the independence of the Commission. In fact, as
149. Minutes of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (27 November 1974) Halifax,
Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-02).
150. Torrens Land Registry System, Trustee Act & Real Property, Status of Overholding Tenants &
Practical Procedures re Magisterial Inquiries, Medical Examiners & Coroners.
151. Supra note 118 at 7.
152. Minutes of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (1 May 1978) Halifax, Nova
Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-04).
153. The memo is unpublished, see ibid.
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already noted,"' the new Chair Linden Smith had proposed a process
which he explained was designed to speed up the research efforts of the
Commission. Under this new process, the Legislative Counsel's office
would do most of the research and drafting of new projects and submit
the results to the commissioners for comment. It is not clear how new
projects were to be selected under this process. If the idea was to have
the Legislative Counsel's office select them, then this would seem to be
a further reduction of the Commission's actual independence by taking
away their prior limited freedom to initiate projects, subject to approval.
The question was moot, however, because the Commission ceased to
operate in January 1981.
Publication of Commission reports
Section 8(1) of the Commission's statute required the Commission to
make an annual report to the Attorney General. The Commission did so
for all the years of its operation except 1980 when a draft annual report
was prepared but never published. A review of the Commission's annual
reports indicates that for the most part they follow a pattern of listing
completed projects by title with a separate list of projects under study at
the time, also listed by title. However, in its first year (1972) for each of the
projects being worked on, the Commission's Annual Report contained a
short summary of the principles that formed the basis of the Commission's
recommendations and the conclusions reached in the relevant study
papers. Thus anyone reading the Annual Report would have some idea of
what was being proposed as changes to the law. In other annual reports the
Commission provided a draft statute reflecting the proposed changes to be
made, and in other cases the annual reports provided a short explanation
for the project being undertaken or a short update on progress. The result
is that annual reports did provide some information to the public about
completed projects and proposed changes. These annual reports were
published by the Attorney General, but how widely they were circulated
is unknown.
However, the founding statute did not require the Attorney General
to publish either interim or final reports of the Commission and the
Commission itself appeared to think that it was not authorized to do
so. As one experienced law reformer noted, the reports of the Advisory
Commission "were not published unless the Attorney General decided
to publish them.""' This situation, he observed "... caused some tension
154. See above, the text accompanying note 135.
155. Supra note 8 at 249.
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between the Commission and the Attorney General."156 Evidence of this
tension can be found in the concerns expressed by some commissioners at
an internal meeting of the commissioners in 197817 that the Commission
ought to be able to publish its own reports independently of the Attorney
General so that the Commission's position on reform issues would be
know to the public. The reports referred to at this meeting appear to have
been final reports rather than interim reports.
In her unpublished report to the Attorney General in 1979, Chair Toward
expressed her personal view that any changes proposed by the Commission
in the form ofworking papers, press releases, private commissions or public
hearings, should be publicized so that the public could read them before
the Commission's final reports were prepared.' The distinction between
interim reports and final reports is important. As she explained, in the case
of interim reports not only do they enlighten the public about concerns the
Commission had with existing legal provisions, they also help to prepare
them to react to the final reports or their reform proposals. Having the
benefit of such views would also help the Commission to ascertain the
reactions of those members of the public who would be affected by the
proposed changes to the law. Such a process would also allow the public to
participate in the reform process itself Allowing the public and interested
parties to voice any objections they might have to the proposed reforms
at an early stage in the reform process might serve to diffuse objections
to final recommendations that the government might decide to implement
statutorily. However, Chair Toward also noted that prior to 1978 it was
her impression that "... [t]he Attorney General was rather diffident about
having the work of the Commission made public in case the Government
might be subject to pressure from the public to take a particular course of
action which they [the government] may or may not wish to follow."1 5 9
Some research reports, prepared either by members of the Commission 60
or by external researchers on contract to the Commission,16 were circulated
for public comment by the Commission. In these cases, the reports were
treated either as study papers or working papers. 162
156. Ibid at 250.
157. See above, the text accompanying note 152 and following.
158. See supra note 129 at 10.
159. Ibid at 10-11.
160. Such as Judge Peter O'Hearn's paper on the Abolition of the Grand Jury or Mrs Toward's paper
of "Matrimonial Support & Disposition of Matrimonial Property.
161. Such as Professor Peter Darby of the Dalhousie Law School Faculty.
162. Judge O'Hearn's paper and Mrs Towards research report were released by the commission
as "Working Papers" while Professor Darby's paper on Mechanisms Liens was released for public
comment as a "Study Paper."
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We should keep in mind that background research papers whether titled
study papers or working papers can differ in what they contain. Whether
prepared by Commission staff or external researchers, these reports can
vary considerably in the extent of their coverage. Some will only outline
the existing legal provisions in Nova Scotia and compare them with similar
provisions in other jurisdictions, while outlining the problems that need
to be addressed. Other reports will go further and discuss solutions that
have been proposed in other jurisdictions, but without recommending any
particular solution or change for Nova Scotia. The most thorough report
will do all ofthe above and also recommend what the author considers to be
the preferred solution. It is the latter kind of study paper or working paper
that gives the reader the best idea of the kind of changes the Commission
might adopt. But these are still just research papers that contain the views of
knowledgeable people in the field. Until they are discussed, analyzed, and
adopted or accepted by the Commission, they do not constitute evidence
of what approach to reform the Commission will take. To publish such
reports is not to announce the changes the Commission will necessarily
finally propose to the government. They are not in the same category or of
the same order as a report published by the Commission that reflects the
Commission's tentative views or conclusions, such as a discussion paper
or a final report. The Nova Scotia Advisory Commission clearly wanted
final reports publicized and were aware of the benefits of publishing
preliminary reports of the Commission as well.
Commissioner appointments
Another problem 6 3 was that commissioners were only appointed for two
years and all terms expired at the same time. These two factors resulted in
disruptions in the work pattern of the Commission and affected its long-
range planning. It also encouraged the commissioners to postpone current
or planned projects until the commencement of the new members' terms
and, most seriously, resulted in a complete shutdown of the Commission
in 1974 for five months.1 64
Amendments to the Commission statute in 1975-1976165 provided
for appointments not exceeding three years for the chair and seven
commissioners, and appointments not exceeding two years for the other
seven commissioners. If these appointments had been made, it would not
163. See above, the text accompanying note 123.
164. A problem that was noted by L Skene, supra note 101 at 204; and Lilias Toward in her Report
supra note 129 at 9. There is no mention of this problem specifically in any of the Commission's
Annual Reports.
165. SNS 1976, c 37.
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only have provided greater continuity of commissioners' experience, but
would also have provided the overlapping necessary to avoid a hiatus in
Commission operations. Unfortunately, the legislative changes were never
implemented by the Attorney General, a fact that was mentioned by Chair
Toward in her Report of 17 September 1979.166
The 1975-1976 amendments also provided for an enlarged
Commission of 10 to 15 members, as well as permitting the appointment of
five nonlawyers. 1 6 7 Following this legislative amendment the Commission
was enlarged to fifteen members, but nonlawyers were never appointed;
a fact that does not appear to have been a cause for concern for the
commissioners since there was no mention of this oversight in any annual
report or the unpublished report of Chair Toward in 1979. The fact that
the first panel of commissioners was composed of legally-trained persons
either judges, lawyers or legal academics, is understandable. First of all,
the initial pressure for the establishment of a law reform commission came
from members of the Bar and so it seemed reasonable to have the reform
of the law carried out by persons with legal training. 1 68 Secondly, it was
not uncommon for law reformers to believe that lawyers were best suited
to find legal solutions to both legal and social problems in the community.
Nonlawyers, it was believed, would have greater difficulty understanding
legal concepts and considerably more difficulty devising legal solutions.
Their lack of understanding it was thought, would slow down the law
reform process. Typical of this approach and belief is the comment of a
former chair of the Ontario Law Reform Commission who declared in
1971:
If... the solution is to be found through control by law, then legal
methodology dictates that lawyers have the primary role in seeking
the means of achieving these solutions. This, to my mind, inevitably
leads one to the conclusion that the final decision-making rests with
the lawyers, and I think it is not helpful that their progress should be
impeded by the necessity of making lawyers of any laymen who are
participating at this stage.16 9
However, there were other reformers who took a different approach
and saw things differently. These commentators, or participants in the
process of law reform, saw the value of having nonlawyers on law reform
commissions or committees so that the technical expertise of lawyers
166. Supra note 129 at 7.
167. Supra note 165, s 2(5).
168. See Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 306.
169. ALeal, "Methods of Law Reform in Canada." (Paper delivered at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor
Great Park, 24 April 1971) [unpublished]. Quoted in Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 307.
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could be balanced by the critical outlook of those with different and more
varied experiences of life. 170 Nonlawyers would help to liberate lawyers
from their conservatism and "preoccupation with the existing framework
of the law."1 7 1 Individuals holding such views thought that nonlawyers
could provide legally-trained law reformers with a different view of what
the law is for ordinary citizens and how it affects their needs. As one
nonlawyer and commissioner of the succeeding Nova Scotia Law Reform
Commission explained, his role was "to ask the obvious why? Or why
not"? which he hoped would encourage other commissioners to articulate
their assumptions. 172
The values that underlie the views held by legally-trained persons vis a
vis the law and its purposes may not be the same as those not trained in the
law. In the end, for commissioners it is a trade off between taking the extra
time to try to explain often complicated legal concepts to nonlawyers and
the offsetting benefits gained from having involved commissioners with
perhaps a different world view and understanding of what the law is, and
what it can or cannot do for society. One English member of the judiciary
and former law reformer, somewhat tongue in cheek, remarked that
"...law reform is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to lawyers." 1 73
He also suggested that "as the work of law reform develops, and the
organization goes on, perhaps consideration might be given in some way
to including in the [English law] Commission ... laymen and laywomen in
the work of law reform."174
4. Accomplishments of the first Commission
By the time the Law Reform Advisory Commission had ceased operations
in January 1981 it had worked on thirty-six projects. Twenty-five of these
had been referred directly to the Commission by the Attorney General
while another eleven had been initiated by the Commission, recommended
to the Attorney General and then referred back to the Commission. 175 Of
the thirty-six projects, the Commission completed seventeen but had also
rejected requests to review eight projects. 1 7 6 Not counting the project to
170. DR Harris, "Comment on the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Turner's Address 'changing the
law"' (1970) 4 NZLR 45 at 47.
171. Hon Justice Anthony Mason, "Law Reform in Australia" (1971) 4:2 Federal Law Review 197 at
215.
172. Dale Sylliboy, Commissioner of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, "Law and Social
Policy" (Paper delivered at The Commonwealth Law Conference, 25 August 1996) [unpublished].
173. Lord Justice Wilberforce, UK, HL, Hansard, 5th ser, vol 264, 1172 at 1177 (1 April 1965) quoted
in Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 307 n 3.
174. Ibid.
175. See Appendix 1, 2.
176. See Appendix 1.
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amend the founding statute, this leaves twenty-eight projects actually
worked on with a completion rate of 61 percent. The implementation
rate however, was only 36 percent (ten out of twenty-eight)"' while the
average time required to complete a project was 2.1 years.'
As already noted,179 the Commission decided to adopt a planned
approach whereby it would try to reform areas of law rather than narrow
discrete problems. Adhering consistently to this approach was made more
difficult by the fact that the Commission had to take on reform projects
that were selected by the Attorney General. An examination of projects
undertaken by the Commission suggests that 40 percent of them fell into
the area of administration of justice.so This would include reform projects
that changed the institutional structure of the judiciary or its practices
or procedures. A second area or category, that of both real and personal
property law, involved nine projects or 30 percent of the total."' Family
law, involving six projects, accounted for 20 percent of the total projects,
while corporate and commercial law involved five projects or 17 percent
of the total. 18 2 What might be described as private law, involving torts and
contract law only accounted for 10 percent of the projects (3 out of 30). In
spite of the fact that the Commission did not totally control its selection of
projects, it was still able, for the most part, to carry out its planned approach
of reforming areas of law rather than small, specific amendments.
If we examine the seventeen final reports produced by the Advisory
Commission in terms of the type of statutory change recommended by
the Commission, we find that seven projects (41 percent) involved the
enactment of new legislation to cover areas of the law not then regulated
by existing statutory provisions.18 These new enactments were deemed
necessary in order to meet the evolving needs of Nova Scotia's society and
to cover gaps in the existing statutory coverage. Seven projects (41 percent)
recommended that existing statutes be revised or abolished (as in the case
of the Grand Jury) in order to modernize the statutory framework.1 4 Three
projects (18 percent) involved what might be considered to be minor or
moderate amendments, which was not surprising given the policy decision
of the Commission not to undertake minor changes to eliminate anomalies,
177. See Appendix 4.
178. See Appendix 3, 5.
179. See above, the text accompanying note 108 and following.
180. See Appendix 6.
181. Ibid.
182. Ibid.
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but it also demonstrates that the Commission was able to follow its
preferred approach of area research as well.'
In the first two years of the Commission's operation much of the
research work of the Commission was carried out by Graham Walker,
Legislative Counsel, who drew heavily upon uniform model acts as the
starting point for new Commission projects. Commissioners themselves
carried out research on some projects. The history of the Nova Scotia's
Law Reform Advisory Commission clearly shows the absolutely critical
role played by Legislative Counsel and the Legislative Counsel's
office in both the selection of Commission projects and the research
and drafting that followed. In all, Legislative Counsel officials did the
primary research in ten of the completed projects. Chair Toward in her
1979 Report stressed the need for the closest possible liaison between
Legislative Counsel and the Commission.18 6 However, that very closeness
detracted from the Commission's independence and may help to explain
her surprising recommendation about the removal of Legislative Counsel
from Commission operations in her 1979 Report.1 7 When the Commission
abruptly ceased operations in January of 1981 there were twelve unfinished
projects." The Petty Trespass Act project 8 9 completed in 1979 was the
last project completed by the government and the Matrimonial Property
Actl 90 was the last project implemented by the government in 1980. During
the period November 1979 to January 1981 the Attorney General referred
five new projects to the Commission.1 91
5. Why was the commission abandoned?
The last meeting of the Law Reform Advisory Commission was held on
23 January 1981. When the meeting adjoumed the Chair advised that the
Commission would "meet again at the call of the Chair." 19 2 The call never
came. The Commission as a potential operating entity continued to exist
until 20 December 1981 when all commissioner appointments expired.
But, as a matter of fact, the Commission, as an operational body, had ceased
operations as of 23 January 1981. The Commission continued to exist as
a legal entity until 1990 when the second (independent) Commission was
185. Ibid.
186. Supra note 129 at 9.
187. Ibid at 9, 16.
188. See Appendix 8 for a list of the 12 unfinished projects.
189. Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission, Petty Trespass Act Report Halifax, Nova
Scotia Archives (1996/055/012).
190. Matrimonial PropertyAct, SNS 1980, c 9.
191. These included: a Securities Act, a Trespass to Property Act, an Occupiers Liability Act, a
Builders Lien Act and a conditional Sales Act.
192. Supra note 137.
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created by statute and the statute that created the first commission was
repealed.193
No reasons were given as to why commissioner appointments were
not renewed and the Commission allowed to expire operationally. Six
years after the event Hurlburt suggested that:
The reasons for its defacto demise appear to have been financial
stringency, lack of common approach to law refonn between the
Commission and the Attorney General, and the feeling of the Attorney
General that he could effect through his department whatever law reforn
is necessary without being faced with reports from an entity which he did
not control.'
Financial stringency may have been an significant factor in the decision
to terminate the Commission, but it was probably not the dominating factor.
It is true that the budget of the Commission had grown from $75,000 in
1973195 to $114,000 in 1975196 and to $141,000 in 1981.197 In order to
keep up with the volume of work the Commission did persistently ask for
greater resources. Even with the assistance of staff from the office of the
Legislative Counsel, including the Legislative Counsel himself, and the
appointment in 1975 of a full-time research officer, there was still a need
for more research assistance if the accumulated backlog of projects was
to be reduced and the completion time of projects improved. The cost of
the Commission was clearly increasing not decreasing, but this issue was
never discussed by the government with the Commission or anyone else.
As to the lack ofa common approachto law reform, it is not clearwhether
this was a reference by the author to law reform in terms of philosophy,
selection of topics or the reform process itself. Since the Attorney General
selected the majority of reform projects to be undertaken, and, even
allowing for the fact that the Commission refused eight projects and
suggested on their own initiative another half dozen, the Attorney General
still had a veto over Commission selections as well as internal control of
research supervision, via Legislative Counsel. It may be that the Attorney
General did not approve of the significant emphasis placed upon family
193. Law Reform Commission Act, SNS 1990, c 17, s 3, 13.
194. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 252.
195. This is mentioned by Graham Walker in the Minutes ofthe Meeting ofLaw Reform Commissions
of the Atlantic Provinces and Canada (1 October 1973) at 2 Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (1996-
055/001-02).
196. Minutes of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission (4 April 1975) at 2, Halifax,
Nova Scotia Archives (1996-055/001-03).
197. Judy Myrden, "Government should revive law reform body, says critics," The Chronicle Herald
(30 October 1989) at A2, Halifax, Nova Scotia Archives (MFM# 6350).
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law as an area of reform by the Commission, but the Commission was
allowed to proceed with the project. Perhaps the differences in approach
referred to may have been due to the Commission's insistence on greater
consultation with the public and interested parties, and the publication of
their interim reports, as well as annual reports of the Commission.
As for the third possibility that the Attorney General might have
thought it preferable to have law reform done inhouse so to speak, there is
some support for this supposition in remarks that were made in 1989 by the
then Attorney General Harry How to a newspaper reporter in a telephone
interview. Mr. How is reported to have said that "it was a cabinet decision
and it was decided we weren't spending money on policy matters that
would be politically practical."1 9 8 The Honourable Harry How explained
that the Cabinet had reassigned the Law Reform Advisory Commission's
duties to the Nova Scotia Policy Board, a body of bureaucrats drafting
government policy, because, as he said in the interview, "the Policy Board
reflected the political reality of the day."1 99 He went on to say "it's no
good proposing laws to the government that in turn get squashed because
they aren't acceptable.. .you've got to realize when you get close to
politics, what matters is what is possible to get through the legislature."2 0 0
The explanation is a bit surprising in light of the fact that the majority of
reform projects were either selected by the Attorney General's office or
approved by that office. His comments may have been a veiled reference
to the Commission's low implementation rate of 36 percent2 0 1 or he may
have been referring more specifically to the Commission's emphasis on
family law projects.
As to the matter of control, if Hurlburt is correct and the Attorney
General was worried about controlling the Law Reform Advisory
Commission, what was the basis for his concern? Clearly the authority
to tell the Commission what projects to undertake, and to be able to veto
those the Commission undertook on its own initiative, gave the Attorney
General as much control as he needed. This fact, together with the influence
that Legislative Counsel could exert as part of his functions as executive
director of the Commission would seem to give the Attorney General all
the control required. Perhaps it was not the actual degree of independence
the Commission had which was the problem, but the spectre of greater
independence constantly being requested by the Commission, and perhaps
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid.
201. The implementation rate usually refers to recommendations implemented into legislation. See
above, section 111(b).
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achieved in the future, that bothered the Attorney General. Chair Toward's
sharp criticism of the Attorney General in her September 1979 Report and
her suggestion that Legislative Counsel be removed as executive director
may have been the last straw for the Attorney General.
As already noted, the Commission had twelve unfinished projects
on its agenda when it ceased operations.202 Seven of these projects had
been referred to the Commission after 1979.203 With only fourteen months
between November 1979 and January 1981, and assuming an average
completion rate of 2.2 years, there was not sufficient time to complete the
new projects and the six projects carried over from earlier years. Twelve
unfinished projects represented a non-completion rate of some 40 percent.
Perhaps this was also a factor in the Attorney General's decision.
As is the case with many political decisions, they are a result of a
consideration and evaluation of several factors with no one factor being
determinative. In the case of the decision to terminate the Law Reform
Advisory Commission, financial stringency may have been an important
factor, but it was certainly influenced by a growing tension between the
Commission and the Attorney General, and the concern by the Attorney
General that the Commission would continue to seek more independence.
6. An assessment of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission
In the eight and a half to nine years of operation, the Commission was
asked to consider 36 different proposals for law reform, an average of 4.2
per year. For a Commission with part-time commissioners, little in the
way of research staff for the first three years, a part-time executive director
and part-time chair, it is not surprising that the Commission was unable
to meet the demands placed upon it by the Attorney General. Even after
the appointment of a full-time research officer in 1975 the Commission
struggled to keep up with the workload. If the office ofthe Attorney General
was not happy with the work of the Commission and its completion rate or
implementation rate, it did not show it by reducing the number of project
reviews being requested of the Commission. In 1980 the Commission
received five new projects to review. 20 4 Considering the resources it had to
work with and the significant contribution it made to the improvement of
the legal system generally, the Commission gave a credible performance
within the limits imposed upon by its founding statute.
202. Ibid & Appendix 8.
203. Securities Legislation (1980), Builders Lien Act (1980), Protection of Property Act (1980),
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IV. The second Law Reform Commission-The independent Commission
1. Bill-70, 1990
On 5 April 1990, after an interlude of almost ten years, the Honourable
Tom McInnes, Attorney General for the Conservative Party then in power,
introduced into the Nova Scotia House of Assembly Bill-70, entitled
"An Act to Establish an Independent Law Reform Commission."205 The
Bill was given second reading on 17 June 1990 at which time Minister
McInnes expressed regret that the province had not had a Law Reform
Commission for almost a decade and emphasized how important it was
for the government to "stay abreast of the law as it is created across the
country."2 0 6 He declared that in the proposed Bill the government had tried
to create an independent group, at least as far as they were able, "to look
at new laws and law reform." 2 0 7
In his outline of the Bill on second reading, the Minister went on
to point out several features that promoted independence. He noted that
the Bill created a commission of not less than five and no more than
seven commissioners, four of which would be legally trained, (two
members of the Barristers' Society, a Judge of the province, and a full-
time member of the Faculty of Law at Dalhousie University), and one
nonlegally trained person. The Society members were to be appointed by
the Council of the Society rather than the government while the Judge
and Faculty members would be appointed by the Cabinet, but only after
consultation with the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia and the Chief Judge
of the Court to which the Judge to be appointed was a member. The
faculty member would only be appointed after consultation with the Dean
of the Faculty of Law. A non-legally trained person would be appointed
by Cabinet.208 Mclnnes emphasized that if the government decided to
appoint seven commissioners instead of five, the extra two could also be
non-legally trained persons, bringing the potential to three out of seven
commissioners. 2 0 9 The Honourable McInnes further explained that the
commissioners would elect their own President rather than the Cabinet
making the appointment. Furthermore, he explained that the annual
reports prepared by the Commission would be tabled by the Attorney
205. First reading Bill-70, Nova Scotia House of Assembly Debates and Proceedings, 55th Par, 2nd
Sess, vol 3 (5 April 1990) at 1661.
206. Nova Scotia House of Assembly Debates and Proceedings, 55th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol 6 (7 June
1990) at 4334.
207. Ibid.
208. Bill-70, An Act to Establish an Independent Law Reform Commission, 2nd Sess, 55th Parl,
Nova Scotia, 1990, cl 5(1).
209. Supra note 206 at 4335.
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General each year. This would, he explained, add to the independence of
the Commission and "afford the Commission the opportunity to complain
of tampering or underfunding or what have you." 2 1 0
The Bill apparently anticipated that staff would consist of an Executive
Director, appointed in accordance with the Civil Service Act, 2 11 but by the
Commission rather than the Attorney General. The Commission also had
the freedom and authority to appoint whatever other staff was required to
carry out the Commission's mandate.2 1 2 The Commission also had control
of its finances in the sense that it was given a notional fund of $300,000,
initially made up of contributions from the Attorney General's department
of $150,000 and a matching grant from the Law Foundation of $150,000.
These amounts were not specified in the Bill itself which only provided
that the Commission had to maintain an account that would be under the
control and management of the Commission and which was entitled The
Law Reform Commission Fund.2 1 3 Into this account the Attorney General
could pay, from time to time, whatever amounts his Department had
managed to get appropriated from the Legislature, as well as other funds,
such as those from the Law Foundation. The Commission had control over
the funds once they were received but had no control over the amounts
that the two primary donors might decide to provide. The notional starting
budget of $300,000 was not guaranteed.
There was one provision in Bill-70 that gave the Minister some concern.
Clause 8(1) outlined the duties ofthe Commission, which included receiving
and considering proposals made to it by any person, initiating and carrying
out the research necessary to accomplish its objective, publishing papers,
studies or other documents prepared by the Commission, cooperating with
other organizations and providing information, research and study results
and recommendations to government departments if the Attorney General
agreed. However, clause 2(b) of section 8 required the Commission to
"undertake at the request of the Attorney General the examination of
particular laws or branches of the law and make recommendations for
their improvement, modernization and reform." If enacted into law,
this provision would certainly put some limits on the Commission's
independence. Minister McInnes admitted that the Barristers' Society and
others had suggested that the Attorney General should not have this type
of control.21 4 Their concern was that because the Commission had such a
210. Ibid.
211. Civil Service Act, RSNS 1989 c70.
212. Supra note 208, cl 10(1)(3).
213. Ibid, cl 11(2).
214. Supra note 206 at 4335.
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broad mandate and limited resources the Commission's ability to pursue
their own preferred reform projects might be compromised, particularly
if an over-enthusiastic Attorney General gave them too many projects to
handle.2 15 The Minister himself mused that he might "...remove that clause
or word it in a different way so that it is discretionary, so [it] is at their
discretion as to whether they take instruction."2 1 6 However, he did concede
that it was important for the Attorney General to have the opportunity to
ask the Commission to review legislation for ideas that the government
might want to pursue and have some assurance that the Commission
would not just shove the request aside.2 1 7 Interestingly enough, several of
the members of the House of Assembly also expressed the view that the
Attorney General should have the authority to require the Commission to
review potential legislative proposals sent to them. They did so on the basis
that the Attorney General might have some important legislative proposal
that he would like the Commission to review and that the Commission
should give his request priority over other Commission work.2 18
As a matter of fact, the concern expressed by some members of the
House that the Commission had a very broad mandate, was certainly
justified by the terms of Bill-70.
By comparison with the mandate of the Advisory Commission, that
of the second Commission, as outlined in clause 4 of Bill-70, was much
broader and gave a better idea ofwhat law reform entailed. Whereas the first
Commission was required to review any enactment (statute or regulation)
that was requested by the Attorney General and to recommend changes,
to consider, at the request of the Attorney General, any matter that might
become the subject of an enactment, and to recommend new legislation,
if required, and to inquire into and consider any matters relating to the
reform of the law,2 19 clause 4 of Bill-70 described the object or purpose of
the second Commission as follows:
[T]o review the law of the Province and any matter relating to law in
the Province and to make recommendations for the improvement,
modernization and reform, including, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, recommendations for
(a) development of new approaches to, and new concepts of, law that
serve the changing needs of society and of individual members of
society;
215. Ibid at 4350 (Bernard Boudreau).
216. Ibid at 4335 (Hon Thomas McInnes).
217. Ibid.
218. Ibid at 4341 (John MacEachern) & 4350 (Bernard Boudreau).
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(b) clarification and simplification of the law;
(c) removal of provisions of the law that are outdated;
(d) improvement of the administration of justice;
(e) review of judicial and quasi-judicial procedures.220
This mandate has several features that are similar to mandates given to
the English Law Reform Commission of 1965221 and the Canadian Federal
Law Reform Commission.2 2 2 Besides being required to review the law of
the province in any matter relating to it, which is a huge task in itself, the
Commission is also required to recommend changes that will modernize
and hopefully improve the existing law. In clauses 4(a) through 4(e)
the Bill tries to clarify what improving, modernizing and reforming can
encompass. Clause 4(b) and 4(c) are usually referred to by law reformers
as legal housekeeping activities. Although very important to public
perception of the law and its administration, they do not have the broad
sweep of clause 4(d) or 4(e) or the very broad vision of clause 4(a). Clause
4(a), in particular, challenges the Commission to stretch its vision of what
law is, or entails, to identify the changing needs of society, and to develop
new concepts and approaches to law that will satisfy such needs. In other
words, the Commission is given free reign to exercise its imagination and
ingenuity in an effort to reform the law. It is no wonder then that some
members of the legislature were concerned about the Commission's ability
to carry out its mandate in relation to whatever law reform initiatives it
decided to undertake, let alone whatever additional requests the Attorney
General might make for law reform projects.
Why did the Conservative government decide to create another law
reform commission? There appeared to have been a number of factors
at play. As frontline observers of legal defects in need of reform and
practitioners forced to work with or around such defects, members of
the Nova Scotia Bar would naturally have a continuing interest in the
resurrection of a law reform commission. During the debate on Bill-70
opposition members took every opportunity to criticize the government
for allowing the first Law Reform Advisory Commission to expire, and
several members mentioned discussions they had with the government
prior to the enactment of Bill-70 about the possibility of revising the
dormant Commission. As one opposition critic put it, the House was
operating very much in a void during the ten years without a Commission
to help bring forth legislation that would innovate and "blaze new trails
220. Bill-70, supra note 208, cl 14.
221. Supra note 20.
222. Supra note 21.
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in the area of legislation."2 2 3 By allowing the 1969 Commission to remain
dormant the House was "missing a real opportunity to involve the people
and institutions who could be a great benefit to this House."2 2 4
A second factor involved the events leading up to the Marshall
Inquiry that submitted its report in 1989.225 This important Report created
awareness in Nova Scotia of the need to reform the administration of
justice in the province. It suggested that the legal system was seen, at least
by some segments of the population, as not responding adequately to the
rapidly changing needs of society.
A third factor may have been the appearance in 1989 of an article in
a local Halifax newspaper quoting the remarks of the Chair of the Federal
Law Reform Commission, Allan Linden as saying that Nova Scotia needed
pressure for reform because it was not one of the progressive provinces on
law reform.2 2 6 The absence of a body to carry on systematic, continuous
law reform activities involving broad consultation, and the need for such a
body, seemed to be demonstrated by the great difficulties the government
experienced trying to get a consensus on proposed legislation involving
the Children 's Services Act.227 Conflicting views on important social
policy issues fundamental to the Act, which prevented a consensus being
achieved, was attributed to the failure of the government to conduct a broad
consultation approach seeking the views of affected parties. This was the
very kind of approach that a law reform body would have undertaken
if there had been one. Bad publicity such as this probably added to the
pressure on the government to reinstitute a commission.
Nineteen-ninety also saw the results of an important initiative to
investigate the possible reform of the courts in Nova Scotia with the
creation of the Nova Scotia Court Structure Taskforce appointed by the
Attorney General.22 8 The Taskforce was given a broad mandate, which
included investigating whether or not the County and Supreme Courts
should be merged and whether a Unified Family Court should be created,
as well as a Traffic Court. The Taskforce was also mandated to investigate
procedures before the courts, enforcement of court orders, bylaws and small
claims orders, as well as the development of judicial case management,
automation of court administration, the role of masters, registrars and
223. Supra note 206 at 4349 (Bernard Boudreau).
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225. Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on The Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Commissioners'
Report (Halifax: 1989).
226. Supra note 197 at Al.
227. Supra note 206 at 4346 (Alexa McDonough); Children s Service Act, RSNS 1989, c 68, as it
appeared on June 1989.
228. Supra note 44.
390 The Dalhousie Law Journal
referees and the use of alternate dispute resolution techniques. This was
clearly a broad reform initiative and the kind of project that might have
been carried out by a body such as a law reform commission.229
Finally, as the last factor pressuring the government to get back into
the law reform business, a private members' bill was introduced by a
member of the opposition on 6 March 1990 that proposed amendments
to the original 1969 Law Reform Advisory Commission Act.230 These
amendments, if enacted, would have given more independence to the
first Commission by allowing it to select its own reform projects without
first seeking approval of the Attorney General.231 The Bill also proposed
creating the position of director of research of the Commission, a position
that would be held by a member of the Dalhousie Law Faculty appointed
by the Dean.232 By so doing, it was hoped that the director would enlist the
help of law students as researchers for the Commission.233
Which of the above factors was the most influential in convincing the
government to introduce Bill-70 to the House is unknown, but historically
the bar had continuously advocated for the creation of a law reform
commission to replace the first Commission.234
The second "independent" Law Reform Commission commenced
operations in February of 1991 with the appointment of the first
commissioners.235 The Commission had no institutional structure, other
than a notional budget of $300,000, with which to begin its primary task
of law reform, but that did not stop the commissioners from getting to
work immediately. Within three days of their appointments commissioners
had their first Commission meeting and within two weeks had convened
a meeting with Legislative Counsel, the Chair of the 1969 Advisory
Commission in 1980 when it ceased to operate, Linden Smith, and the
then current Chair of the New Brunswick Law Reform Commission.236
The first three months of operation concentrated upon the building of
the institutional infrastructure of the Commission, gathering background
information relevant to the law reform process, trying to establish criteria
229. See, Terms of Reference of the Charles Report 1991, ibid at 6-7.
230. Bill-24 An Act to amend Chapter 251 of the Revised Statues of 1989. The Law Reform Act, 2nd
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for the selection of reform projects, and trying to develop their own
philosophy or approach to law reform. Clearly, there was a lot of work
to do.23 7 In the first fourteen months of operation the Commission met 34
times.
The Commission began its operations in offices quite physically
removed from the Department of Justice offices in downtown Halifax.
Operations commenced with one full-time and one part-time secretary/
administrator. From February until July 1991 the Commission had no
executive director and no legal research officer. With the appointment of
its first legal research officer, the Commission was able to hold a weekend
conference to consider the selection of projects. The Commission chose
as its very first project the enforcement of maintenance orders. The
Commission was aware of changes to the law that had taken place in
other provinces and was concerned about the delays that existed under
the present system in Nova Scotia as well, and the inconsistent way the
Family Maintenance Act2 38 was currently being applied. The Commission
was also aware of public concern with the problem of enforcement.2 3 9
Within three weeks of choosing its first project, the Commission
received a formal request from the Attorney General to consider the state
of administrative law in the province and to provide specific input into new
proposed administrative law procedures and practices that the government
wanted to incorporate into legislation scheduled for the fall of 1991.240 This
was a hugely important and broad project for a Commission who had yet
to hire an executive director who would direct all of its research efforts. In
fact, the Commission's first executive director, Dr. Moira McConnell was
not hired until January 1992 and then only on a part-time basis because
of her law school commitments. Ms. McConnell assumed her full-time
duties as Director on 1 July 1992.241 In the interim the Commission's
President, Professor Charles, took on these duties. Because of the breadth
and complexity of the administrative law of reference, the Commission
hired, on a contract basis, a second legal research officer.2 4 2
In December 1991, the Commission decided to undertake a third
project, (the second of its own choosing), in the area of domestic violence.
The purpose of the project was "to examine how the legal system deals
237. Ibid at 3-5. See Appendix 9 for a list of factors the 2nd Commission considered during their
discussions relating to both existing laws and proposed, future law.
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with the issue of spousal assault."243 The Commission noted that there
was a growing interest at all levels of government in law reform and
other initiatives in this area. 244 One important question was whether
any deficiencies in the legal approach to domestic abuse was a result of
inadequate laws or rather, the way the law was currently being utilized to
deal with the problems. An additional legal research officer was hired on
contract to conduct the necessary research for this project. Thus, in the
space of one year, the new Commission had developed its institutional
underpinnings, hired staff, found physical accommodations from which
to conduct its operations, selected two projects for reform and received a
third project in the form of a government reference, a project that had the
potential to be larger than the other two combined. The second Commission
appeared to be offto a fast start. But in spite of the Commission's best efforts
there were members of the Nova Scotia Bar and Law Foundation who, by
April 1992, thought that the Commission was doing nothing but dealing
with administrative matters since no product had yet been produced by the
Commission. Such concerns were expressed to the Executive Director.245
The fact that the Commission was without a full-time Executive Director
until July 1992 and without a permanent full-time secretary, was either
not considered to be a sufficient reason for the lack of any final reports or,
alternatively, was not known to the critics.
2. How the Commission saw itself
Early annual reports of the Commission show that it did recognize that
the Nova Scotia legislature had given it several important and distinctive
characteristics, not necessarily shared by other law reform commissions
in Canada and elsewhere. 2 46 These characteristics have already been
discussed, 247 but it is important to realize that the commissioners themselves
were very much aware of them, and particularly, the major hallmark or
anchor of the Commission, "its statutorily guaranteed independence."248
This was a quality which the commissioners saw reflected in the following
way and which bear repeating:
(a) a statutory requirement that the Commission include a non-
legally trained Commissioner who would not bring to the table the
traditional perspectives and approach of a legally trained person;
243. Ibid at 9-10.
244. Ibid.
245. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (24 April 1992) [unpublished, archived
at the Law Reform Commission Office].
246. Supra note 235 at 1.
247. See Discussion of Bill-70 and its provisions in section IV(1) above.
248. Ibid and supra note 235 at 1.
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(b) the ability of the Commission to review the administration ofjustice
as a whole and not merely the substance of statutes and regulations,
in other words the Commission could review not only the substance
of the law but, just as important, the way it was used or applied;
(c) the ability of the Commission to choose its own projects and, hire its
own staff, including the Executive Director;
(d) the ability to manage its own budget once funds were allocated;
(e) the ability to select its own President.
Commission financing was to be shared equally by the government and
the private sector to promote independence. These features were dictated
by the founding statute and expressed the will of the legislature, but the
Commission had also developed its own philosophy of law reform and its
own law reform process.
During the first two years of its life the second Independent
Commission tried to develop and articulate its philosophy of law reform
and to indicate what were some of the underlying themes that would
drive the reform process. One such important theme was the belief that
both the public and government needed to be better informed "about the
nature of law as a method of communication between society and elected
representatives."2 4 9 The concern seemed to be that if the law of the land did
not reflect the needs and aspirations of society, as interpreted by its elected
representatives, there would be an unwanted and unnecessary disconnect
between the two groups. It was the Commission's conviction that it was
important to educate the public and government about the idea of law
and its role in society, as well as the concept of law reform as a process
and that this function was as important as reforming specific areas of the
substantive law.250
A second Commission theme involved the question of how success in
law reform should be measured.2 5 1 This was important to the Commission
because of its conviction that law should not be changed just for the
sake of change. If for example, thorough background research revealed
that the problem was not inadequate or defective legislative provisions
but a failure to apply or administer those laws effectively, then as far
as the Commission was concerned, the law should not be changed but
rather its administration should be improved. If this was the perceived
solution then the Commission would so recommend and would not
249. SecondAnnual Report of The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 1992-1993 (Halifax) at
2.
250. Ibid.
251. This issue was raised and discussed in the commission's Second Annual Report, ibid.
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recommend changing the old law by statutory amendment. Similarly, if
the Commission was convinced that legislative changes were necessary
and should be recommended, but the evidence showed that the necessary
human or physical resources could not be found to make the proposed
legislative changes effective, then, in their view, legislation, however
much it might be needed, would not be recommended. The Commission
also acknowledged that proposed legislative reform, even if not capable
of implementation, could still have some educational value in the sense
of showing what should be done. Nevertheless, it was also the view that
proposing stillborn legislation in these circumstances would constitute a
disservice to the community.2 5 2
The third underlying theme or conviction of the Commission flowed
from its desire to educate the public and the government about the nature
or idea of the law and its important function in society. However, to do so
required greater public discussion and interest in the work of government
and the contribution that law reform can make to developing a society
that better meets the needs of all people in the province.2 5 3 Expanding a
public discussion would require broad consultation with the citizens of
Nova Scotia who would or might be affected by the law being reviewed
and changed.254
The Commission recognized the diverse societal natures of both
Canada and Nova Scotia and considered that an important role for the
Commission, as a law reform agency was, through its actions, to legitimate
and give voice to the validity of pluralism in Nova Scotia's society.2 5 5 It
was the Commission's belief that they had an obligation to actively seek
the participation of all Nova Scotians in the reform process and they
proposed doing this by "affirmative consultation." Although involving
many different aspects, one essential characteristic was "the recognition
that the Law Reform Commission is not only a public service but is,
through its very existence, part of the law reform culture and that the way
in which it acts also causes changes." 25 6
Finally, the Commission was of the view that socio-economic
development will not occur in the absence of equality. This belief is
252. Ibid.
253. Ibid at 3.
254. First Annual Report, supra note 235 at 2.
255. Fourth Annual Report of The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 1994-1995 (Halifax) at
12.
256. Ibid at 10.
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reflected in the Commission's acknowledged focus upon equality in its
early project selection.2 5 7
The Commission decided early on that it was very important to
establish, as soon as possible, its identity and credibility with the public,
government, Bar, and other reform agencies.25 To do this, the Commission
decided that an ambitious and diverse programme of research, involving
what might be considered difficult or contentious areas of the law, would
generate the sought after interest in the Commission and its reform work.
The Commission thought that such undertakings in reform would have
greater impact and service more needs in the community than developing
one or two more modest straightforward projects. The initial hope was to
produce one final report per year.2 59
The Commission's philosophy of public involvement in the reform
process via broad discussion of its projects also produced a second strategic
initiative. Copies of Commission reports were given wide distribution free
of charge and summaries of reports were published in three languages,
English, French and Mi'kmaq. Reports were written as much as possible
in plain language to allow the public to participate in discussions in a
reasonably informed manner.2 6 0
A third stratagem involved a request to the government to increase
the size of the commission to seven Commissioners with the hope that the
additional two members would be appointed as representatives of minority
groups and thus more fully ensure a perspective from people whose needs
might differ significantly from the majority.2 6 1
A final strategy focused upon the Commission's commitment
to close liaison and cooperation with other agencies engaged in law
reform, particularly the Department of Justice and other departments of
government.2 6 2 Recognizing the fact that its independence meant much
less direct interaction with the Department of Justice and the Legislative
Counsel's office than was the case with the Advisory Commission, the
second Commission nevertheless saw the need to share information about
reform research and initiatives with the government. The government
257. Fifth Annual Report of The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 1995-1996 (Halifax) at 13.
258. ThirdAnnual Report of The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 1993-1994 (Halifax) at 1.
259. Ibid at 1-6.
260. Fifth Annual Report, supra note 257 at 2.
261. Second Annual Report, supra note 249 at 3.
262. Ibid at 2-3. The executive director noted that the Commission had "focused on a cooperative
and consultative approach to its research work. Where possible every effort is made to ensure that the
research carried out is made available to other agencies in both governmental and nongovernmental
sectors to avoid duplication and to assist where other agencies have a similar interest in a research
topic but may not have the resources to do the necessary research"
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also saw benefits in a collaborative approach. This is reflected by the
cooperation and coordination experienced in early projects between the
government and the Commission. For example, the Administration of
Justice Project required the collection of basic data from approximately
400 administrative tribunals. Besides providing additional research funds
specifically for the project, the Nova Scotia government assisted with the
collection of data by having the Commission's request for completion of a
questionnaire accompanied by a letter from the Premier himself requesting
tribunal cooperation.263 Since this was a government reference perhaps
such cooperation should not be too surprising.
In other instances, the Commission cooperated with other non-
governmental agencies or equality and advocacy groups by suspending
work on projects currently being researched by these groups.26 4 There were
other occasions upon which the government and the Commission worked
on similar projects with varying degrees of liaison and cooperation.265
In perhaps what was the clearest evidence of government/Commission
cooperation, the Department of Justice and the Commission issued
simultaneous joint press releases that provided details of their two different
approaches to the problem of domestic violence, with the explanation that
it was in the best interest of the public to show two different approaches
and solutions to the same problem.266
As an additional courtesy, the Commission regularly provided the
Department of Justice, or other affected government departments, with
advance copies of relevant discussion papers and final reports so that they
would have time to react in an informed manner to immediate questions
and inquiries.26
The general work process268 adopted by the second commission
involved five distinct stages as follows:
Stage one: Project Selection;
Stage two: Project design/feasibility study;
Stage three: Research/advisory;
Stage four: Discussion Paper/Consultation;
Stage five: Final Reports/Recommendations.
263. Second Annual Report, supra note 249 at 19.
264. The Human Rights Project is an example of such an approach
265. Such projects as Adult Guardianship, Electronic Information, Adoption Information, Civil
Procedure rules, Court Structured Settlements and Contaminated Sites.
266. Second Annual Report, supra note 249 at 17.
267. Third Annual Report, supra note 258 at 15.
268. The general work process involving different stages of research is outlined in the Commission's
Second Annual Report, supra note 249 at 10-11.
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Stage number one Project Selection
Project selection theoretically presupposes some objective criteria that
can be applied when making decisions about new reform projects. The
second Commission did try to enumerate relevant factors that could
apply to both existing laws and new proposed laws.2 6 9 But there is one
other important factor in project selection, not necessarily the first to be
considered, that involves areas of reform or specific projects undertaken
by other law reform agencies. Experience has shown that similar areas
of law in different common law jurisdictions tend to need updating and
improvement as the years go by and societies evolve. Reform activities
by other law reform agencies can either encourage a local reform agency
to select a project or might confirm a decision already made for other
reasons. The second Law Reform Commission in Nova Scotia, like the
Advisory Commission, was well aware of the reform initiatives of other
reform agencies and took guidance from their efforts.
Stage number two-Project designfeasibility study
In the second stage, staff engaged in preliminary research work to
determine the size and cost of the project, whether it was useful and viable,
and also considering its potential relation to other work in the community.
To take an example, because there was concern within the Commission
that the size and scope of the Administrative Law Project (ABC Project)2 70
would engage all of the Commission resources, the Commission asked a
legal research officer to prepare a viability study that would determine the
scope, timing of the project, and resources required.2 71 Although the ABC
Project was a government reference, the Commission could theoretically
have refused to take on the project if it decided that it could not meet
government deadlines or it could not do so with resources available.
During its first five years the Commission required feasibility studies for
two other potential projects, which included Children and the Law (project
not undertaken) and Enduring Powers of Attorney (project undertaken).2 72
Stage number three Research/advisory
If the decision is made to take on a project with or without a feasibility
study being done, the third stage consists of a research brief being
completed or prepared by a Liaison Committee comprised of one or more
commissioners, the researcher assigned to the project and the executive
269. See Appendix 9.
270. See above, the text accompanying note 240.
271. First Annual Report, supra note 235 at Appendix C.
272. Ibid at Appendix E.
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director. The research brief, in addition to providing basic research data
about the project, also contains proposed recommendations for reform. Such
recommendations are usually developed through specific consultations
and advisory meetings among the Liaison Committee, affected people in
the community and the government.273 The research brief is submitted to
the commissioners but is not circulated to the public at this stage.
Stage number four Draft discussion paper
This paper contains the initial positions or conclusions that the
commissioners have reached on various issues, having taken into account
the recommendations put forth in the research brief. The discussion paper
is given broad public consultation and comments are invited. A copy of
the discussion paper on each project is provided to affected government
departments prior to general release. A summary of the paper is translated
into French and Mi'kmaq languages and a period of several months is
allowed for responses and comments to be received by the Commission.
The Commission tries to arrange for media coverage of discussion papers
to promote public discussion and meetings are arranged with interested
groups to provide information as well.274
Stage five Final reports/recommendations
After public submissions and comments have been received and reviewed
by the Commission, a final report with recommendations and draft
legislation, if appropriate, is provided to the Minister of Justice and other
affected ministers. The final report is also given wide public distribution
and may include changes to proposed recommendations contained in
the discussion paper, based on public reaction to the discussion paper
recommendations.
Apart from terminology differences, the main distinction between
the general work process of the Advisory Commission and the second
Commission is the addition of an extra stage by the second Commission,
that is, the project Design/Feasibility Stage Two.
273. Second Annual Report, supra note 249 at 11.
274. Ibid.
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3. Accomplishments or productivity of the Commission
During the 27 years between 1990 and 2017, the Second Commission
produced 53 reports, composed of discussion papers, final reports and three
other related reports. 2 75 Twenty-five of the 53 reports were final reports. 2 76
Of the 25 final reports, 2 recommended new legislation to cover
previously unregulated areas ofthe law, eight recommended modernization
by replacement ofexisting statutes with new legislation, seven recommended
amendments to existing statutes, three recommended changes to common
law rules, three recommended changes to administrative practice or
procedures, and one recommended no action at all.2 7 7 Twelve of the final
reports were implemented by the Nova Scotia government and brought
about changes to the justice system in some way with an implementation
rate of 48 percent. If projects recommending administrative action rather
than legislative action are included, the success ratio increases to 56
percent. 2 78 As the Commission emphasized in its annual reports, education
of the general public and government officials regarding the law and
law reform was considered to be of equal value and importance to the
Commission.279 How well this goal was achieved is impossible to measure,
but it did not appear to translate into public support for the Commission in
2015-16 when the government decided to withdraw Commission funding.
It took, on average, 2.9 years to complete a Commission reform project,
3.27 years for government references and 2.6 years for non-govemment
projects. 28 0 Six government references took between 1 and 3 years to
complete 28 1 while 4 of them took 4 to 6 years. 28 2 Of the 15 non-govemment
references, 10 took I to 3 years to complete and 5 more than 3 years but
not more than 5 years. 28 3 The longer time required to complete some
projects can be partially attributed to withdrawal or reduction of funds
by the government or the Law Foundation causing a temporary halt to
275. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 2014-2015
(Halifax) at 4, which states that the Commission has published 51 project reports and papers. In
August 2015 the Commission published its final Report on Powers of Attorney, bringing the total to
52. And in September 2017 a final report was published on the division of family property, bringing
the total to 53.
276. See Appendix 10 for a list of completed projects.
277. See Appendix 11 for the projects involved.
278. These included projects dealing with: (1) Domestic Violence (training program developed),
(2) Administrative Law Reform (training program for tribunal chairs and members developed), (3)
Human Rights and (4) Seniors Only Housing (Commission recommended no legislative change).
279. See the text accompanying note 253, above.
280. See Appendix 12.
281. Ibid.
282. Ibid.
283. Ibid.
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Commission work on some projects. In other cases, the broad consultation
process adopted by the Commission was the cause. In still other cases, the
complexity of the project under taken required more extensive research
and thus more time to complete.
In total, the Commission worked on and reviewed 34 different
projects, not all of which resulted in the production of a final report.2 8 4
While recognizing there is bound to be a certain amount of overlap in
broadly described categories and that the categories themselves are subject
to subjective delineation, it appears that family law was the area subjected
to most review with twelve reform projects undertaken in this area.285 The
second most reviewed area is best described as involving the administration
of justice, with nine projects in this area.286 These projects covered issues
involving the structure of legal institutions, as well as their procedures and
administrative practices. The remaining eight projects dealt with private
law-tort and contract, mortgages, electronic information, human rights
and property.
Several of the projects endeavoured to provide additional legal
protection to various vulnerable groups in Nova Scotia society and to
address equality concerns.287 Although important social policies were also
involved in many of these projects, none involved recommendations that
would create radical changes in the social order.
The most prevalent reason or basis for recommending reform was to
modernize outdated statutes whose provisions no longer were considered
suitable to regulate particular areas of the law brought about by changes
in technology, social values or changing circumstances. The need for
reform was often brought to the attention of the Commission by the Bar or
public groups who experienced daily problems dealing with outdated legal
provisions. The need for change was often recognized by the Commission
itself when it reviewed the reform projects of other law commissions.
Fourteen of their reform projects were taken on in order to modernize
areas of the law.288
A second important motivating reason for reform was the need to make
the administration of justice more effective and efficient. Access to justice
issues promoted simpler, less costly legal processes and procedures, as
exemplified in 10 reform projects.289 Several of these were large projects
284. See Appendix 10 for a list of the 34 projects.
285. See Appendix 13.
286. Ibid.
287. See Appendix 14.
288. Ibid.
289. See Appendix 12.
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taking 4, 5 or 6 years to complete and included the ABC Project.2 9 0 Other
projects included reform of the Juries Act291 and the Probate Act,292 as
well as an empirical review of the operations of the Small Claims Court.
Other smaller but related projects involved interim payments of damages,
vexatious litigants and court structured settlements.293
Some reform projects were more concerned with the way the law was
being administered, and therefore focussed their recommendations, not
on reform of substantive law, but on the application or administration of
that law by those charged to do so to make it more effective. Projects
having this emphasis and recommendations included an enforcement of
maintenance orders, domestic violence and human rights. Several reform
projects addressed the need to provide additional new legal options for
particular situations and constituencies, such as projects on living wills and
mortgage remedies. Still other projects were needed to correct a specific
common law anomaly, such as a problem with the Tortfeasor & Act,2 9 4 and
the rule against perpetuities. The need to clarify the law was often only one
factor in many projects, but was the main reason for reform in the project
dealing with minors consent to medical treatment.
4. Three perennial concerns of the Commission
Almost a decade after it began its operations, the Executive Director of the
Nova Scotia Commission, John Briggs, noted in his 11th Annual Report
(31 March 2002) that the Commission faced three distinct but interrelated
challenges going forward. 29 5 They were the need to: establish stable, long
term funding; have the Commission seen by the public and government as
a credible agency for reform, producing reports and recommendations for
reform that were not only of high quality but relevant to the solution of
persisting legal deficiencies that affected all Nova Scotians; and, finally to
develop broader and deeper public support for its work, as well as support
from the judiciary, the Bar, the government and the academic community.
Funding was not a new concern for the Commission. As far back
as November 1992 the then Executive Director, Moira McConnell, had
expressed concern to the commissioners about the ability of the Law
Foundation to continue to match the government's financial contribution
to the Commission in the light of lower Foundation revenues caused by
290. Ibid; Also see the text accompanying notes 5, 240, 270, above.
291. JuriesAct, RSNS 1989 c 242.
292. Probate Act, RSNS 1989 c 359 as amended by SNS 1992 c 16, SNS 1994 c 28, SNS 1994-95 c
7, and SNS 1996 c 23.
293. See Appendix 14.
294. TortfeasorsAct, RSNS 1989 c 471.
295. Eleventh Annual Report, supra note 7 at 7-8.
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falling interest rates. In her second Annual Report 1992-1993, McConnell
states that the Commission would be unable to take on any new projects,
unless they were government references and accompanied by financial
assistance.2 9 6 This situation led the Commission to consider possible
alternate funding sources in the form of direct payments from individual
government departments for research work done by the Commission to
support specific departmental reform initiatives.2 9 7 Fortunately, the Law
Foundation was able to match the government's contribution of $150,000
in the fiscal year 1993-1994. However, that proved to be the highwater
mark of the Law Foundation funding because for the next 4 years, the
Foundation's contribution consistently diminished until it reached zero in
1997-1998.298
By 1994-1995 general Commission revenues had decreased by 20
percent with more decreases expected in 1995-96. In her 4thAnnual Report
Executive Director McConnell writes that "[t]he funding position of the
Commission has been tenuous since its inception and remains so from
year to year as its two funding sources, the Department of Justice and The
Law Foundation, have each had to reduce their budgets."2 99 As indicated
above, in 1997-1998 the Law Foundation was unable to supply any funds
to the Commission and the Commission was able to continue operating
only because the government increased its contribution from $150,000
to $200,000 and the Commission, luckily, had a surplus of $50,000 in
its budget due to a staff reduction. The Commission's total budget for
1997-1998 was therefore $250,000 as opposed to its initial starting budget
of $300,000.300 By 1998-1999 the Commission was running a deficit of
$17,000.301
The Law Foundation did manage to increase its funding contribution
to $100,000 in the fiscal year 2000-2001, but in April 2000 the government
notified the Commission that it would be unable to provide any funds for
the fiscal year 2001-2002.302 It was against this backdrop that Executive
Director John Briggs noted the need for stable funding and the Commission
296. Second Annual Report, supra note 249 at 7.
297. Memorandum from Dr ML McConnell, Executive Director, to the Law Reform Commissioners
(23 November 1992) [unpublished, archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
298. See Appendix 15.
299. Fourth Annual Report, supra note 255 at 7.
300. Sixth AnnualReport of the Law Reform Commission ofNova Scotia 1996-1997 (Halifax) at 9.
301. Eighth Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 1998-1999 (Halifax) at
Appendix B.
302. Tenth Annual Report ofthe Law Reform Commission ofNova Scotia 2000-2001 (Halifax) at 9.
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decided not to plan for any new projects.3 0 3 Faced with what might be the
end of its operations, the Commission decided to concentrate its efforts on
finishing those projects already underway.
The Commission was fortunate that the Law Foundation eventually
agreed to provide funding in the amount of $250,000 per year for three
years from 2001 to 2004.304 In return for this financial bailout, the Law
Foundation required the Commission to prepare a report for the Foundation
respecting the Commission's mission, governance, staffing arrangements,
and operations. The Commission used the report as an opportunity to
engage in a self examination of the Commission and its operations. The
Report titled "A Continuing Need for Law Reform: The Case for the Law
Reform Commission of Nova Scotia," was published in January 2001 and
given wide circulation in Nova Scotia.3 05
The Report evaluated the position occupied in the legal and legislative
landscape by the Commission in Nova Scotia and reviewed the experience
of other law reform bodies in Canada, as well as in a number ofjurisdictions
throughout the world. The Report also addressed such questions as whether
there was a need for a law reform commission in Nova Scotia, what had
been its achievements, and what, if anything, should be changed about the
Commission. The Report concluded that funding remained a consistent,
continuing problem and weakness and the key to the Commission's future
viability depended upon the government recognizing the clear benefits of
a permanent, full time and independent law reform body, and providing it
with sufficient and regular financial support. The Report also indicated that
most features relating to the current Commission had served Nova Scotians
well and were not in need of change and that the Commission performed
an essential public service that was not and could not be provided by any
other entity. It concluded that the need for a permanent institution to carry
out law reform in Nova Scotia was more compelling than ever.30 6
In February 2003, the Commission received a letter from the Law
Foundation advising that it would not be able to sustain its pledged funding
of $250,000 due to the continuing decline of interest rates.3 0 7 Without
government support, any significant reduction below $250,000, in the
303. Ibid and Minutes ofthe Law Reform Commission ofNova Scotia (20 October 2000) [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
304. Eleventh Annual Report, supra note 7 at 7, 4.
305. Supra note 77.
306. Ibid, and also see the text accompanying note 77 above and following.
307. Twelfth Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 2002-2003 (Halifax:
April 2003) at 15.
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Commission's view, would mean the probable end of the Commission. As
it was stated in the Commission's 12th Annual Report 2002-2003:
It is clearly apparent that without a return of provincial government
funding support, the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia will have
to cease its operations by the fiscal year ending March 3, 2004.308
The Report then went on to critically observe:
It is ironic that at a time when Canada's federal Government is
supporting law reform initiatives in various parts of the world, and while
Commonwealth law Ministers are being urged by the Commonwealth
Secretariat to support independent law reform agencies, we inNova Scotia
face the real prospect of losing our own Law Reform Commission. 309
Ultimately, the government of Nova Scotia agreed to restore partial
funding for the Commission in the amount of $125,000, each year, for 2
years covering the period 2004-2006, on condition that the Commission
devote most of its resources over this time period to "participation in a
collaborative review and revision of the Nova Scotia Rules of Civil
Procedure" 3 10 (the Rules Project). The Law Foundation agreed to match
the government's contribution for two years as well. 311 In addition the
Commission requested supplemental funding of $34,500 to cover special
expenses related to the Rules Project. 312
The Rules Project turned out to be a lifesaver for the Nova Scotia
Commission, but it did mean that the Commission had little time to devote
to other reform projects. As the 14th Annual Report lamented "the fiscal
year just ended (31 March 2005) was unique in that for the first time the
focus of the Law Reform Commission was not on examining of the laws
of the Province with a view to recommending changes in the law but
rather a review of the Civil Procedure Rules that guide the workings of the
Nova Scotia Courts." 3 13 However, the Commission was still able to start a
project on vexatious litigants in 2005 .314 This project resulted directly from
308. Ibid at 16.
309. Ibid.
310. Thirteenth Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 2003-2004 (Halifax:
April 2004) at 7.
311. Ibid and Fourteenth Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (2004-2005
(Halifax: April 2005) at 11.
312. The Commission requested $17,500 from both the Government and the Law Foundation.
Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (20 May 2005) [unpublished, archived at
the Law Reform Commission Office]. The Commission received $20,000 from the Government-
Fourteenth Annual Report, ibid at 16.
313. Ibid. Fifteenth Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (Halifax: April
2006) at 5.
314. Ibid at 7.
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the research work done by the Commissioners on the Rules Project and
was recommended by the judiciary as an urgent project. At about the same
time, the Commission started another project of collaborative research
with Saint Mary's University, Halifax, examining the operations of the
Small Claims Court.3 1 5
The Nova Scotia Commission was not the only Commission struggling
to remain financially afloat. Other reform agencies in Canada continued to
be vulnerable to the competing claims put forth by other worthy claimants
for limited public funds. Although the international situation continued
to demonstrate the need for law reform as a necessary support for the
maintenance of the rule of law, the same need was not always seen or
appreciated to the same extent in Canada.
Law foundation funding reached its peak in 2008 when the Foundation
contributed $167,728.00 to the second Commission, but after that time
funding decreased continually until it reached its lowest point in 2015-
2016 at $96,070.00.316 In spite of efforts by the Commission to reduce costs
by moving the Commission to cheaper premises in 2014317 and reducing
publication costs, the Commission began to run deficits, $4,285.00 in the
fiscal period 2013-2014318 and $9,400.00 in the period 2014-2105.319
Finally, on 8 June 2015, the Commission was notified by the
government that funding would cease entirely by 31 March 2016.320 Given
the inability of the Law Foundation to come to the rescue a second time,
the government decision seemed to spell the end of the Commission. The
problem of financial instability was a real one for the Commission from
its beginning to its end and appears to have been the main reason for its
eventual demise.
As to the issue of relevance, in 1993, the then Executive Director ofthe
Second Commission, Moira McConnell, articulated to the commissioners
concerns that had been expressed to her by members of the Nova Scotia
Bar and the Law Foundation that the Commission needed to be seen as
a useful working group that carried out projects quickly, so that results
315. Ibid at 7.
316. See Appendix 15.
317. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, supra note 275 at 9.
318. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 2013-2014
(Halifax) at 8.
319. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, supra note 275 at 8.
320. Supra note 5.
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were relevant and of interest.321 Coming after only two full years of its
operation, such concerns might seem a little premature, but they were
taken seriously by the Commission. Usefulness and relevance in this
context appeared to relate to the timely production of Commission reports.
Relevancy was tied to timing rather than to the type of projects selected. As
McConnell explained to the Commission, it had to find a balance between
thoroughly researching projects and producing the results expeditiously.
She emphasized that the Commission could not run the risk of being
perceived as an "academic resource agency."322 As we have already
noted, the Commission had originally hoped to produce one report per
year but was unable to meet this goal.323 By taking on projects involving
more difficult social issues and engaging the public more actively in the
reform/consultation process, the Commission inevitably increased the
length of time required to produce a final report. In the first 5 years of
the Second Commission, on average, a final report took 2 years and 3
months to complete compared with 2 years and six months to 3 years in
the succeeding years.3 24
But usefulness as a goal had another meaning for the Commission. It
seems to have considered education of government and the public about
the nature of law and the reform process as a useful initiative on its part,
and one it wanted to pursue. This subjective view of the Commission's
usefulness by the Commission itself was also supported by more objective
evidence in the form of use of the Commission's reports by academics,
lawyers, judges and the public, even in cases where the reports did not
bring about legislative change. Comments made by Nova Scotia legislators
in the House lauding the work of the Commission added to the objective
evidence of usefulness.3 25 But would these expressions of approval
translate into public or government support for Commission funding, in
times of government financial constraint, requiring hard decisions by the
government?
About a decade later, the then Executive Director, John Briggs echoed
similar concerns that the Commission must be, and must be seen to be
321. The issue was originally raised in a Commission meeting on 24 April 1992 by Commissioners
Culley and Ring (Bar representatives) supra note 245 and discussed in more detail by the then
Executive Director in a special memo to the Commission dated 2 November 1993 [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
322. Ibid.
323. Supra note 249.
324. See Appendix 12.
325. As John Briggs noted in the Commission's Eleventh Annual Report, supra note 7 at 3 and
as detailed in Appendix G of the Commission's Special Report on "The Case For the Law Reform
Commission of Nova Scotia, December 2001." Supra note 77.
The Story of Law Reform in Nova Scotia: 407
A Perilous Enterprise
"helpful" and to demonstrate its "usefulness." In using these terms Mr.
Briggs appears to have meant that the Commission should undertake
reform projects that were relevant to the needs of the government, and
particularly to the public, in that they addressed social needs and cured
legal defects in a timely manner.3 2 6 The Commission did see evidence that
the public accepted the Commission as a public resource and, in this sense
was relevant, and the fact that the public was submitting an increasing
number of suggestions for reform projects. 32 7
If public support is taken to include public participation in the law
reform process by responding to Commission discussion paper proposals,
attending discussion groups, viewing the Commission's website or
contacting the Commission for legal information or advice, it would seem
that the second Commission had generated such support. But, if public
support also means actually lobbying or pressuring the government
to reinstate funding at times when it is withdrawn, or to provide public
testimonials as to the importance and value ofthe Commission as an agency
of law reform, we find little evidence of this in the history of the second
Commission. Admittedly, the public had not been called upon to express
its support for the Commission during the several funding crises already
chronicled, and we therefore have no way of knowing what support might
have been demonstrated had it been requested. With regard to the last and
fatal funding crisis in 2016, the Commission did solicit and receive the
support of the Bench, Bar, Academia and related agencies, such as the
Nova Scotia and Dal Legal Aid Societies, in the form of expressions of
support directed to the government, in hopes that the government decision
would be changed. The public, however, were never asked directly to
show their support. There were no editorials in newspapers, there was no
social media blitz and there were no public demonstrations outside the
legislature objecting to the funding cut. It is not clear how many members
of the public even knew that the funding had been withdrawn, and even
less clear what their reaction might have been.
5. Significant events in the life of the second Commission
In addition to the perennial problems of funding, public perception and
public support, just discussed, there were several important events that
had a significant impact upon the second Commission and its operations.
The first of these was publication of the Donald Marshall Inquiry Report
in 1989.328
326. Eleventh Annual Report 2001-2002, ibid at 8.
327. EighthAnnual Report, supra note 301 at 19-20.
328. Marshall Inquiry, supra note 225.
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This report highlighted deficiencies in the Nova Scotia criminal
justice system, in particular. It was against this backdrop that the second
Law Reform Commission was created in 1990. One question to consider
is what direct impact did the Marshall Inquiry have on the approach to
law reform taken by the Commission and in particular on its project
selection and operations? Commission Minutes show a decided difference
of opinion as to whether the Commission should specifically examine
the recommendations of the Marshall Inquiry, presumably to carry out
any needed reforms, or whether the Commission should only keep the
Marshall recommendations in mind when working on future projects,
particularly in relation to issues of access or inclusion or both to the justice
system.3 2 9 The issue was not directly resolved or put to a vote but the
Marshall recommendations by themselves were never the focus of later
Commission research or inquiry. The Commission did agree that it would
be appropriate for the Commission to request another community member
for the Commission be appointed, preferably an Aboriginal person.33 0
As a result of a meeting of the Commission held in 20 August 1992 it
was decided that a summer student be employed to do research in relation
to human rights in Nova Scotia and $1,500.00 was allocated to cover
the cost.3 3 1 The Federal Government also contributed $9,000.00 to assist
with research costs. But the project proved hard to define and the Human
Rights Commission3 3 2 did not seem to think any changes were needed to
the Act.3 3 3 Investigation and research into the project soon revealed that
the issues identified appeared to be more involved with resources and
implementation of the Act rather than legislative reform of the Act. In
addition, many of the issues had been covered fairly thoroughly in the
ABC Project.3 3 4 As a result, the Commission decided that a specific project
on issues raised by the Human Rights Act would not be appropriate and
that specific comment could be made in the ABC Project, which was
not yet completed, on the issue of the need for expeditious resolution
of violations and claims under the Act.3 35 That appeared to be the end of
the matter. However, we should keep in mind that the Human Rights Act
329. Supra note 245 at 17-21.
330. Memorandum from ML McConnell, Executive Director, to the Law Reform Commissioners (20
August 1992) [unpublished, archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
331. Ibid.
332. The Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission was created by the Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989,
c 214, s 22.
333. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (8 December 1995) at 8 [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
334. Ibid. Also see supra note 240.
335. Fifth Annual Report, supra note 257 at 34.
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Project was not the only one that had been initiated but not completed
by the Commission. There were four others, including minors consent to
health care 1999, adoption information (a Government Reference put on
hold in 2001 when government funding stopped), structured settlements
(government legislative changes pre-empted issue of Commission final
report) and, finally, electronic information law reform.
Not long after the Commission was created in 1990, and started actual
operations in 1992, interest rates in Nova Scotia experienced a sharp and
dramatic decline. The consequences were felt by the Law Foundation
which saw its revenues decrease sharply and, as a result, it's ability to fund
operations like the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission. For example,
the original arrangement was to have the Law Foundation match the
government contribution of 50 percent of a notional budget of $300,000,
if the Foundation had sufficient funds to do so. During the first 10 years
of the second Commission's operation, the Foundation was only able
to provide, on average, 31.6 percent of the Commission's budget. It is
therefore even more remarkable that the Law Foundation was able to fund
the Commission to the tune of $250,000.00 per year for three years during
the period 2001-2004. Between 2005 and 2015 the Law Foundation was
able to maintain its funding at the rate of 43 percent of the government's
contributions. In the final year of government funding, 2015, the Law
Foundation was able to supply 34 percent of the government contribution
or, in other words, $96,070.00.336
Over the entire 26 years of Commission operation, the Law Foundation
was only able to fund the Commission at a rate of 33 percent rather than
the hoped for 50 percent.3 3 7 Obviously, such a shortfall in Commission
revenues made operations much more difficult.
A third significant event, also involving funding, occurred in April
of 2000 when the government announced that the Commission would
no longer receive funding beginning 31 March 2001. As a result of this
unexpected action the Commission was forced to think about alternatives
to its way of operating and to explore new models of operation which
would, hopefully, address the recurring problem of funding law reform
in Nova Scotia.3 3 8 One useful by-product of the government decision to
336. See Appendix 15.
337. See Twelfth Annual report (2002-2003), supra note 307 at 15 where this ratio was first noted and
in 2016 by then President D. Jamieson in an internal Commission document prepared as a response to
media questions-April 6 [unpublished].
338. See the text accompanying note 296 and following. Also see the Minutes of the Law Reform
Commission of Nova Scotia (20 September 2001) [unpublished, archived at the Law Reform
Commission Office].
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stop funding was the preparation of a document by the Commission titled
"The Case for the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia."3 3 9 It also
prompted the Foundation to step in with funding at the rate of $250,000.00
for three years (until 2004).340
The possibility of some kind of collaboration with a university,
as part of the exercise by the Commission to explore alternate ways of
conducting law reform was initially raised by the Commission in the
process of preparing its document entitled "The Case for the Law Reform
Commission" in December of 2001. Some kind of partnership with either
Dalhousie Law School or Saint Mary's University was discussed in the
document.3 41 The purpose of such a partnership was to reduce costs and
demonstrate to the Law Foundation and government that the Commission
was exploring initiatives to do this. It was estimated that if the Commission
could transfer its operations to a university site, savings of approximately
$20,000.00 or more could be achieved.3 4 2 Partnership with Dalhousie Law
School appeared to be problematic because of the lack of space and other
considerations, so it was decided to focus the possibility of law reform
collaboration with Saint Mary's. 3 4 3
Discussions began in December of 2001 with meetings between the
Commission's Executive Director and Saint Mary's officials and continued
until March 2003 when a formal Memorandum of Understanding was
signed. 3 4 4 It was declared, among other things, that "Saint Mary's believes
in the importance of law reform to all Nova Scotians and wishes to assist
the Law Reform Commission with its work." 3 45 However, Saint Mary's
officials warned that space was a problem. There was one other factor
critical to the development of a successful partnership, whether with Saint
Mary's or Dalhousie, and that was the ability ofthe Commission to produce
evidence of financial viability; some assurance that the Commission had
the necessary core funding to continue operations. 3 46
The President of Saint Mary's met with the Attorney General in
early January 2004. He stressed the importance of the joint venture in
339. Supra note 77.
340. Tenth Annual Report, supra note 302 at 9.
341. Supra note 77.
342. One Commissioner estimated savings of between $20,000 and $40,000, see Minutes of the Law
Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (25 October 2002) at 4-5 [unpublished, archived at the Law
Reform Commission Office].
343. Supra note 338 at 3. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (19 June 2002)
[unpublished, archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
344. Twelfth Annual Report, supra note 307 at 11.
345. Ibid.
346. Minutes of the Commission, 19 July 2002, supra note 343.
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law reform with the Commission as well as the importance of funding
for the Commission by the government.3 47 The fact that Saint Mary's had
well-recognized courses in criminology and sociology meant that valuable
staff resources were available to engage in and support inter-disciplinary
work on law reform projects. In the fall of 2005 a Joint Research Project,
involving an examination and assessment of the Nova Scotia Small Claims
court, was initiated. Saint Mary's faculty provided the social science
expertise required for the project but investigative work revealed that there
was "shockingly little empirical socio-legal research being conducted in
Canada on the civil Justice system."3 48
Discussions with Saint Mary's regarding the availability of space on
campus took place between 2005 and 2009 but the problem was never
resolved and the Commission did not relocate to Saint Mary's.
The decision to seek a partnership with a university was driven by the
need to reduce rental costs as well as a desire to show the Commission's
two crucial funding agencies, the government and the Law Foundation,
that the Commission was trying to reduce the costs of law reform by
trying other methods of operation. Both the universities and Commission
hoped that such an arrangement would raise their public profile. The
Commission also believed that such collaboration would demonstrate
the benefits to be gained by engaging in more extensive interdisciplinary
work. The attempted partnership did produce a Final Report on the Small
Claims Court in March 2009. It also resulted in the appointment of John
McMullan, Professor of Sociology and Criminology at Saint Mary's, to
the Law Reform Commission and the appointment of William Lawrence,
the Commission's Legal Research Officer, as a part-time teacher at Saint
Mary's in the Faculty of Business and Business Law.3 4 9 The arrangement
was probably looked upon with favour by the Commission's two major
donors, but it did not save the Commission any money. Nevertheless,
government funding and Law Foundation funding was restored in whole
or in part anyway.
The Law Foundation's three year rescue grant was scheduled to end
on 31 March 2004 with no guarantee of further funding after that date.
In the Commission's 12th Annual Report (April 2002-31 March 2003)
the Commission warned "It is clearly apparent that without a return of
provincial government funding support, the Law Reform Commission of
347. Fifteenth Annual Report (2005-2006), supra note 313 at 6.
348. Professor McMullan was appointed a Commissioner in February 2006. See Seventeenth Annual
Report of the Law Reform Commission ofNova Scotia 2007-2008, (Halifax: April 2008) at 14.
349. Supra note 307 at 16.
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Nova Scotia will have to cease its operations by the fiscal year beginning
31 March 2004.""35 Coincidentally, however, the Civil Procedure Rules of
the province were in need of an overhaul, the last revision having taken
place 30 years before.
In 2002 the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society and the judiciary jointly
suggested that the Commission consider a revision of the Civil Procedure
Rules as a Commission Project (the Rules Project) and discussions began
between the Commission, the Barristers' Society and members of the
judiciary.3 5 1 At the same time the Commission was considering another
bigger and more wide-sweeping project described as Access to Justice.3 52
This broad umbrella project was intended to contain within it more
specific topics such as a simplified procedure for courts, contingency
fees, structured settlements, and the problem of self-represented litigants.
The Commission favoured their broader Access to Justice Project over
the Rules Project, since it was more like the normal projects that the
Commission usually undertook, and there seemed to be more of a role for
the Commission to play in such a larger project.35 3 The Deputy Minister
of Justice for Nova Scotia was reported as being receptive to the idea and
suggested that a proposal be submitted before the end of 2002.354
The Commission had already been looking for a project or projects
that would help it to extend its existence beyond 1 April 2004 when
the Law Foundation Rescue Grant ended. Originally, the Commission
envisaged a proposal for a project that would combine both the revision
of the rules as well as an access to justice component. It was thought
that if the Commission could carve out for itself a helpful role, it would
gain increased support from the Bar as well as the judiciary, and possibly
raise its public profile as well. However, the judiciary made it clear that
their priority was with the Rules Project and the role they saw for the
Commission was that as project administrator or secretariat rather than
providing research support.3 5 5
As a compromise, the Commission decided to submit a proposal before
the end of December 2002 for a Rules Project only, one that described the
350. Minutes ofthe Law Reform Commission ofNova Scotia (14 March 2002) [unpublished, archived
at the Law Reform Commission Office] and ibid at 10.
351. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission ofNova Scotia (18 April 2002) [unpublished, archived
at the Law Reform Commission Office].
352. Supra note 344 at 2. The Chief Justice favoured a broader Access to Justice type project. On 25
October 2002 the Commission struck a Committee to help define a Civil Justice Reform Project. Supra
note 342.
353. Ibid, at 1.
354. Ibid.
355. Ibid at 6.
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Commission's role as primarily administrative rather than research, but
which also suggested that the Commission staff could provide substantive
research support as well. Not all commissioners were happy with the
decision, however, even though the Commission had also decided to
continue planning for a separate Access to Justice Project and to seek
funding for such a project.3 5 6
At a meeting of the Commission on 19 June 2003 the Executive
Director advised the commissioners that no money would be forthcoming
from the government for a Rules Project.3 5 7 On the other hand, the good
news was that the Law Foundation had agreed to provide $125,000.00
for Commission operations from 1 April 2004-31 March 2005, if the
Commission could obtain $150,000.00 in funding from some other source.
The Commission therefore subsequently made an application to the
government for more funding in the amount of $125,000.00, slightly lower
than the normal annual funding of $150,000.00, but matching what the Law
Foundation had offered.3 5 8 In October 2003, the Deputy Minister of Justice
advised the Commission that the Department had $200,000.00 available,
but only for the current fiscal year ending in 31 March 2004. Moreover,
the money was only available on condition that the Commission devote all
of its resources for two years to a rewriting of the Civil Procedure Rules.
There was also the possibility of an additional $50,000.00, making a total
of $250,000.00 over two years. The Commission's role would be that of
secretariat with some research support to be provided.3 5 9
We can speculate about the reason or reasons for the Department of
Justice's decision to make the project funds available, even with conditions.
No doubt the judiciary, who were in favour of the Project, probably
exercised a little gentle persuasion and the fact that the Law Foundation
had offered to provide $125,000.00 for at least one extra year also helped.
There may have also been a genuine desire on the part of some senior
Justice Department staff to assist the Commission to keep it operational.
There were a number of serious issues the Commission had to consider
that flowed from this new arrangement. On the positive side, the two year
project would allow the Commission to continue operating after 31 March
2004 and perhaps encourage the Justice Department to provide more long-
356. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (10 December 2002) [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
357. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (19 June 2003) at 1 [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
358. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (3 September 2003) at 1 [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
359. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (21 October 2003) [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
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range core funding. Insofar as the revision of the Civil Procedure Rules
could be characterized as part of an Access to Justice Program, Saint
Mary's University might see the Commission's involvement as a positive
factor supporting the proposed move of the Commission to Saint Mary's.
There were other factors at work on the negative side, however.
First of all the $250,000.00 offered by the government was less than the
Commission had budgeted for the project. Also of considerable concern
was the lack of clarity about the Commission's role, and the fact that
the Rules Project was a very different project than the Commission had
undertaken in the past. The condition imposed by the government that
the Commission devote almost all of its time to the Rules Project meant
that there would be little additional time for the Commission to work on
other projects. The Commission might become both, in fact, and in public
perception, merely a research or administrative arm of the Project and
would continue to exist in name only as a Law Reform Commission. At
the beginning it was not clear who would lead the project and whether the
Commission would provide any research report at all or would only act as
a secretariat.360
At a Commission meeting on 18 November 2003 it was decided by
the Commission to agree in principle to the government's funding offer
and that a meeting would be sought with the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia to obtain a Memorandum of Understanding which would clarify
the Commission's role.36 1 In January of 2004 the Commission was invited
to participate in an all day "Chartering or planning session" along with
members of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, the
practicing Bar and Department of Justice representatives.3 6 2
In March of 2004 the Commission began to receive materials from the
"Chartering Session" which provided for the development of a Steering
Committee and the creation of eight other working committees who would
concentrate on revising different parts of the Rules.3 6 3 By July of 2004
the Commission staff was fully engaged with the Rules Project. It had
been expected by all parties that the research support component of the
Rules Project carried out by the Commission would be finished by April
360. Ibid.
361. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (18 November 2003) [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
362. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (13 January 2004) at 2-3 [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office] indicate that a "Chartering session" was planned for
17 January 2004. See also Thirteenth Annual Report 2003-2004, supra note 310 at 12 & 13.
363. Fourteenth Annual Report (2004-2005), supra note 311 at 7, and Minutes of the Law Reform
Commission ofNova Scotia (2 March 2004) [unpublished, archived at the Law Reform Commission
Office].
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2005, at which point drafting of the rules would begin.3 6 4 As it turned
out, the drafting stage did not start until November 2005 with completion
not expected until February 2006.365 Contrary to initial expectations, the
Commission continued to receive requests from the drafters for research
reports relating to the drafting exercise until the end of 2007.366 The Judges
approved the Rules in the spring of 2008, at which time the Commission
staff was still engaged in support work for the Project. A two-year project
had developed into one that lasted six years from the proposal stage and
four years from the time that work started on the Project.
In spite of devoting most of its time to the Rules Project from 2004
to 2008, the Commission was still able to complete several other projects,
including a final report on Privity of Contract, a background paper on
Court Structured Settlements, and a project on Vexatious Litigants.3 6 7
The government also sent the Commission a Reference on Grand Parent-
Grand Child: Access.3 68 The fact that the Commission was able to meet
significant research and administrative demands placed upon it by virtue of
its involvement in the Rules Project, speaks volumes about the dedication
and perseverance of Commission staff, particularly Bill Lawrence, who
shouldered the bulk of the research demands.
Without a doubt, the Rules Project, coming as it did just before the Law
Foundation grant expired in 2004, saved the Commission from extinction.
It allowed the Law Foundation to match the government funding and,
although it was basically project funding, it supported the Commission
financially until core funding by the government could be restored. The
price paid by the Commission was reduced project output for about four
years.
The Commission's second major funding crisis was precipitated
on 8 June 2015 by the arrival of the government notice warning that
Commission funding would be completely cut off as of 31 March 2016. As
soon as the notice was received, the President of the Commission, Darlene
Jamieson, arranged meetings with the Deputy Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Justice to discuss the decision and to try to get it reversed. A
364. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (2 November 2005) [unpublished,
archived at the Law Reform Commission Office].
365. Ibid.
366. Minutes of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (27 November 2006) at 2 and (30
January 2008) at 2 [unpublished, archived at the Law Reform Commission Office] and Seventeenth
Annual Report, supra note 348 at 5.
367. See, Fourteenth Annual Report (2004-2005), supra note 311 at 8 regarding Privity of Contract
and Structured Settlements and Fifteenth Annual Report (2005-2006), supra note 313 at 5 regarding
Vexatious Litigants.
368. Seventeenth Annual Report, (2007-2008), supra note 348 at 5.
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letter was sent to the Premier on 24 September 2015 from the Commission
asking for a meeting but the request was not granted. Instead, the Minister
of Justice responded on 15 December 2015 advising there would be no
change in the decision.
Between 15 December 2015 and February 2016, the Commission
asked for and received letters of support from many legal organizations, all
of which indicated their opposition to the government's decision and urged
the reinstatement of funding. Agencies involved included the Nova Scotia
Barristers' Society, the Canadian Bar Association, the Schulich School of
Law, Dalhousie, Dalhousie Legal Aid Service, the Alberta Law Reform
Commission Institute and the Federation of Law Reform Agencies. In
an unprecedented move, 17 Nova Scotia law firms sent a joint letter to
the premier praising the accomplishments of the Commission and urging
the premier to recognize its importance to law reform and to reverse his
decision. On 23 February the Commission sent a follow-up letter to the
premier again asking for a meeting. On 2 March, the minister of justice
responded saying the decision would not be reviewed.
On 31 March 2016 the Commission sent a letter to individual MLA's
asking for their support by urging reversal of the government decision.
In April the president of the Commission met with leaders of the two
opposition parties, the New Democratic Party and the Conservative Party
and their justice critics. On 16 May 2016 in the House of Assembly, the
leader of the NDP, Ms. Marian Mancini, noted that the premier had not
responded to the hundreds of lawyers represented by the letter sent to
the premier by the 17 law firms. She asked the premier if he would like
to do so before the House.3 69 The premier responded by explaining that
the Premier's Office frequently sends matter to individual ministers for a
response .370 In this case the appropriate minister was the justice minister
who had replied on behalf of the premier.
The premier also noted that the government had given the Commission
a year's notice of their intention to discontinue funding and that they had
provided the Commission in-kind office space. He further explained that it
was the government's hope that the commission "would be able to find some
funding to continue to do their work"3 71 and "that perhaps those 17 Nova
Scotian law firms, who have taken the time to write to tell how important it
is, will contribute financially to make sure they (the Commission) have the
369. Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Hansard, 62nd Parl, 2nd Sess, No 10 (17 May 2016) at 9470
(Marian Mancini).
370. Ibid (The Premier).
371. Ibid.
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resources they need...."3 7 2 11In response, the Honourable Mancini pointed
out that it would be inappropriate for the Law Reform Commission to seek
private funding and that she had made this point on several occasions.3 73
The premier disagreed with this contention and insisted that it would
not be inappropriate for law firms to contribute (financially) to the
Commission, that the government would be happy to be a partner with
the Bar by continuing to provide and offer office space free of charge to
the Commission.3 7 4 When questioned by the media sometime later, outside
the House, the Executive Director of the Commission, Angus Gibbon,
explained that such a contribution would not be appropriate and could
affect the independence of the Commission.3 75
As a result of the loss of two-thirds of its budget, the Commission lost
the services of its Executive Director, as well as its chief legal research
officer, and was forced to operate with a part-time researcher and part-time
finance officer. The Commission continued, nevertheless, to work after
31 March 2016 on two projects that were in progress, The Matrimonial
Property Act Project and The Intestate Succession Act Project.3 76 The Law
Foundation provided the Commission with funding of $85,000.00 for the
fiscal year 2016-2017,377 and $72,000.00 for the fiscal year 2017-2018,378
funds which permitted the Commission to continue limited operations
with part-time employees.
On 16 November 2016 a meeting of stakeholders representing the
Commission, the Schulich School of Law, the Department of Justice, the
Judiciary, the Barristers' Society and the Law Foundation was convened
to explore the possibility of carrying on law reform activities using a
different institutional structure. The meeting agreed that the venture was
worth pursuing and further meetings were planned. As of November 2017
the second Law Reform Commission continues to exist as a legal entity,
operating at a very reduced level, with a very reduced budget, with part-
time personnel and in offices provided by the government free of charge,
kept alive by the generosity of the Law Foundation.
372. Ibid.
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12. Why is stable funding for law reform commissions not sustainable in
Nova Scotia?
We have described law reform in Nova Scotia as a precarious enterprise
and posed what we described as the overarching question, whether
continuous law reform, as carried out by a law reform commission, is a
sustainable activity in Nova Scotia. We further elaborated by asking, if it is
not sustainable, what are the reasons or factors that make it so? Funding, or
rather lack of it, was not a major problem for the first Law Reform Advisory
Commission in Nova Scotia. Funding was never reduced or withdrawn
completely and was not the reason for the first Commission ceasing to
operate. As we have already chronicled, the Chair of the Commission,
Linden Smith, in January 1981, did not call any further meetings of the
Commission and the appointments of the then commissioners simply
expired and replacements were not appointed.3 7 9 The second Commission,
a decade later had a different experience. The later Commission lasted two
and a half times as long as the first, but had the government component
of its funding withdrawn completely twice during that period (2001 and
2016). Similarly, Law Foundation funding, the other major component
of the Commission's fund, was withdrawn entirely once and was at risk
of being withdrawn several times during the 26 years. No government
has been prepared to guarantee long term funding, but without stable,
consistent funding law reform commissions are destined to suffer the
uncertainty that goes with year to year financial handouts.
Generalfactors affecting funding
Theoretically, there can be a number of general factors, both positive and
negative, that might have an effect upon funding and funding decisions.
William Hurlburt has suggested that there are some factors that tend to
protect law reform commissions from institutional oblivion.3 8 0 But, as
he points out, they provide only modest advantages and any protection
given would not be effective against a minister or government that
was "indifferent or even hostile to a law reform or a law reform
commission..."381 However modest these advantages might be, they are
worth noting. First is the fact that a budget for a Commission usually
appears as a line item in the Department of Justice budget year after year
and, as a result, may be taken for granted and included as an habitual item,
unless the Department is called upon to reduce its own budget. If this
379. See Section 111(7) above.
380. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 486.
381. Ibid.
The Story of Law Reform in Nova Scotia: 419
A Perilous Enterprise
occurs at a time of financial stringency, each item in the budget will be
subject to close scrutiny and justification will be required for its continued
presence. But unless the triggering event occurs, the possibility is that
the status quo will not be disrupted and the funding item will continue to
appear in the budget.
Secondly, having a law reform commission to carry out needed
reform activities relieves the pressure on governments and government
departments to do all the reform work themselves. There may also be
some political advantage to the government appearing to be interested in
law reform by funding a law reform commission. Thirdly, there might well
be a political price to be paid for dissolving a law reform commission, and
it could be a high one, but this is not likely in Canada.
A fourth factor is that financial crunches experienced by every
government come and go like the tides. Less severe financial constraints
are more likely to occur more frequently than the more severe ones and
may not result in draconian measures being taken by the government.
There is always the hope and the possibility that an improvement in
government fortunes will permit a reinstatement of funding and that lack
of government funding will not be permanent.
A final positive factor, not specifically enumerated by Hurlburt, is
the fact that hopefully there will always be a group of supporters of law
reform outside the political arena who will continue to support funding
for law reform and law reform commissions. The ultimate question,
however, is whether all or any of these factors can have a sufficient impact
on government funding decisions to protect law commissions from a
government decision to withdraw or severely curtail funding. Experience
in Nova Scotia clearly tells us they cannot.
Factors that discourage funding
Although financial constraint is often the reason given by governments
for withdrawing funding, there are other factors that may play an equally
important role in the government decision. For example, it may be that
the government does not fully appreciate the important role played by law
reformers in the maintenance of the rule of law. Legally trained persons
would understand the connection but nonlawyers may not. Officials in the
Department of Justice will appreciate the fact that continuous law reform
is an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of the rule of law, but it is
questionable whether non-lawyer members of the Cabinet would see the
importance of this concept. As Hurlburt has observed "A Cabinet is not
likely to be devoted to law reform. It is not likely to consider law reform
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to be something which should be given a high priority." It is not, in their
view, an essential service.382
Perhaps politicians do not think in terms of the rule of law at all.
They may be under the illusion that law reform, however it is done and
by whom, can be suspended for a period of time without doing irreparable
harm to society. It is difficult to point to any specific effect that might flow
from either a shut down of a law reform commission or a drastic reduction
in its operations. Any negative effect will probably not be noticed. Some
laws will continue to produce unjust or undesirable results, but such
consequences will not usually be attributed to lack of sufficient law reform
or to a degrading of the rule of law. A deteriorating rule of law is unlike a
rusting bridge, and it is hardly as visible, but the longer term consequences
can be just as harmful.
Governments sometimes reach the conclusion that law reform can be
done "in house" just as effectively, at lower cost, and with the government
in complete control of the timetable and results. This may have been a
factor with the first Commission's demise. When such a decision is made,
it usually signals some degree of dissatisfaction with the work of a law
reform commission. In more specific terms, it might mean dissatisfaction
with the thoroughness of the research work done by the Commission
or with the identification of the legal deficiencies or the recommended
solutions. Final reports may be considered not persuasive enough or
lacking in insight or innovative solutions.
Disagreement with the type of projects selected by the Commission
can also be an underlying, but not necessarily expressed, source of
dissatisfaction. Apart from government references, the Commission may
have selected reform projects that the funders do not think address the most
pressing social needs. They may also be considered to be too technical or
narrow, too dull or uninteresting and with little public appeal. Conversely
they may be considered to be too ambitious, controversial or "avant
garde," as was the case with the Federal Law Commission's approach to
law reform. In rare cases, there might be an ideological conflict with the
minister or cabinet. Law commissions make considerable efforts to solicit
and generate public suggestions about perceived shortcomings in the legal
system that need to be corrected. The second Commission, particularly,
made a point of expanding public outreach consultation. But choices still
have to be made by the Commission as to the project to be undertaken,
hopefully on the basis of well-thought-out criteria.
382. Ibid at 368.
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Governments, in particular, are very time sensitive, particularly with
respect to government references. They have a legislative agenda to follow
and political pressure to contend with. Given the consultation processes
that law reform commissions use, as well as their extensive research work
to ensure a quality product, short range, quick solutions are usually not
possible for a Commission unless the project has a very narrow compass.
As a result, governments are usually unhappy with the length of time it
takes for reform projects to be completed.
A low implementation rate for a Commission is not usually of
concern to a government unless it results from the government accepting
Commission recommendations for reform only to have them rejected by the
legislature. In such circumstances the government might be embarrassed,
even though they have approved the recommendations of the Commission.
Government will obviously be concerned if this happens very frequently.
Other donors, such as the Law Foundation, may be more concerned about
a low success rate because it raises the question whether they are getting
good value for monies provided to the Commission.
A practical consideration in a government decision to terminate, is
that it is easier for a government to cut small programs like a law reform
commission than to cut a departmental budget that is largely committed
to personnel salaries. For example, the Department of Justice would find
it easier to cut the Commission's budget rather than cut its staff by one or
two positions. Concern for the rule of law could easily be overridden by
more immediate concerns within the Department.
A final factor that is always in the background is the issue of control.
Although a Commission does not make binding decisions having the
effect of law when it publishes its final reports, the fact that it is pointing
out deficiencies in the legal system that require fixing puts pressure on the
government to take some action. In some cases, due to lack of resources,
the government may not be able to take action immediately no matter how
much it approves of the recommended reforms. In other situations the
recommended reforms may not be welcomed at all by the government.
From a government perspective this can be an annoying by-product of
law reform which a government can avoid or diminish by exercising more
control over the Commission or getting rid of it.
Ultimately, however, no matter what influence these various factors,
both supportive and nonsupportive, may have on government decisions,
the government will make a political calculation on the public reaction to
its decision.
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Specific factors
The foregoing are common or generic factors that could apply in any
jurisdiction in Canada to any law reform commission. But there may
also be additional specific or special factors created by local conditions
or circumstances that also may affect government-funding decisions. The
question is, were any of these generic or special non-fiscal factors at work
in Nova Scotia when decisions were made to let the first Commission
expire and to severely restrict funding for the second?
V. Possible reasons for the demise of the first Law Reform Commission
and government withdrawal offunding for the second
William Hurlburt offered his view that the first Nova Scotia Commission
was "... the victim of ministerial indifference, ministerial desire for control,
government parsimony, and, perhaps, official dislike."3 8 3 He further
suggested that the government was also concerned that the Commission
might somehow "usurp the functions of the political process by engaging
in the formulation of social policy" and that this concern was "at the root
of the parsimonious attitude of Nova Scotia to its Law Reform Advisory
Commission...."3 8 4 On this point the author may have been referring to
the restrictive legislative mandate of the first Advisory Commission
rather than its actual activities. As previously noted, the first Advisory
Commission did exercise a certain amount of de-facto independence by
initiating selection of some of its projects. There was obviously a desire
for government control, as exercised through Legislative Counsel, and
the Attorney General was probably stung by the sharp criticism of the
Commission's lack of independence by a strong Chair like Lilias Tower.
This may have developed into a personal dislike as well. Her emphasis
upon reform in the family law area may, as well, not have been appreciated
by the government of a conservative male-dominated society.
As for the second Commission, the fact that the government sent
seven references to the Commission between 2010 and 2015 suggests that
the government still had confidence in the Commission and was satisfied
with the work it was doing.3 8 5 This, in spite of the fact that the Commission
was not always able to meet a government imposed deadline, as in the
case of the Adoption Information Act.38 6 The fact that the premier and the
Attorney General were both nonlawyers may have had an impact upon
383. Ibid at 485.
384. Ibid at 262.
385. See Appendix 12.
386. Adoption Information Act, SNS 1996, c 3.
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their appreciation of the vital importance of law reform and the essential
role played by law reform commissions in that essential service.
Hurlburt was of the view that "[i]n the long run, the greatest threat
to law reform commissions, as it is to the implementation of any one law
reform proposal, is indifference to law reform."3 8 7 Indifference on the part
of legislators, government officials and the public clearly contributes to
the difficulties law commissions have in their quest for stable funding or
any funding at all. Lawyers, on the other hand, are not as indifferent, as the
history of law reform in Nova Scotia demonstrates. Their clear support for
the second Law Reform Commission was demonstrated by the common
letter of support sent to the premier by 17 Nova Scotia law firms, an action
never before taken.
As for the public, they were not made aware until the last moment ofthe
government action and so it is difficult to gauge what level of support they
might have expressed for the Commission had they known. Experience
has shown the Department of Justice to have been both cooperative, for
the most part, and supportive of the Commission and, despite government
withdrawal of funds, the Department of Justice provides the Commission
with free government space. But there are two other government entities,
the Cabinet and Treasury Board that also play an important part in the
allocation of public funds. What their view of law reform or law reform
commissions was, or is, cannot be known, but the final decision may have
been in their hands rather than in the hands of the Department of Justice.
Of the many factors that might have had some influence upon
the Nova Scotia government's decision to terminate funding for the
Commission there are three factors, I suggest, that had the greatest impact
upon that decision. The first factor was the lack of understanding and
appreciation, by both government officials and members of the general
public, of the important role that law plays in our society and the equally
important functions of law reform commissions. This deficiency means
that any government action to reduce funding will not result in a negative
backlash-the political risk of which will have been calculated by the
government of Nova Scotia and which was probably estimated to be small.
This makes it easier for a government, in times of financial constraint, to
cut funding to small, discrete programmes like law reform and law reform
commissions, even if this means the end of such programmes.
The second factor of special significance is a lingering concern on the
part of the Nova Scotia government for the lack of control that invariably
results from the creation of an independent law reform commission. With
387. Hurlburt, supra note 8 at 487.
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such a commission, not only does the government not control all projects
undertaken by the commission, but it also cannot control the legal and
non-legal solutions to problems proposed by the independent commission.
In the case of government references, the government does control topic
selection, but not the solutions proposed by the Commission. There is
a certain loss of credibility, and perhaps embarrassment as well, that is
suffered by the government when it does not agree with the solution or
solutions recommended by a Law Reform Commission and it chooses not
to act upon them. This is particularly problematic if the reform project
involves significant social policy issues. Not only might some segments
of the population be disappointed if the proposed changes are not made
but some legislators might, as well, be concerned that the Commission is
impinging upon the political arena and usurping their function.
The third and equally important factor is the government's belief that
its own departments, including the Department of Justice, can perform all
the necessary reform work "in-house," under controlled conditions, within
required timelines and at a lower cost. It is perfectly reasonable to think
that government departments, or the policy unit of the Justice Department,
can handle day to day housekeeping problems that emerge, involving
technical drafting, or implementation problems. They can also probably
deal with reform issues that involve some degree of social policy requiring
a certain amount of public consultation. But if the reforms required
involve serious social policy decisions that require wide-spread public
consultation and the gathering of empirical data, both legal and social,
the process of law reform becomes much more complex and lengthy and
usually well beyond the normal capabilities of government departments.
If such complex reform projects are undertaken by the government as "in-
house" projects, there is a real risk that policy choices will be made on the
basis of insufficient and incomplete data.
An example occurred in October 2017 with the Nova Scotia
government's attempt to replace the 300-year-old Incompetent Persons
Act.38 8 Twenty-two years earlier the second Law Reform Commission
recommended the repeal of this act because it did not respond to twenty-first
century social needs in Nova Scotia nor did it reflect contemporary social
values.3 8 9 Although the Commission's final report and recommendations
were published in 1995, successive governments failed to act on those
388. Incompetent PersonsAct, RSNS 1989, c 218 as amended by SNS 2007, c 17 and SNS 2014, c
27.
389. Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Reform of the Laws Dealing with Adult Guardianship
and Personal Health Care Decisions: Final Report (Halifax: November 1995) at 23-30.
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recommendations until the Incompetent Persons Act was declared
unconstitutional by the Nova Scotia Supreme court in 2016.390 The Supreme
Court gave the government until December 2017 to introduce a new Act.3 9 1
Because the government had ceased to fund the Law Reform Commission
as of 31 March 2016 it was forced to do the reform work itself Bill-16
entitled "Adult Capacity and Decision Making Act to Respect Autonomy
ofAdults in Decision-making" was introduced in October 2017.392 The Bill
was severely criticized both at Law Amendments Committee hearings and
publicly because the consultation process began too late, was rushed and
did not allow for adequate canvassing of the public or the expression of
views.3 9 3 As a result, it was argued, Bill-16 still did not respond adequately
to current social needs or reflect contemporary social values.3 9 4
Although other factors may also have had some influence on the
government's decision in 2015 to terminate funding, the above three factors,
I suggest, were the most influential and had the greatest impact. Scarcity of
funds was, no doubt, the triggering event that led to the ultimate decision
and certainly was a significant factor in its own right. By withdrawing
Commission funding, the government assumed responsibility for law
reform in Nova Scotia. We can only assume that by so doing it realized
that it might have to undertake some reform projects that would require
extensive research, as well as difficult policy choices and some lengthy
consultations. The government decision to carry out all of its required law
reform "in house" means that either the government thought that its own
personnel could do just as good a job as a law reform Commission or that
the results might not be quite as good but still acceptable given the lower
costs. Either way, the government regained control of the process. It is also
possible that the government would be content to see some other reform
agency, not funded by government, such as a re-constituted law reform
commission/institute, also engage in law reform. Such a non-govemment
funded reform agency could engage in a variety of law reform projects and
pass on the results and recommendations to the government for review and
390. Webb (Litigation guardian of v Webb, 2016 NSSC 180, R016 CarswellNS 596.
391. "Editorial: Adult Capacity Act a Step in the right direction," The Chronicle Herald (19 October
2017).
392. 1st reading, Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Hansard, 63rd Parl, 1st Sess, No 9 (2 October
2017) at 641 (Hon Mark Furey).
393. Sheila Wildeman, Professor of the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, in her
presentation to the Law Amendments Committee as reported in Keith Doucette, "Law needs Change:
advocates" The Chronicle Herald (12 October 2017) Al.
394. Archie Kaiser, Professor of the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, "Opinion:
Suspend Intellectual disability bill lest NS be dragged before the UN" The Chronicle Herald (21
October 2017).
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assessment but without the same degree of public expectation that they
would be acted upon by the government.
Conclusion
Reference has already been made to the importance of the rule of law and
the need for the government and the public to recognize and understand
how important this concept is to a democratic society.395 However, we
should also note that one important element of the rule of law396 is the
assurance of equality of treatment for all persons by the law, both in
reference to their rights, but also their responsibilities.397 Law provides
a legal structure by its rules, procedures, and institutions that facilitates
the creation and development of social ordering and the creation of social
institutions.398 If we viewed society as a tall building, law would occupy the
four or five underground floors we seldom see, but which provide support
for the rest of the building above, and all the activities of society that are
carried on there. Basement law allows the rest of the building to function
effectively and safely. If the basement is allowed to deteriorate, the rest of
the building is put at risk. Viewed in this way, the importance of law and
a well-maintained law is clear. But politicians and the public do not see
the basement very often and, as a result, they do not fully understand or
appreciate the critical role that law plays in our society, or how important
it is for a society to have laws that reflect and support necessary social
policies.
Perhaps those involved in law reform have not done enough to produce
the necessary understanding that is needed. But perhaps we are not the
only ones who are responsible for creating that understanding. Perhaps the
Justice Department has a role to play. But until governments in particular
come to understand the importance of the legal basement, funding for law
395. See Section I(1).
396. See Dicey, Introduction to the Study ofthe Law ofthe Constitution 10th ed (London: MacMillan
& Co, 1960) at 202-203, who lists equality as the second ofthree elements that constitute his definition
of the rule of law. Quoted in Gall, supra note 12 at 57.
397. See Jones, "The Rule of Law and the Welfare State" (1958) 58:2 Colum L Rev 143 at 149-150
who suggested a re-statement of Dicey's second element might read, "all members of society, private
persons and government officials alike; mustbe equally responsible before the law." The Law Reform
commission stressed the need for equality of rights as one of the basic aspects or themes of its reform
philosophy. See section IV(6) above.
398. Hurlburt, supra note Sat 9-13 has observed that laws affect everyone in society, often profoundly.
The law as a whole should regulate human behavior and provide a framework for human activity in
ways which are suitable to the society in which it operates. Gall, supra note 12 at 13 has suggested
that "the law should be regarded as the core matter which those persons and institutions in any legal
system utilize in order to effect an ongoing process in regulating the affairs and conduct of persons in
society."
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reform and law reform agencies and Commissions will remain sporadic
and uncertain and the whole enterprise will remain perilous.
But even if there was universal agreement about the importance of
law in our society and the need to keep it polished and well maintained,
we are still left with the question of the appropriate mechanism to do
this. Some governments take the view that law reform can be done most
effectively "in house" rather than by external law reform commissions.
Governments taking this view or position are not likely to consider law
reform commissions as essential for the maintenance of the law and its
institutions. Perhaps the answer is that law reform is big enough and
important enough to allow both governments and commissions to each
play their part. Perhaps government departments, and particularly Justice,
could concentrate upon reforms that are narrow in scope and do not
require extensive research and public consultation, projects that can be
completed in a short frame and would fit within a legislative timetable.
Law reform commissions would then concentrate their efforts upon
more controversial, complex reform projects requiring extensive public
consultation and comparative research. The division of labour would not
be sharp, clear or exclusive, but would provide a working plan for the
two reform agencies. In times of adequate government revenues the Nova
Scotia government might be prepared to fund both "in house" and "out of
house" (law reform commission/institute) but when money is tight and
fiscal restraint is the overriding government concern, it is not prepared to
do so and cost becomes the deciding factor.
Some interesting parallels can be drawn between the experience of
the law reform commissions in Nova Scotia and the reform experience in
Manitoba. The first Manitoba Law Reform Commission was created in
1970 and became operational in 1971. It operated for 26 years until 1987
when the government notified the Commission that its commissioners
would not be reappointed and that they would be replaced by senior civil
servants with a savings of $250,000.00 per year as a result. The ultimate
intention of the government apparently was to wind down the Commission.
However, the significant backlash from the legal profession, the Faculty
of Law and members of the public and media, as well as an impending
election, caused the government to reverse its decision. A new statute
was passed in 1990 entitled The Law Reform Commission Act 99 which
included provisions intended to protect the Commission from similar
government action in the future. However, the good times only lasted for
seven years and in 1997 the government once more announced its intention
399. SM 1989-90, c 25.
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to shut down the Commission and to repeal the Law Reform Commission
Act. The government was very clear about its reasons for doing so and
explained that it wanted to put more money into community involvement
and public safety. Once again, there were protests and the government
changed its position. It allowed the Commission to continue its existence
but with government funding that was reduced by 75 percent. This drastic
reduction in funding meant that the Commission's full-time staff had to
be let go with the result that any research work or writing of draft reports
had to be out sourced to external consultants retained on contract. As of
2015, the Manitoba Commission's budget stood at $205,000.00 with the
Department of Justice contributing $85,000.00 plus free office space and
accounting services. The Law Foundation provided $120,000.00.'
If we compare the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission with that
of Manitoba we find that there are some striking similarities. Both served
provinces that have relatively small populations and both Commissions
operated with modest budgets. Both were threatened with government
withdrawal of funds or nonreplacement of Commissioners on more than
one occasion. The Manitoba Commission is still operating but on a much
reduced budget and with reduced output. The question is does the Manitoba
experience provide a useful or accurate indicator of what might happen
to the existing Nova Scotia Commission? Although there are similarities
in experience, there is one significant difference. In Manitoba there was
a significant backlash and pushback by both the general public and the
media while in Nova Scotia the only negative reaction to the government
decision came from the local Bar. Therefore, the Nova Scotia government
did not, and does not, have to contend with adverse public reaction, so there
is little political pressure involving potential loss of votes to encourage the
Nova Scotia government to reverse its latest decision. However, it might
be encouraged to help in some other way.
VI. Postscript
The suggestion that the Nova Scotia government, despite its earlier
decision to withdraw funding from the Law Reform Commission, might
be willing to help support independent law reform in other ways, seems
to have become a reality. After two years of discussion and negotiation a
proposal to maintain some degree or level of independent law reform in
Nova Scotia appears to have been developed.
400. For an account of the experience of the Manitoba Law Reform Commission with government
funding see Hurlburt, supra note 4 at 230-232.
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Since November 2016 a group of interested stakeholders have been
working on a proposal to replace the existing Commission with a more
broadly based organization that would monitor the administration ofjustice
in Nova Scotia with particular emphasis upon necessary reform of the
substantive laws as well as access to justice issues. It has seemed generally
agreed that the new organization will be described as an "institute," but
there currently is no definite title.
The new Institute would be housed at Dalhousie University in the
Faculty of Law and would be funded by grants from the Nova Scotia
Department of Justice, The Nova Scotia Law Foundation and hopefully
the Federal Government. Administrative support, in the form of personnel
time, would be supplied by the Law School and the Nova Scotia Barristers'
Society.401
One might well ask what prompted the Nova Scotia government to
resume funding independent law reform. Several possible reasons come
to mind. After two years of discussions, the government may have gained
a better understanding of the value and importance of independent law
reform. The benefits to government departments in their efforts to keep
Nova Scotia law up to date may have become more evident. Perhaps the
proposed new organizational structure of an Institute involving a number
of different stakeholders each with their own contribution, financial and
otherwise, was more appealing, particularly if it resulted in a smaller
government financial contribution. Or perhaps it was the fact that the new
Institute would concern itself, not only with the reform of substantive Nova
Scotia law, but would also focus upon the timely problems of accessing
that law. Access problems appear to generate more public attention and
concern than reform of existing laws. From a public relations point of
view, government money used to seek solutions to access issues may be
seen as a better investment than money spent only on more general law
reform. Perhaps the government's change of heart can be attributed to a
combination of these reasons.
Whatever were the controlling reason or reasons for the government's
decision to fund the new institute, when and if it begins anticipated operation
in 2018, it will have to face a number of important issues. First will be
the need to achieve a workable balance, in terms of time and resources,
between access to justice issues and traditional substantive law reform
projects. It has been suggested that law reform agencies are access to
401. The Commissions current executive presented a confidential proposal for a "Nova Scotia
Commission for Access to Justice, and Law Reform / or The Nova Scotia Access to Justice Institute"
to its stakeholders on 16 November 2016.
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justice agencies because law reform encompasses not only substantive law
but legal process reform as well.4 0 2 The Nova Scotia Commission has, in
past annual reports, observed that access to justice is an issue of increasing
concern 4 0 3 and has specifically referred to individual commission projects
that either have a specific access to justice component within them or
which impact the general issue of access to justice in some way.404 The
Commission has not, however, in the past, specifically indicated that
access to justice was, a major theme or thrust of the Commission's work. 40 1
The term "access to justice" is aterm that can be used to encompass a wide
variety of situations and problems. Interpreted too broadly it can be easily
trivialized. 406
A second important issue concerns the expectations that the new
institute may generate. Will there be expectations that both the Access
to Justice and substantive law reform projects will involve a broader and
deeper look at social justice issues? Such issues usually require broad
public consultation, extensive gathering of social and legal data as well
as multi-discipline research. Critics of historic law reform agencies have
long argued for such an expansion,4 0 ' but not only is such an extension
time consuming, it is also expensive, which leads to the third and final
concern to be addressed here, that of funding.
In its last full year of operation the Nova Scotia Law Reform
Commission worked with a budget of $288,894.40' The initial proposal for
an Institute made to stakeholders suggested a budget of between $310,000
and $340,000.409 The budgets for two other provincial law reform
institutes, namely the Alberta Law Institute and the British Columbia Law
Institute / Canadian Centre for Elder Law, have budgets of $1,555,000 and
402. Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Tom Cromwell (addressing a meeting of Law Reform
Commissions in Halifax, 3 October 2015) at 4 [unpublished].
403. As in the Small Claims court project, Eighteenth Annual Report ofthe Law Reform Commission
ofNova Scotia 2008-2009 (Halifax: April 2009) at 5.
404. See Enforcement of Civil Judgement commentary, Powers ofAttorney Act commentary, Twenty-
Third Annual Report, supra note 318 at 6; Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, The Powers of
Attorney Act: Final report (Halifax: August 2016) at 40 and Institute Succession Act, commentary,
Twenty-Third Annual report, supra note 318 at 7.
405. No mention was made of access to justice as a commission focus when the commission reviewed
its work in 2011 over the previous twenty years. See Twentieth Annual Report of the Law Reform
Commission of Nova Scotia 2010-2011 (Halifax) at 11-12. In the commission's final report on
Vexatious Litigants-April 2006, the commission drew a needed distinction between the concept of
access to justice in general and the right that all citizens have to access the court system (except for
vexatious litigants). See pages 2, 15, 16 and 20.
406. As cautioned by Tom Cromwell, supra note 402.
407. Supra note 29.
408. See Appendix 15.
409. An outline of the proposed funding is contained in the initial proposal to stakeholders. See supra
note 401.
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$866,000 respectively.410 The budget for the proposed Institute has not yet
been finalized but it would be totally unrealistic to think that it would be
anywhere near the budgets of two larger and wealthier provinces. Whether
the finalized budget will be close to the proposed range of $310,000-
$340,000 remains to be seen. Even a budget of $340,000 might still prove
insufficient to effectively achieve the institute's twin purposes.
Guaranteed long term funding for law reform commissions or
institutes is probably not attainable, but funding adequate to allow them to
successfully complete their missions should be. In 1997 Professor Hurlburt
likened the Manitoba experience to a modem-day "Perils of Pauline"
adventure, with the Commission at the last moment being "rescued from
actually falling from the cliff, but insecurely suspended from it and with
limited room for action."1 1" Let us hope that the Nova Scotia experience
will be different.
Concluding observations
Twenty eight years after its legal birth (1990), and one year after its
more recent near practical demise, the second Nova Scotia Law Reform
Commission is about to take on a new life, in a new form, with a new
mandate. In light of this, two observations seem appropriate: First, the
Commission might be viewed as having completed the ultimate law
reform project, namely reforming itself (although not entirely voluntarily).
Secondly, it is worth noting that, after an absence of many years, organized,
independent law reform will once more be carried on in the Faculty of
Law at Dalhousie. Dean Read would have been pleased.
410. Email from Angus Gibbon, Executive Director of the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia
Commission (31 October 2016) [unpublished]-the budget amounts were allocated for the period
2015-2016.
411. Supra note 4 at 231.
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Appendix #1
36 Projects Presented to the Law Reform Advisory Commission for Action
(1972-1981)
1. Mechanics / Builders Lien Act - (14 April 1972)
2. The Dower & Courtesy Act - (26 September 1972)
3. Limitation of Actions Act - (26 September 1972)
4. Amendments to the Fatal Injuries Act - (26 September 1972)
(Rejected by Commission)
5. Probate Legislation - (26 September 1972)
6. Abolition of the Grand Jury - (26 September 1972)
7. Creation of the Office of the Public Trustee - (26 September 1972)
8. Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments - (26 September 1972)
9. Interest on Clients' Trust Accounts - (6 November 1972)
(Rejected by Commission)
10. Regulations Act - (6 November 1972)
11. Personal Properties Securities Legislation - (9 July 1973)
12. Torrens Land Registry System - (9 July 1973)
(Rejected by Commission)
13. Trustee Act and Real Property - (9 July 1973)
(Rejected by Commission)
14. Amendments to the Law Reform Advisory Commission Act (1974)
15. Small Claims Court - (18 September 1974)
16. Matrimonial Property - (18 September 1974)
17. Collections Act - (18 September 1974)
18. Assessment of Legal Aid in NS - (27 November 1974)
(Rejected by Commission)
19. Change of Name Act - (27 November 1974)
20. Age of Consent to Medical Treatment - (27 November 1974)
21. Intestate Succession Act - (January 1975)
22. Frustrated Contracts Act - (April 4, 1975)
23. Occupiers Liability Act - (April 4, 1975)
24. Companies Act - (10 May 1975)
25. Registry Act - (14 January 1977)
26. Juries Act - (14 January 1977)
27. Petty Trespass Act - (14 January 1977)
28. Illegitimate Children - (14 November 1977)
29. Privacy as a Tort - (4 December 1978)
30. Status of Overholding Tenant, Tenancies & Distress Act viz a viz
Residential Tenancies Act (1978) - Rejected
31. Practical Procedures re Magisterial Inquiries, Medical Examiners &
Coroners (1978) - Rejected
32. Protection of Property Act / Trespass to Property Act (December 1980)
33. Builders Lien Act (1980)
34. Securities Legislation (1980)
35. Evidence Act (Uniform) (December 1978)
36. Conditional Sales Act (1981)
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Appendix #2
Source of the Projects: Who Requested Them as Reform Projects?
(a) Projects Requested by the AG
1. Builders Lien Act
2. Dower & Courtesy
3. Limitation of Actions
4. Fatal Injuries Act
5. Abolition of the Grand Jury
6. Creation of the Office of the Public Trustee
7. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
8. Interest on Clients' Trust Accounts
9. Torrens Land Registry System
10. Trustee Act and Real Property
11. Collections Act
12. Small Claims Act
13. Change of Name Act
14. Registry Act
15. Companies Act
16. Juries Act
17. Assessment of Provincial Legal Aid
18. Petty Trespass Act
19. Protection of Property Act
20. Builders Lien Act (2nd Project)
21. Securities Legislation
22. Conditional Sales Act
23. Status of Overholding Tenants Act
24. Practices, Procedures Re Magisterial Inquiries, Coroners Inquiries
25. Age of Consent for Medical Treatment
(b) Projects Requested by The Commission
1. Regulations Act
2. Probate Legislation
3. Matrimonial Property Act
4. Intestate Succession
5. Amendments to the Law Reform Advisory Act
6. Occupiers Liability Act
7. Illegitimate Children
8. Frustrated Contracts
9. Privacy as a Tort
10. Uniform Evidence Act
11. Personal Property Security Legislation
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Appendix #3
List of Completed Projects
Title Time to Complete
1. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1 year
(1972-1973)
2. Builders Lien Act (1972-1976) 4 years
3. Public Trustee Act (1972-1973) 1 year
4. Regulations Act (1972-1973) 1 year
5. Abolition of the Grand Jury (1972-1974) 2 years
6. Intestate Succession Act (1975-1976) 6 months
7. Dower & Courtesy Act (1972-1973) 1 year
8. Change of Name Act (1974-1975) 1 year
9. Amendment to the Law Reform Advisory Act 1 year
(1975-1976)
10. Registry Act (1975-1976) 1 year
11. Frustrated Contracts (1975-1976) 1 year
12. Matrimonial Property Act (1975-1980) 5 years
13. Juries Act (1976-1978) 2 years
14. Petty Trespass Act (1977-1979) 2 years
15. Probate Act (1972-1979) 7 years
16. Protection of Property Act (1980-198 1) 1 year
17. Builders Lien Act (1980-198 1) 1 year
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Appendix #4
Implementation of Reports
1. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act C. 12 SNS 1973
(1972-1973)
2. Public Trustees Act (1972) C. 12 SNS 1973
3. Regulations Act (1972) C. 15 SNS 1973
4. Grand Jury (1974) C. 41 SNS 1978-79
5. Intestate Succession (1975-1976) C. 61 SNS 1975
6. Amendment to Law Reform Act (1975-1976) C. 37 SNS 1976
7. Change of Name Act (1976) C. 6 SNS 1977
8. Registry Act (1975-1976) C. 48 SNS 1977
9. Illegitimate Children (1977) C. 6 SNS 1980
10. Married Women's Property Act C. 9 SNS 1980
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Appendix #5
Duration of Projects
(Time Required to Complete)
(a) Less Than One Year
Intestate Succession Act (6 months)
(b) One Year Projects
(1) Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
(2) Public Trustee Act
(3) Regulations Act
(4) Change of Name Act
(5) Registry Act
(6) Frustrated Contracts Act
(7) Protection of Property Act
(8) Builders Lien
(c) Two Year Projects
(1) Abolition of the Grand Jury
(2) Juries Act
(3) Petty Trespass Act
(d) Three Year Projects - 0
(e) Four Year Projects - 1 - Builders Lien
(f) Five Year Projects
Builders Lien Act - 2 Projects
(g) Six Year Projects
Dower Courtesy-Marriage
Matrimonial Property Act - 6 years - 2 projects
(h) Seven Year Project
Probate Act
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Appendix #6
Areas of Law Reformed
I. Administration of Justice (12)
(a) Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
(b) Regulations Act
(c) Limitation of Actions
(d) Grand Jury Abolition
(e) Probate Legislation-Procedure
(f) Office of the Public Trustee
(g) Collections Act
(h) Juries Act
(i) Legal Aid Assessment
(j) Uniform Evidence Act
(k) Small Claims Court
(1) Practices / Procedures re Magisterial Inquiries, Medical
Examiners and Coroners
II. Property Law-Real & Personal (9)
(a) Personal Property Security
(b) Torrens Land Registry System
(c) Trustee Act and Real Property
(d) Registry Act
(e) Occupiers Liability Act
(f) Petty Trespass Act
(g) Protection of Property Act
(h) Overholding Tenants
(i) Conditional Sales Act
III. Family Law (6)
(a) Dower and Courtesy
(b) Change of Name Act
(c) Age of Consent to Medical Treatment
(d) Matrimonial Property Act
(e) Intestate Succession
(f) Illegitimate Children
IV. Commercial / Corporate Law (5)
(a) Personal Property Security Legislation
(b) Conditional Sales Act
(c) Collections Act
(d) Companies Act
(e) Securities Legislation
V. Private Law / Tort & Contract (3)
(a) Frustrated Contracts
(b) Privacy as a Tort
(c) Fatal Injuries Act
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VI. Other / Misc (3)
(a) Mechanics Lien / Builders Lien
(b) Interest on Clients' Trust Accounts
(c) Amendments to Law Reform Advisory Act
Note: Two Reform Projects appear listed in more than one category or area-
Collections Act, Area I & IV and Personal Securities Legislation, Areas II
& IV
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Appendix #7
Type of Reform Solutions Proposed
By 17 Final Reports
I. New Legislation-New Statute
(1) Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
(2) Public Trustee Act
(3) Intestate Succession Act
(4) Frustrated Contracts Act
(5) Marriage Partnership Act
(6) Petty Trespass Act
(7) Protection of Property Act
II. Amendments to Existing Statute
(1) Law Reform Advisory Act
(2) Registry Act
(3) Dower & Courtesy Act
III. Replace or Abolish An Existing Act
(1) Regulations Act
(2) Abolition of the Grand Jury
(3) Mechanics / Builders Lien Act
(4) Change of Name Act
(5) Juries Act
(6) Probate Act
(7) Builders Lien Act
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Appendix #8
Unfinished Projects
(1) Limitation of Actions (1972)?
(2) Personal Property Security (1973)
(3) Companies Act (1975)
(4) Illegitimate Children (1975)
(5) Small Claims Act (1974)
(6) Age of Consent to Medical Treatment (1978)
(7) Securities Act (1980)
(8) Occupiers Liability (2nd time) (1980)
(9) Privacy as a Tort (1981)
(10) Conditional Sales Act (1981)
(11) Evidence Act (1981)
(12) Collections Act
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Appendix #9
Criteria Used by the 2nd "Independent" Commission for Project Selection
* Are there biases in the law or in the application of this law based upon race?
* If the laws are criminal or quasi-criminal in nature are the recommendations
of the Marshall Commission being considered?
* Does the law respect the right to freedom of religion?
* Is the law biased against non-Christian faiths or "non-believers"?
* Do these laws specifically refer to marital status?
* Are these laws applied differently to de facto relationships?
* Are there gender biases or does the law discriminate on the basis of sex?
* Is the language gender neutral?
* Are there biases in the present law or its application based upon an
individual's sexual orientation?
* Does this law apply differently to same-sex relationships?
* Are the mentally and physically challenged affected by these laws?
* Does this law affect First Nations persons differently?
* Does provincial law apply at all in light of the federal Indian Act?
* How will the law be dealt with in Native courts (e.g., such as the pilot
project for the Mi'kmaq-based court for Indian Brook Community).
* Are ethnic minorities treated differently by these laws?
* Does the law respect an individual's ethnic or national background?
* Are language rights affected?
* Are the interests of all age groups being considered?
* Is there adequate protection for the rights of children?
* Does the law respect the rights of the aged?
* Are there economic considerations / does this law treat people differently as
a "class"?
* Are there discriminations against individuals on social assistance or the
homeless?
* How does this law affect people who are incarcerated or institutionalized?
* Does the law infringe upon an individual's freedom of association or
freedom of expression?
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Appendix #10
List of Final Reports: 2nd Commission
34 Formal Projects Undertaken By The Commission
25 Final Reports + 1 Report in Progress +
7 Projects Without final Reports + One Background Paper and
Three "Other Related Reports"
(25) Final Reports 2nd Commission
Title Year
(1) Enforcement of Maintenance Obligation 1992
(2) Reform of The Jury System 1994
(3) Domestic Violence 1995
(4) Status of Child Bom Outside Marriage 1995
(5) Adult Guardianship / Advance Health Care Directives 1995
(6) Administrative Justice System (ABC Report) 1997
(7) Matrimonial Property Act 1997
(8) Mortgage Foreclosure & Sale 1998
(9) Probate 1999
(10) Enduring Powers of Attorney 1999
(11) Interim Payment of Damages 2001
(12) Mental Health Provisions of the Hospital Act 2002
(13) Joint Tortfeasors & the Common Law "Release Bar 2002
Rule"
(14) Builders Liens 2003
(15) Wills Act 2003
(16) Privity of Contract (Third Party Rights) 2004
(17) Vextious Litigants 2006
(18) Grandparent-Grandchild Access 2007
(19) Contaminated Sites in N.S. 2009
(20) The Rule Against Perpetuities 2010
(21) Human Rights Act: Seniors Only Housing 2011
(22) Builders Lien 2013
(23) Enforcement of Civil Judgments 2014
(24) Powers of Attorney 2015
(25) Division of Family Property 2017
1 ProIect-In Proress
(1) Intestate Succession
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7 Projects-No Final Report
(1) Human Rights
(2) Electronic Information
(3) Minors Consent to Medical Treatment
(4) Disclosure of Adoption Information
(5) Court Structured Settlements (Background Paper)
(6) Small Claims Court
(7) Civil Procedure Rule 79:08
Other Related Reports
(1) Evaluation of the Nova Scotia Small Claims Court (Final 2009
Report)
(2) A Continuing Need for Law Reform: The Case for the 2001
Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (Final Report)
(3) A Collection of More Than 8 Specific Individual 2004
Research Papers Prepared by Commission Staff for the
Steering Committee of the Judicial Rules Project
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Appendix #11
Type of Reform Recommended
I. New Statutes Recommended
(1) Enforcement of Maintenance Obligations (1994)*
(2) Adult Guardianship-Personal Directives Act (2008)*
II. Replace Old Statute with a New One
(1) Juries Act (1998)*
(2) Matrimonial Property Act (1997)
(3) Mortgage Foreclosure & Sale (1998)
(4) Probate Act (2000)*
(5) Enduring Powers of Attorney (1999)
(6) Builders Liens Act (2004)*
(7) Powers of Attorney (2015)
(8) Division of Family Property (2017)
III. Amend Existing Statutes
(1) Status of Child Bom Outside Marriage (1999)*
Amendments to Interstate Succession Act
(2) Interim Payment of Damages (2001)
(3) Mental Health Provisions of the Hospitals Act (2002)*
(4) Wills Act (2006)*
(5) Vexatious Litigants / Litigation
Amendments to Judicature Act (2009)*
(6) Builders Lien Act (2013)*
(7) Enforcement of Civil Judgments (2014)
(8) Grandparents-Grandchild Access (2012)
Amendments to Maintenance & Custody Act*
IV. Change the Common Law Rule
(1) Joint Tortfeasors and the Common Law "Release Bar Rule" (2002)
(2) Privity of contract-Rights of Third Parties (2004)
(3) Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities (2010)*
V. Other Actions
(1) Domestic Violence-Admin Reforms Recommended Training
Program Initiated (1995)
(2) Administrative Justice System (ABC) (1997)
Government Training Program established for Administrative
Tribunal Members
(3) New Regulations re Contaminated Sites (2013)
Enacted under Environment Act
(4) No Action recommended-Human Rights Act (2011)
Seniors Only Housing
* Indicates reconmendations accepted by the govermnent and legislation/
regulations enacted-12/25 (48%)
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Appendix #12
Length of Projects-Time to Complete
Title Time to Complete
(1) Enforcement of Maintenance Obligation 1 year / 4 months
(July 1991 - November 1992)
(2) Reform of The Jury System 2 years
(July 1992 - June 1994)
(3) Domestic Violence 3 years / 2 months
(December 1991 - February 1995)
(4) Status of Child 2 years / 8 months
(July 1992 - November 1995)
(5) Adult Guardianship 3 years / 5 months
(July 1992 - November 1995)
(6) Administration of Justice (ABC) 5 years / 6 months
(July 1991 - January 1997)
(7) Matrimonial Property 1 year / 9 months
(July 1995 - September 1997)
(8) Mortgage Foreclosure & Sale 3 years /6 months
(July 1995 - September 1998)
(9) Probate Act 2 years / 8 months
(July 1996 - March 1998)
(10) Enduring Powers of Attorney 2 years / 3 months
(June 1997 - September 1999)
(11) Interim Payment of Damages 1 year / 6 months
(August 1999 - January 2001)
(12) Mental Health Provisions of the Hospital Act 4 years / 2 months
(December 1997 - February 2002)
(13) Joint Tortfeasors 5 years
(July 1997 - September 2002)
(14) Builders Liens 3 years / 9 months
(September 1999 - June 2003)
(15) Wills Act 1 year
(January 2003 - November 2003)
(16) Privity of Contract 1 year
(July 2003 - July 2004)
(17) Vexatious Litigants / Litigation 2 years
(May 2004 - April 2006)
(18) Grandparents Access 1 year / 4 months
(January 2006 - May 2007)
(19) Contaminated Sites (Regulations) 2 years
(January 2008 - January 2010)
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(20) Rule Against Perpetuities 2 years / 3 months
(September 2008 - December 2010)
(21) Seniors Only Housing 1.3 months
(March2010 -April 2011)
(22) Builders Liens 3 years
(March 2010 - March 2013)
(23) Enforcement of Civil Judgments 5 years / 2 months
(July 2009 - August 2014)
(24) Enduring Powers of Attorney 5 years / 5 months
(March 2010 - August 2015)
(25) Division of Family Property 5 years / 6 months
(April 2012 - September 2017)
Average length of time to complete a project 2.9
years
447
448 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Appendix #12(a)
Government References
Time to Complete
Title Time to Complete
(1) Administrative Justice (ABC) 5 years / 6 months
(July 1991 - January 1997)
(2) Probate 2 years / 9 months
(July 1996 - March 1999)
(3) Mental Health Provisions of the Hospital Act 4 years / 2 months
(December 1997 - February 2002)
(4) Grandparents Access 1 year / 4 months
(January 2006 - May 2007)
(5) Contaminated Sites (Regulations) 2 years
(January 2008 - December 2009)
(6) Perpetuities Rule Abolition 2 years / 3 months
(September 2008 - December 2010)
(7) Seniors Only Housing 1 year / 1 month
(March 2010 - April 2011)
(8) Builders Liens 3 years
(March 2010 - March 2013)
(9) Enforcement of Civil Judgments 5 years / 2 months
(July 2009 - August 2014)
(10) Enduring Powers of Attorney 5 years / 5 months
(March 2010 - August 2015)
Average time to complete 2.5 years
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Appendix #12(b)
Non-Government References
Time to Complete
Title Time to Complete
(1) Enforcement of Maintenance Orders 1 year / 4 months
(July 1991 -November 1992)
(2) The Jury System 2 years
(July 1992 - June 1994)
(3) Domestic Violence 3 years / 2 months
(December 1991 - February 1995)
(4) Status of the Child 2 years / 8 months
(July 1992 - March 1995)
(5) Adult Guardianship 3 years / 5 months
(July 1992 - November 1995)
(6) Matrimonial Property 1 year / 9 months
(July 1995 - March 1997)
(7) Mortgage Foreclosure & Sale 3 years / 6 months
(July 1995 - September 1998)
(8) Enduring Powers of Attorney 2 years / 3 months
(June 1997 - September 1999)
(9) Interim Payments of Damages 1 year / 6 months
(August 1999 - January 2001)
(10) Joint Tortfeasors 5 years
(July 1997 - September 2002)
(11) Builders Liens 3 years / 9 months
(September 1999 - June 2003)
(12) Wills Act 1 year
(January 2003 - November 2003)
(13) Privity of Contract 1 year
(July 2003 - July 2004)
(14) Vexatious Litigants 2 years
(May 2004 - April 2006)
(15) Division of Family Property 5 years / 6 months
Average time to complete projects 2.6 years
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Appendix #13
Areas of Law Reformed
I. Family Law-12 Projects
(1) Enforcement of Maintenance Orders
(2) Domestic Violence
(3) Status of the Child
(4) Adult Guardianship
(5) Living Wills
(6) Division of Family Property
(7) Enduring Powers of Attorney
(8) Minors Consent to Medical Treatment
(9) Wills Act
(10) Intestate Succession
(11) Mental Health Provisions of the Hospital Act
(12) Grandparents Access to Grandchildren
II. Administration of Justice-9 Projects
(1) Administrative Law Refonn
(2) Enforcement of Maintenance Orders
(3) Domestic Violence
(4) Juries Act
(5) Probate Act
(6) Vexatious Litigants
(7) Small Claims Court
(8) Civil Procedure Rules
(9) Interim Payment of Damages
III. Other Areas-8 Projects
(1) Human Rights
(2) Electronic Infonnation
(3) Mortgage Remedies
(4) Mechanics Liens
(5) Privity of Contract
(6) Rule Against Perpetuities
(7) Seniors Only Housing
(8) Contaminated Sites (Regulations)
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Appendix #14
Reasons for Reform
I. To Make Administration of Justice More Effective & Efficient-10
Projects
(1) ABC Report-Administrative Tribunals
(2) Juries Act
(3) Reform of the Probate Act
(4) Interim Payment of Damages
(5) Court Structured Settlements
(6) Civil Procedure Rules Reform
(7) Vexatious Litigants
(8) Small Claims Court
(9) Enforcement of Civil Judgments
(10) Civil Procedure Rules
II. To Modernize Outdated Statutes-14 Projects
(1) Probate Act
(2) Mental Health Provisions of the Hospital Act
(3) Abolition of Rule Against Perpetuities
(4) Builders Lien Act
(5) Powers of Attorney Act
(6) Status of the Child
(7) Adult Guardianship
(8) Electronic Information
(9) Intestate Succession
(10) Division of Family Property
(11) Adoption Information
(12) Contaminated Sites Regulations
(13) Seniors Only Housing
(14) Civil Procedure rules
III. Administrative Enforcement or Application of Statutory Provisions
Need Reform
(1) Enforcement of Maintenance Orders
(2) Domestic Violence
(3) Human Rights
IV. Need to Amend or Abolish & Current Common Law Rule-3
Projects
(1) Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities
(2) Tortfeasors Act
(3) Third Party Rights Under Contract-Privity of Contract
V. Need to Clarify the Law or Provide Additional Remedies or
Options-3 Projects
(1) Living Wills
(2) Mortgage Remedies
(3) Minors Consent to Medical Procedures
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Appendix #15
Funding Contribution History
Year Total Total NS Gov't LF Contribution
Expenses Revenues (% of total Revenue) (% of total Revenue)
1991-1992 $194,409 $293,289 $200,000 68% $87,500 30%
(14 months)
1992-1993 $290,133 $253,797 $150,000 59% $100,000 39%
1993-1994 $293,488 $318,577 $159,3002 50% $150,000 47%
1994-1995 $283,482 $232,520 $152,500 66% $75,000 32%
1995-1996 $273,661 $256,027 $150,000 59% $100,000 39%
1996-1997 $238,327 $278,058 $150,000 54% $125,000 45%
1997-1998 $206,857 $203,037 $200,000 99% 0 0%
1998-1999 $221,264 $204,434 $150,000 73% $50,000 24%
1999-2000 $213,773 $192,674 $150,000 78% $40,000 21%
2000-2001 $240,719 $254,309 $150,000 60% $100,000 39%
2001-2002 $250,517 $251,226 0 0% $250,000 99%
2002-2003 $239,581 $250,287 0 0% $250,000 99%
2003-2004 $252,753 $250,323 0 0% $250,000 99%
2004-2005 $275,185 $256,118 $130,075 51% $125,000 49%
2005-2006 $288,066 $279,192 $125,000 57% $125,000 45%
$34,500
2006-2007 279,718.41 $304,312 $150,000 54% $140,308 46%
$14,000
2007-2008 $314,134 $294,875 $147,425 50% $147,425 50%
2008-2009 $339,715 $369,456 $170,00 54% $167,278 45%
$30,000
2009-2010 $338,563 $353,009 $184,824 52% $167,728 48%
2010-2011 $348,798 $334,576 $184,824 55% $142,325 43%
2011-2012 $293,081 $329,024 $184,824 55% $142,325 43%
2012-2013 $301,451 $292,144 $184,824 63% $106,744 37%
2013-2014 $296,903 $297,086 $184,824 63% $106,744 37%
2014-2015 $302,244 $292,842 $184,824 63% $106,744 37%
2015-2016 $276,732 $288,894 $184,824 66% $96,070 34%
2016-20173 $155,335 $85,214 0 0 $84,914 100%
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NOTES:
The Commission's fiscal year runs from April 1st to March 31st. The Commission began
operations inFebruary 1991. It received amounts of $50,000 from the NS Governmentt, and $50,000
from the LF to cover the months of February and March 1991. These amounts were followed by grants
of $150,000 and $37,000 respectively, to finance the 1991-1992 fiscal year.
2 $150,000 was granted by the NS Department of Justice, and $9,300 was received from the
Office of the Executive Counsel. In every other year, the NS Department of Justice provided all of
the Commission's NS government funding. Not separately identified in the table is a $7,000 grant in
1993-94 from the federal Department of Justice. This was the only occasion on which the commission
received a grant other than from the NS Governmentt or the LF.
3 The government of Nova Scotia contributed funds to the Commission for 22 of the 26 years
between 1991 and 2017 in the amount of $3,706,268.00 for ayearly average of $168,466.00.
The Law Foundation of Nova Scotia contributed funds to the Commission for 25 of the 26 years
between 1991 and 2017 in the amount of $3,234,655.00, for ayearly average of $129,326.00.
The average yearly budget contribution provided by the Nova Scotia Government and the
Law Foundation amounted to $266,958.00, approximately 10 percent below the notional budget of
$300,000.00 as originally planned.
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Appendix #16
Members of the First Panel of Commissioners
of the 1st Law Reform Advisory Commission
(1) Hon. Chief Justice Gordon Cooper (Chair)
(2) Hon. Justice Gordon Hart
(3) Arthur Moreira, Q.C.
(4) Lome 0. Clarke, Q.C.
(5) Lilias Toward
(6) R. MacLeod Rogers, Q.C.
(7) F. Murray Fraser
(8) L.J. Hayes
(9) Peter G. Green
(10) J. Gerald Godsoe
(11) Graham D. Walker, Secretary and Executive Officer (Legislative
Counsel)
